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Post-industrial waterfront redevelopment refers to the transformation from the
Keynesian-Fordist industrial landscape to the post-industrial service-based waterfront
(Vormann, 2014). Neoliberal financial devolution has empowered local development
coalitions to tap into local financial resources by leveraging private investment.
Coalitions made up of city hall and private sector actors may be considered as urban
development regimes that can utilize their institutional resources to make potent
governing decisions (Stone, 1989).
This research focuses on the financing of waterfront redevelopment projects in
Chinese port cities under neoliberalism. The study examines Qingdao Olympic
Sailing Centre as an example of how such urban development coalitions function to
promote waterfront redevelopment projects, and by extension, to understand how
post-industrial waterfront redevelopment is pursued in Chinese port cities. In addition
to the Sailing Centre, the relocation of Beihai Shipyard exemplifies how
post-industrial waterfront redevelopment, in conjunction with the effect of
gentrification, shapes the neoliberal urban landscape. The financing story of the
Qingdao Olympic Sailing Centre is explored as a case study of entrepreneurial urban
redevelopment strategy, and this study uncovers the process to present how an urban
development coalition extracts land value from entrepreneurial strategies amid the
trend of neoliberalism.
How the Chinese urban growth coalitions, made up of the local city halls and private
developers, conduct city redevelopment projects in an entrepreneurial way via
mobilizing market elements and land resources to avoid the conventional budget
public financing has been missing in past literature. Hence, the discussion about the
financing of the waterfront redevelopment projects in the second-tier Chinese port
cities contributes to filling the literature gap of how the second-tier Chinese cities
conduct great-mega projects through off-budget financial instruments.
Keywords: Post-industrial waterfront redevelopment, neoliberalism, urban regime
theory, growth machine theory, financing, case studies, Chinese port cities
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1. Introduction
1.1 The Introduction of the Study
If you asked a Canadian to name 10 Chinese cities for 10 dollars, I would bet that
99 percent of all Canadians would not able to get the 10 dollars. And, likely, they
probably only know fewer than five Chinese cities. This is not to say that Canadians
are bad at geography, but that the world is changing fast.
By 2017, China had more than 100 cities with a population of more than one
million, including 13 cities with a population of more than 10 million. Today, many
cities in China are unknown in the West but have sizeable economies and populations.
If you visit these cities, you are likely to be amazed by their skylines.
Apart from the famous municipalities such as Beijing and Shanghai that are
directly under the control of central government, these big cities are generally divided
into two categories: inland provincial capitals, and coastal cities that enjoy some
aspects of the policies regarding special economic zones.
The Chinese port cities are generally different from the inland provincial capitals
known for being an aggregation of resources and population. For example, the inland
provincial capitals are the centres of educational resources (most universities in a
province are concentrated in the provincial capitals) and medical resources (the best
hospitals in a province are generally concentrated in the provincial capitals). The
inland provincial capitals are perceived by the general public to be the favoured
beneficiaries of policies; sometimes this is criticized as an after-effect of the planned
economy via favouritism and patronage. In contrast, China’s coastal cities are
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characterized by a developed market economy. They thrive because of their access to
sea and maritime trade, and they have the characteristics of an export-oriented
economy.
China’s coastal cities have played an important and irreplaceable role in
economic development in the past 40 years since China’s reform and opening up.
They are the leading geese (an economic geography metaphor to describe how Japan
led the development of the newly industrialized countries (Hayter & Edgington, 2003))
of China’s economy and have very distinct characteristics of neoliberalism.
Nevertheless, the underpinning political forces and theoretical foundation
propelling Chinese port cities’ development have not been systematically analyzed
and summarized by scholars, nor has the role of the redevelopment coalitions—the
main stakeholders of carrying out development schemes in Chinese port cities—been
researched. The waterfront redevelopment coalitions driving change in Chinese port
cities have distinctive Chinese characteristics. Therefore, it is necessary to undertake
an empirical study of the driving force behind redevelopment of these real estate
flagship projects, with appropriately and critically applied theories of western
sociology and urban geography to illuminate the processes of Chinese port city
redevelopment. The aim of this dissertation is to help readers to compare the
development mode of waterfront redevelopment projects in China’s coastal cities with
similar projects in western cities.
This project concentrates on Qingdao as an example of the post-industrial
redevelopment processes operating in Chinese coastal cities. And the Olympic Sailing
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Centre of Qingdao serves as an excellent example of how industrial relocation is
related to the service sector’s post-industrial redevelopment. That is why I am using it
as a case study to investigate the financing and development regime building in
waterfront redevelopment in Chinese port cities under neoliberalism.
What I would like to introduce to the readers is the current form of the port city of
Qingdao by analyzing the evolution of the neoliberal urban redevelopment regime and
its history of property-led economic development in the city. Moreover, I make a
comparison between the commercial centre in Qingdao’s old town, the Zhongshan
Road Commercial Street, and the emerging Central Business District (CBD), Qingdao
Olympic Sailing Centre Business Circle. This comparison aims to illuminate the
evolution and the composition of the development regime/governing coalition of the
Qingdao Olympic Sailing Centre. Second, by analyzing the development of the
Qingdao Olympic Sailing Centre, I evaluate how various financial instruments were
developed and have evolved amid the financing of the Olympic Sailing Centre project.
In addition to that, I examine how the governing coalition is formed and how the
Qingdao municipal government cuts deals with private developers to facilitate
financing of the project. This information is important because it unveils how private
finance is solicited by state actors to participate in the financing of waterfront
redevelopment projects in Chinese port cities, all within a neoliberal context.
Moreover, a preliminary background introduction of where the redevelopment
story takes place: Qingdao: During the past thirty-five years, Qingdao has been going
through rapid local economic growth, the change of urban built environment, and the
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shift of urban spatial structure. This, almost like a city’ s rebirth story, is undergirded
by endogenous and exogenous factors.
First of all, the intrinsic causes can be attributed to the intrinsic characteristics of
the city, which is chiefly the city’s neoliberal traits and the entrepreneurial spirits that
the city’s residents inherited from the history of the city and its hinterland region.
Namely, the industrial history of Qingdao starts with the colonial heritage. Qingdao’s
current industrial pattern is featured by the industrial foundation built by the German
pioneer settlers. Moreover, the Japanese entrepreneurs kept expanding the textile
manufacturing industries based on the German foundation. During the post-1949
communist revolution era, under the guidance of import-substitution policy, the
central government developed heavy industries in Qingdao. And after the 1979
neoliberal open policy, new economic and industrial formats emerged in Qingdao.
Many appliance manufacturing enterprises, including Haier and Hisense, ushered the
trend of foreign trade economy under the export-oriented development strategies.
Moreover, some high-end equipment manufacturing industries have also developed
rapidly. The detailed introduction and evaluation of the neoliberal uniqueness of the
city will be unfolded in Chapter four.
Secondly, the external factors also contribute to the neoliberal shift and change of
the city’ s built environment/spatial structure. In brief, the national neoliberal reform
entails the introduction of a tax-sharing system and a land-leasing system. The newly
introduced tax-sharing system allows the municipal governments to retain most of
their land-based revenues; therefore, they are motivated to propel property-led
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economic development and expect to extract value from that. The new land leasing
system established by the neoliberal reform stipulates that land use rights could be
traded in the market. Hence, also due to the strong domestic demand and the boom of
the private housing market, these exogenous factors have also paved the way for the
emergence of projects such as Olympic Sailing center redevelopment in second-tier
cities in China. Last but not least, the detailed implications of the effects of these
exogenous factors in the second-tier Chinese cities will be introduced in the following
chapters (Chapter 5).
1.2 Study Goals
By studying the development process of Qingdao Olympic Sailing Centre, the
study goals aim to generalize the regime building of waterfront redevelopment
projects in Chinese port cities, to understand the outcomes and efficiency of the
Chinese urban growth coalitions, and to unveil the financial instruments that underpin
the financing of such redevelopment projects. Also, I have analyzed the general rules
of the development coalition building of waterfront revitalization projects in Chinese
port cities from the following perspectives. I explicitly examine the regulatory
boundaries of government in the regime (the roles of government). Moreover, I
explain how the neoliberal roll-back destructs the Keynesian-Fordism regulatory
landscape and how civic cooperation results in the transfer of government’s function.
How does the localization of regulatory power happen? And how do institutional
innovations and neoliberal roll-out creations lead to the transformation of the regime
so that the private sector becomes the principal part of the regime and plays a leading
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role, while the government plays an auxiliary role, like its counterpart in the U.S.? It
is essential to understand how the public and private partnerships function in
waterfront redevelopment projects in Chinese port cities, because it reflects neoliberal
entrepreneurial urban governance.
Another goal of the study is to examine how the waterfront redevelopment
projects are financed and what entrepreneurial urban redevelopment strategies are
used to extract value from the redevelopment projects. Furthermore, the study has
been designed to elucidate how the unfolding of the regime and the financing stories
of the waterfront redevelopment projects reflect the rationales of neoliberalism.
Therefore, my work will contribute to the current literature about how urban
redevelopment projects (especially the waterfront flagship projects) in the second-tier
Chinese port cities reflect the formation of the growth coalition of the actually
existing neoliberalism there. Moreover, the discussion about the financing of the
waterfront redevelopment projects in the second-tier Chinese port cities really
contributes to filling the literature gap of how the second-tier (or even including the
first-tier Chinese cities) Chinese cities conduct great-mega projects (in this case,
Qingdao Olympic Sailing Centre) through off-budget financial instruments. How
these Chinese urban growth coalitions, made up of the local city halls and private
developers, conduct city redevelopment projects in an entrepreneurial way via
mobilizing market elements and land resources to avoid the conventional budget
public financing (government allocation) has been missing in past literature.
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Therefore, I intend to help to fill in the gap and analyze what has been missing by
other scholars through evaluating the off-budget financial instruments (the market
mobilization of land resources and the concrete off-budget strategies) tapped by the
entrepreneurial urban governing coalition in the second Chinese port city---Qingdao,
to emphasize the emerging Chinese entrepreneurial neoliberalism that is rising against
the context of the unique Qingdao local situation and the national socialist
background.
1.3 Core Research Questions
In general, there are three core research questions to be answered in this
dissertation. First, I look at whether the waterfront redevelopment projects in Chinese
port cities reflect the transformation from a Keynesian-Fordism industrial waterfront
to the post-industrial service-based city. Second, the study specifies how the
development coalitions function to facilitate the waterfront redevelopment initiatives
in Chinese port cities. Additionally, this study illustrates how the development
coalitions are formed. The third core research question is relevant to the financing of
the projects. It is essential to aware of the concrete off-budget financial instruments
and market ways of mobilizing land resources in the financing of waterfront
redevelopment projects in Chinese port cities.
And lastly, the conclusions of the study show my reflections about what I have
learned from the waterfront redevelopment projects in the Chinese port cities under
the neoliberal context.
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1.4 Brief Review of Each Chapter
The second chapter of the dissertation is the literature review on post-industrial
waterfront redevelopment, neoliberalism, urban regime theory/growth machine theory,
and the financing of urban redevelopment projects. In the third chapter, I examine the
case study as part of the research design, and the constructivist grounded theory
methodologies that are used in the thesis. The chapter later informs readers why I
chose interviews as the strategy for data collection.
The fourth chapter unravels my goals; it tells the readers why Qingdao is an
excellent example of a neoliberal city. I explain the two case studies: the Olympic
Sailing Centre project and the Zhongshan Road Commercial Street, and why they are
suitable for my study’s goals. I first introduce an overview of Qingdao to discuss why
the case is a unique example of the neoliberal city. I start from the basic facts of
Qingdao by comparing its geographical location and history of development. Then I
focus on evaluating Qingdao’s industrial and economic situation before turning to an
explanation of the city’s neoliberal experiences. Moreover, I elucidate Qingdao’s
economic structure and the main pillar industries of the city nowadays. Furthermore,
the coming paragraphs are about Qingdao’s built environment and the German
colonial impact on the city’s landscape. It should be noted that, compared with other
colonial coastal cities in China, only in a city like Qingdao, where a unitary German
presence once dominated and where communities were segregated by functions and
ethnicity, can urban design fully reach its ideal form. The German legacy has laid the
foundation for the urban pattern of old town areas in Qingdao, and more than a
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century ago the Zhongshan Road was booming due to this master plan. The only
German impact meant that German colonists could plan and manage the Qingdao area
uniformly, unlike in Shanghai, where different colonists only managed a part of the
city, resulting in differences in the city’s functions.
Moreover, the industrial history of Qingdao also has the colonial heritage.
Qingdao’s industrial foundation is built by the German industrialists in the early 20th
century. Afterwards, the Japanese businessmen expanded Qingdao’s textile
manufacturing industries based on the German foundation. After the Chinese
communists came to power since 1949, under the guidance of import-substitution
policy, the communist regime developed heavy industries in Qingdao.
After that, I highlight the burgeoning economic growth of Qingdao since Deng
Xiaoping’s neoliberal reform. It is because of development after the reform and
opening up that Qingdao has established its position on China’s economic map. The
later chapters examine the development of entrepreneurship in Qingdao and
emphasize the real estate industry’s importance in the city. I also illustrate the
influence of administrative division on public and private partnership and property-led
economic development. The post-1978 Chinese reform has seen the transfer of power
and resources to the regional administrative authorities. Due to this neoliberal
rescaling of state, the Qingdao local government has relatively strong
decision-making power and more responsibility by absorbing the devolved central
government fiscal and administrative powers. In addition to that, the land and housing
reforms have been the catalysts for neoliberal property-led redevelopment in Qingdao.
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Then, I introduce the two case studies: Qingdao Olympic Sailing Centre and the
declining Zhongshan Road Commercial Street. By studying the physical
transformation of Qingdao Olympic Sailing Centre and comparing its business circle
to Zhongshan Road Commercial Street, this study evaluates why some waterfront
redevelopment projects succeed and others fail.
The fifth chapter presents results of the interviews on Beihai Shipyard, Olympic
Sailing Centre, Zhongshan Road Commercial Street, and the Evolution of the Growth
Coalition of Olympic Sailing Centre. From my interviews, I was able to determine
that the development in Olympic Sailing Centre reflects the roll-back destruction of
Keynesianism and the roll-out neoliberalism of institutional creation. Analyzing the
interview data also allowed me to determine that these cases reflect the neoliberal
entrepreneurial urban governance and the specific financial instruments used to
finance the Olympic Sailing Centre project. Moreover, my interviewees’ answers
helped me to understand the financing details of the Olympic Sailing Centre project
and how the market mobilization of the seven pieces of land helped to recover the
investment. Based on what one interviewee told me, I analyze how the market is
empowered by optimizing/improving the functions of new government institutions.
The interviews also helped me to analyze the fiscal/administrative decentralization
explicitly. Through the interviews, I learned of the difficulties involved in revitalizing
the Zhongshan Road Commercial Street.
Another interviewee tells the story of how the separation of business function and
administrative function happened. Then, the Chinese growth coalitions’ deep and
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close ties with governments are revealed when state-owned development enterprises
entered the Chinese real estate market. Indeed, the development of the local economy
is the performance criterion of Chinese government officials. From what we discussed,
I make a comparison with urban renewal in the U.S. I reveal the characteristics of the
Chinese growth coalition and the nature of the Chinese growth coalition by examining
the roles/orientations of public, private, and state-owned development enterprises.
By studying the empirical case of the financing and development regime building
of the Qingdao Olympic Sailing Centre (and its business circle), this study also
exemplifies how an industrial site has transformed itself into a service-oriented
post-industrial waterfront.
In a nutshell, the Chinese growth system has been stimulated by the fiscal
decentralization/devolution that gives municipalities new autonomy. What is more,
the birth of the market economy, the establishment of the real estate market after the
1980s reform, and the huge land-based profits generated by property investment all
lead to the birth of Chinese growth coalitions. Together the growth coalitions bring
new urban landscapes and economic growth. In turn, local economic development is
the motivation for local government, state-owned enterprises, and the private sector to
form a growth coalition. And the burgeoning urban economy makes Chinese cities the
growth engine of the national economy.
Some interviewees believe that the current Chinese model of social regulation is
not neoliberalism. They insist that the Chinese Communist Party and government
dominate the political life of Chinese people. I can thus comprehend that the
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state-owned development enterprise is the primary promoter of urban redevelopment
projects. Furthermore, the limited level of market-oriented operation is guided by the
government and participated in by private sectors’ capital. Therefore, I understand
that the urban redevelopment in Qingdao is conducted through the market-oriented
operation with the municipal government’s supervision. Others believe that the
current Chinese urban management model is neoliberalism, confirming that the reason
for fostering business activities and the city’s civic life is to facilitate entrepreneurial
urban governance. And the ultimate goal is to extract value from land-based
speculative activities.
I argue that the current Chinese model of social regulation is intrinsically
neoliberal entrepreneurial urban governance, and I disagree with the viewpoint that
the current urban redevelopment model in Chinese cities is to “serve the people.”
I deepened my understanding of how the redevelopment of the Olympic Sailing
Centre project is led by the municipal government and state-owned development
companies. An illustration from one of my interviewees’ description is that the
growth coalition in the Olympic Sailing Centre project is constituted by the municipal
government, state-owned development enterprise (Dong’ao Corporation), and private
developers. The municipal government controlled the land resources, and the
state-owned development enterprise (Dong’ao Corporation) was responsible for
leasing the land and mobilizing land resources in a market-oriented approach.
Therefore, they are the primary stakeholders. In contrast, the Chinese private sectors
in second-tier Chinese cities are only responsible for concrete property development;
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they have no voice amid the development decision-making process, unlike their
American counterparts. Nonetheless, the Chinese growth coalition is effective and
efficient because of its close ties with the government.
14
2. Literature Review
The literature review chapter consists of three sections (sub-chapters):
post-industrial waterfront redevelopment, the conceptual framework of urban
development coalitions, and the financing tools of urban redevelopment projects. The
concepts of post-industrial development, neoliberalism, urban regime theory and
growth machine theory are introduced in the following fractions in this section. The
theories above are central to answer my overall research questions in terms of laying
the theoretical foundation for and working up to the empirical case study analysis.
Each sub-section (2.1, 2.2, and 2.3) corresponds to each research question:
sub-section 2.1 evaluates literature that helps us understand whether the waterfront
redevelopment projects in Chinese port cities reflect the transformation from
Keynesian-Fordism industrial waterfront to the post-industrial service-based city.
Sub-section 2.2 specifies how development coalitions function, in order to provide the
conceptual tools to understand the actors that have facilitated waterfront
redevelopment initiatives in Chinese port cities. Additionally, this section illustrates
how the development coalitions are formed. The literature that is relevant to the third
core research question is analyzed in sub-section 2.3, which is relevant to the projects’
financing: the concrete off-budget financial instruments and the market ways of
mobilizing land resources to finance the waterfront redevelopment projects in Chinese
port cities.
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2.1 Post-industrial Waterfront Redevelopment and Neoliberalism
The first sub-research question I am trying to answer in this section (2.1) is: whether
the waterfront redevelopment projects in Chinese port cities reflect the transformation
from Keynesian-Fordism industrial waterfront to the post-industrial service-based
city.
Although a vast amount of literature exists on urban waterfront redevelopment,
most of it focuses on Europe and North America. But, in contrast, barely any scholars
have applied the theories to Chinese port cities. Therefore, I review the existing
literature to introduce the theoretical prerequisite for using them in a Chinese context.
To address my first core research question, I believe that the Qingdao Olympic
Sailing Centre project reflects the transformation from a Keynesian-Fordism
industrial waterfront to a post-industrial service-based city. The experiences in North
America and Europe introduced in volumes such as Transforming Urban
Waterfronts and Global Port Cities in North America could help us understand
China’s current waterfront redevelopment boom.
According to Desfor and Laidley (2011), waterfront redevelopment initiatives are
significant because they are the critical components of twenty-first-century urban
development. The waterfront redevelopment investments are designed to transform
derelict waterfront industrial sites into “communities of hope” (Desfor & Laidley,
2011, p. 3) to facilitate sustainable urban economies. Therefore, the goals of
waterfront redevelopment initiatives are to revive the older inner-city port areas.
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Nevertheless, we need to understand everything relevant to the maritime ports and the
politics of North American and European ports that may serve as precedents for us to
understand what is going on in China.
2.1.1. Disconnection between Port and City
My argument is that the “twin revolution” of containerization and neoliberal
reform has promoted Chinese port cities’ transformation during the past forty years.
Chinese port cities have experienced the transformation from a Keynesian-Fordism
industrial landscape to a post-industrial service-oriented development mode. Amid
this transformation process, many cities’ inner-city and downtown working harbours
have moved to urban fringes, becoming container ports. I agree with the author, and
my study contributes to conducting a systematic analysis about the retreat of
manufacturing industries from inner-city working harbours. Thus, there has been a
disconnection between ports and the downtown areas in many cities, which means
that the container ports are no longer located within cities’ boundaries. For example,
Qingdao’s and Dalian’s container ports have moved to the metropolitan regions’
peripheral areas where the water is deep and large container ships can be moored.
Deindustrialization, moreover, facilitates neoliberalism. In turn, neoliberalism has
facilitated the process of deindustrialization due to creative destruction. However, the
disconnection between port and a city’s downtown unexpectedly enhances the
connection between container ports and cities’ vast hinterlands. For example, after the
relocation of Qingdao’s container ports to Huangdao Qianwangang, the economic ties
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between Qingdao’s new container port and rural hinterland were enhanced and
strengthened.
For almost half a century, with the development of containerization and the
introduction of shipping innovation, the phenomenon of disconnection has occurred.
Disconnection refers to the change of physical, economic, and institutional
relationships between ports and their cities (Hall & Clark, 2011). Thus, the changes in
the maritime industry (such as containerization) are also linked to changes to the
waterfront that then affect cities through various processes, including disconnection.
Schubert (2011) argues that technological innovations such as containerization have
made port container terminals extend more and more to the tidal water (farther out
from land). The location of container port facilities, then, moves far away from the
shallow and narrow port in the city’s downtown traditional maritime trade core.
During the boom of the global information economy, the new land-use activities
began to flourish, promoting the tendencies of “from ships to chips” (Schubert, 2011).
According to Schubert (2011), waterfront redevelopment is significant because the
waterfront provides space for cities to transform into a post-industrial society. Since
the waterfront is generally the location of the cargo distribution centre, the
transportation of the waterfront area is convenient. Therefore, the waterfront exerts a
significant impact on the “socio-cultural changes and spatial restructuring process”
(Schubert, 2011, p. 75). Additionally, Schubert (2011) illustrates the transformation of
a small-scale, project-oriented waterfront to a regional perspective by using the
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conversion of London Docklands’ to Thames Gateway as an example (Schubert,
2011).
The disconnection between central city and the city’s port is embodied in the
change of coastal configuration. Due to containerization, the vessels become more
massive. Accordingly, more spacious channels are needed, as well as more convenient
land transportation to be able to adapt to the larger container ships. And the
downtown port urban use is incompatible with the container terminals. Thus, the port
facilities move away from the city’s core to the remote location and upgrade to
large-scale port container terminals. In this way, the cargo ports are relocated
downstream and far away from the traditional ocean- and river-front locations, so the
city’s traditional maritime trade core becomes blighted (Hall & Clark, 2011). In this
vein, Vormann (2018) argues that the process of deindustrialization was promoted and
accelerated by the neoliberal political realignment. The derelict harbour spaces are
symbols of the declining American inner cities. Similar stories have also happened in
Chinese cities. For example, the Beihai Shipyard relocation in Qingdao was to
accommodate the construction of larger ships to fit the twenty-first century’s
shipbuilding demand. In a similar way, the industrial ports are disconnected from the
city-region economically because the previous economic benefits of the port economy
have been geographically dispersed due to the relocation of container terminals. The
port economy is no longer closely associated with the (central) city economy. In
contrast, container ports’ economic benefits extend to the broader inland region
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because of the relocation of container ports to the inland area and the enlargement of
container vessels.
In addition to the economic disconnection, there is also an important phenomenon
called institutional disconnection, which means the decision-making power has been
moved up to the national and global levels from the local level. And one of the
reasons that port managers face increasing difficulties in gaining local support for
seaport development is that the economic benefits have been transferred from local
port communities to the “widely spatially dispersed carriers, shippers, and final
customers” (Hall & Clark, 2011, p. 21). In contrast, global private shipping interests
are playing more important roles in the local port decision-making (Hall & Clark,
2011).
In the case of Vancouver’s port, many reasons are contributing to the institutional
and economic disconnection. The federal government’s administration of the port
leads to the institutional disconnection, whereas the economic disconnection between
the port and city is caused by the exportation of natural resources linking overseas
markets to the hinterland rather than Vancouver’s real economy (Hall & Clark, 2011).
Therefore, Vancouver’s development is no longer a local issue but a national one
because the natural resource exportation business stimulates the container terminal’s
enlargement, which has many things to do with the national interests. The Roberts
Bank coal terminal development has surpassed the traditional confines of the urban
core and connects Greater Vancouver’s metropolitan area with the rural hinterland.
This means the development of a deepwater container terminal at Roberts Bank has
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involved people and port activities from extra-local regions (Hall & Clark, 2011). Still,
the city and port eventually reconnect through the continuous infrastructure
investment provided by the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council (GVGC) and the
enactment of marine, trade, and tourism policies. This also ensures that there will be
constant container flows for the port of Vancouver. The city and port therefore get
reconnected through the mechanism.
Moreover, the concentration and dispersion of port activities are associated with
the changing spatial distribution of advanced service sectors such as FIRE (finance,
insurance, and real estate) industries (Hall & Clark, 2011). Hall and Clark (2011)
further argue that the decision of infrastructure investment in Vancouver results from
a political contest between the port and city region. So, the city-region is the crucial
interface where reconnection occurs. This is somehow resonating with Brenner and
Theodore’s (2002) idea that cities are essential in actually existing neoliberalism
because cities are where creative destruction and speculation of financial capital
happen particularly intensely. This research’s primary study site, Qingdao, has unique
neoliberal traits due to its particular colonial heritage and export-oriented economy. I
introduce and emphasize it in the following chapters.
In general, it is deceptive to think that disconnection and waterfront politics are
confined to localized contests about property redevelopment and access to sites
previously industrial, because waterfront politics is regional and extra-local. And the
marine terminal activities could only be more efficient when the working waterfront
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and metro hinterland are closely associated. Therefore, the working waterfront
increasingly has more regional characteristics (Hall & Clark, 2011).
All in all, there are mainly three reasons contributing to the local reconnection: (1)
the rise of Vancouver’s local market, (2) a steady growth of flows of container cargo,
and (3) different types of gateway strategies. However, the essence of this local
reconnection dynamic is that community interests are dominated by global capital
interests and extra-local ones. The Vancouver port interests have overlooked the
“local political engagement in favour of federal and inter-provincial relationship” to
“secure an increasingly regional ‘space of dependence’” (Hall & Clark, 2011, p. 32).
Moreover, this reconnection between ports and cities and local communities
dominated by global interests as the result of a rising local market, facilitating
container flows, and gateway strategies has happened in port cities in the West in
general. And this is an application of Kevin Cox’s idea of spaces of dependence and
spaces of engagement: people rely on spatialized social relations against the broader
global context to realize their essential interests (Cox, 1998). Cox’s theory is linked to
the state rescaling/neoliberal devolution introduced in the neoliberal theory fraction of
the literature review chapter.
2.1.2. Neoliberalism and Waterfront Redevelopment
Many Chinese port cities’ waterfront redevelopment projects deeply reflect the
rationales of neoliberal reform. These project-oriented waterfront transformations are
regarded as essential within neoliberal rationale, not only because they are the
flagship projects of their cities, but also because they are the iconic developments
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across the region. The previous derelict industrial waterfront’s transformation
initiatives manifest the collapse of the Fordist industrial city and post-industrial
service-oriented redevelopment. For example, the relocation of Beihai Shipyard and
the Olympic Sailing Centre project’s redevelopment exemplify this transformation
process.
Schubert’s article (2011) mainly explains how to transform a small-scale and
project-oriented waterfront to a regional perspective of waterfront transformation. In
the case of London Docklands’ transformation to Thames Gateway, the
semi-autonomous organizations were utilized to prevent the time-consuming
democratic decision-making and to accelerate building permissions. Most of the
Docklands’ redevelopment initiatives were property and office-led redevelopments,
and the redevelopment initiatives were developed against the context of privatization,
deregulation, neoliberalism, and marketization (Schubert, 2011). Hackworth (2007)
also believes that neoliberalism is deeply rooted in individualism, the market, and the
non-interventionist state. In addition to that, from the Qingdao Olympic Sailing
Centre redevelopment project I discuss in the following chapters, we can see that the
Qingdao Olympic Sailing Centre initiative shares some neoliberal traits as elaborated
by Schubert (2011): privatization and marketization. Nonetheless, deregulation
resulted in fragmentation and polarization. The detailed outcomes of neoliberal
deregulation are explored later. The tax relief was used to leverage private capital.
Besides the privatization of planning, developers also started cooperating with the
government. Weber (2002) explains that the neoliberal downward shift of states’
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financial power has made municipalities tap into local property tax revenues to rely
on the private real estate market. Sagalyn (2007) emphasizes that this transition from
grantsmanship to deal-makingship restructures city officials and developers’
relationships. My study conforms to Sagalyn’s emphasis here. And my study presents
that although the Qingdao Olympic Sailing Centre’s financing still received financial
support from the municipal government (for the financing of the relocation of the
Beihai Shipyard part), the local public authority has also become businesslike and
actively negotiated with the private developers.
Moreover, private developers have transformed the previous empty and derelict
warehouses into expensive lofts and offices. And there are no longer any empty
warehouses in the Olympic Sailing Centre area. The industrial relics have been
replaced by luxury shopping malls, office buildings, and skyscrapers. The booming
economy has made the previously isolated and fragmented part of the city become
“regionally oriented sustainable development” (Schubert, 2011, p. 79).
Schubert (2011) concludes that the redevelopment of a derelict harbour
exemplifies transforming a Fordist industrial city into a post-industrial
service-oriented city. In the book Global Port Cities in North America, Vormann
(2018) describes how the industrial waterfront was considered by city managers in the
reformative 1980s as the symbol of backwardness and how this industrial polluted
Keynesian-Fordist waterfront transforms itself into a tourist and recreational attraction.
Moreover, the Qingdao Olympic Sailing Centre’s redevelopment case unravels how
the manifestation of a Fordist industrial waterfront (the Beihai Shipyard) develops
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into a post-industrial service-oriented waterfront. And it presents the industrial
upgrading—from ships to chips. Redevelopment of the derelict harbour shows that it
has become part of the large-scale strategic perspective and part of the broader
comprehensive urban and regional integration. Furthermore, these flagship projects
are no longer locally led; rather, they are regionally led and impact regional
development in the long-term (Schubert, 2011). And the urban commercial cores and
CBDs have become the “billboard” of exhibiting neoliberal governance through
constructing great mega flagship projects (Hackworth, 2007, p. 171).
Due to the influence of existing neoliberalism (though the Chinese official
discourse denies the discourse of neoliberalism, one of my interviewees, Zhipeng Li,
is in line with the Chinese official discourse), the market form of development is
based on the roll-back destruction of the Fordist industrial landscape. Thus, the
development of new projects is more like roll-out creation. Peck and Tickell (2002)
believe that roll-out neoliberalism means the reconstitution of state, the reformation of
social regulation (a contrasting concept roll-back destruction is defined and explained
in the following neoliberal paragraphs in the literature review section), and the
building and consolidation of neoliberalized government sectors. Roll-out
neoliberalism also refers to the “neoliberalized economic management, authoritarian
state form, and proactive policies” (Peck & Tickell, 2002, p. 49). All in all, roll-out
neoliberalism exemplifies the rebuilding of state-interventionist, paternalist, and
punitive government disciplines (Peck & Tickell, 2002). Therefore, many projects are
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initiated per the market way (private sector plays a dominant role) under the
neoliberal institutional interventionist.
The sixth chapter of Transforming Urban Waterfront (2011) revisits waterfront
redevelopment dynamics in London Docklands more specifically. In theory, that
waterfront redevelopment is highly market-oriented and impacted by neoliberalism,
which is reflected by the “dominance of market criteria in decision-making”
(Brownill, 2011, p. 129). However, in reality, the redevelopment projects in London
Docklands have the features of state “interventionist agenda” (Brownill, 2011, p. 129),
and this conforms to the rationales of actually existing neoliberalism. Moreover, this
resonates with Brenner and Theodore’s (2002) argument that neoliberal policies
misrepresent the real effect of how neoliberal ideologies should be. Likewise, for the
waterfront redevelopment projects in second-tier Chinese cities such as Qingdao, the
municipal government is always the stakeholder who has the final say. State
interventions were used to create land and property markets, and semi-autonomous
agencies were created to leverage further private investment (Brownill, 2011). The
establishment of the Qingdao Dong’ao Development Corporation is the
semi-autonomous agency created in the Qingdao Olympic Sailing Centre’s case to
facilitate the financing and redevelopment of the waterfront project. The
redevelopment cases of London Docklands, therefore, are typical examples of
roll-back and roll-out neoliberalism. Roll-back neoliberalism refers to the removal of
social welfare and state capacities, and the destruction and dismantling of
Keynesian-welfarist and social-collectivist institutions (Brownill, 2011). Avni and
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Fischler (2020) illustrate that waterfront redevelopment projects worldwide have been
used as showcases of neoliberal entrepreneurial urban governance, and the success of
these redevelopment projects reflects the dominance of corporate interests. And
according to Avni and Fischler (2020), the development dynamics of the waterfronts
are defined by unequal power states. North American municipalities are moving away
from the welfare state toward promoting their cities’ competitive edge amid the
transformation of the Keynesian welfare state to neoliberal entrepreneurial urban
governance. The policies to improve social welfare are replaced by local economic
development policies. Thus, social well-being is neglected amid neoliberal waterfront
redevelopment projects (Avni & Fischler, 2020). In contrast, roll-out neoliberalism is
the construction and consolidation of new state forms, which is manifested by
neoliberalized economic management and authoritarian, paternalistic, and punitive
state forms (Brownill, 2011).
2.1.3. Waterfront Redevelopment Project and Property-led Economic Development
To a large extent, waterfront redevelopment is a form of the property-led
development scheme. Many city managers in the Chinese port cities are accustomed
to using property-led economic development to usher in waterfront redevelopment
projects. And many industrial land uses are up-zoned to commercial and residential
land use. For example, the site of Qingdao Olympic Sailing Centre’s original use was
an industrial shipyard. Furthermore, redevelopment projects such as Olympic Sailing
Centre, as the centre of the city’s CBD, have played a significant role in attracting
tourists and high net-worth individuals to move and live there. In a sense, the CBDs
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and business circles, centred by the waterfront redevelopment projects, have become
the important attractions that are the carriers of high-end development. For example,
in Chengdu, the IFC (international financial centre) in Chunxi Road has been a huge
commercial development hub of business activity. And many spin-off real estate
developments surrounding IFC have been initiated since the IFC became a signature
development project in the Chunxi Road area. By the same token, the Olympic
Sailing Centre project paved the way for a similar development story in Qingdao. The
aforementioned projects all gathered great popularity and promoted the city’s
economic development by facilitating GDP growth and creating job opportunities in
the Qingdao region (this is not contradicted by Logan and Molotch’s [1987] growth
machine theory’s discourse on growth).
Schaller and Novy (2011) talk about how the post-industrial top-down
development agenda accelerates economic growth by designing property-led
economic development. Chapple (2014) believes that property-led economic
development highly relies on private investment and an incremental entrepreneurial
approach, and it is very much market-driven. My research is contrary to Chapple
(2014)’s opinion. In the case of the Qingdao Olympic Sailing Centre project, the
state-owned enterprise and municipal government dominate the local growth coalition.
So my research contributes to building a property-led economic development with
Chinese characteristics in the second-tier Chinese cities. And under the principle of
“The highest and best use,” all property-led economic development projects must be
oriented toward profitability. Therefore, industrial land use should be up-zoned to
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commercial/residential land use. The Qingdao Olympic Sailing Centre’s
redevelopment project exemplifies this rationale of “The highest and best use” to
generate enormous profitability. According to Schaller and Novy (2011), writing
about then-New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg, the Bloomberg Way is the typical
roll-out neoliberalism as the state has played a robust and aggressive role that includes
(1) rezoning, (2) a property-led economic development venture, and (3) improving the
city’s transport infrastructure and expanding/enhancing public space. The overall goal
of these policies was to promote New York’s future population growth, accelerate its
economic development, and propel the city’s attractiveness to investors, tourists, and
high-income earners. Schaller and Novy (2011) describe the deindustrialization
process and the decaying waterfront in New York City and explain how the
dilapidated waterfront became the space of hope for post-industrial growth and
high-end redevelopments. This resonates with Vormann’s (2018) argument that
entrepreneurial strategies have been used to promote post-industrial redevelopment
and economic restructuring. The Qingdao Olympic Sailing redevelopment scheme
manifests the post-industrial economic restructuring by facilitating the dismantling of
deteriorating industrial sites and promoting retail development. What Vormann has
generalized therefore confirms the effectiveness of Bloomberg’s way of revitalizing
the dilapidated waterfront and stimulating central cities’ economies. One of the
prominent features of Bloomberg’s way reconstructed the abandoned industrial
waterfront by initiating projects/property-led regeneration to build marinas, hotels,
office buildings, and apartments so as to build the post-industrial service-oriented
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waterfront (Schaller & Novy, 2011). What is more, his way supported waterfront
revitalization initiatives to develop unoccupied land for property-led economic
development that aimed to promote entertainment land-use development and the
revival of old commercial districts (Schaller & Novy, 2011). The once industrial
polluted waterfronts were dilapidated and declining (Schaller and Novy, 2011), but
served as the right niche for commercial and residential development, so the
Bloomberg administration sought to extract value from the entrepreneurial urban
development and create new urban recreation space (Schaller & Novy, 2011).
Nevertheless, one reason Bloomberg’s approach was popular is that it maintains
the region’s long-term viability (Schaller & Novy, 2011): many niche manufacturing
job opportunities are created, and the preservation of other industrial blue-collar jobs
is part of this post-industrial waterfront redevelopment (Schaller & Novy, 2011). The
Bloomberg administration’s NYC waterfront redevelopment strategy is a more
balanced one (Bloomberg’s waterfront redevelopment strategy also considers keeping
blue-collar manufacturing jobs), compared with the London Dockland redevelopment
initiative, and it emphasizes the maritime industry and the maintenance of blue-collar
jobs (Schaller & Novy, 2011). Furthermore, many industrial waterfront jobs are
preserved to reflect the local economy (Schaller & Novy, 2011).
2.1.4. Entrepreneurial Urban Governance
The entrepreneurial urban governance in Chinese cities’ politics is the critical
force propelling the boom of waterfront flagship redevelopment projects across the
nation. In Chinese vice-provincial cities such as Qingdao, the city’s secretary of the
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municipal party committee (who has more power than the city mayor) could
potentially mobilize tens of billions of yuan, and most of these funds are used as
stimulus packages to leverage private investment or for fixed-asset investment. Lin
and Yi (2011) argue that the “system of fiscal responsibility” reformation has enticed
the municipal governments in China to initiate land development projects to promote
local public finance because the local governments were allowed to keep the surplus
profits earned from the local redevelopment projects after a lump-sum payment to the
central government every five years. Thus, the fiscal system’s decentralization has
directly facilitated the urban redevelopment projects in the Chinese cities. Hence, the
local revenues generated from real estate development projects have become one of
the largest financial resources for local public finance (Lin & Yi, 2011). The Chinese
municipal governments are increasingly using land development as a means to
generate wealth for facilitating economic growth and the urbanization process. For
example, the land conveyance fees have been collected by the Chinese local
governments to financially support infrastructure construction and site maintenance to
attract FDI and foster the tax base. Moreover, many urban lands are used by
state-owned development enterprises established by the municipal governments as
collateral to apply for bank loans (Lin & Yi, 2011).
Susanne Heeg (2011) conceptualizes the role of urban planning and the flow of
capital to analyze how they promote the development process. According to Heeg
(2011), urban strategies depend upon the nature of how development coalitions
generate revenues and how the relevant revenues circulate temporally and spatially.
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Consequently, urban politics is designed to facilitate redevelopment investments and
earn revenues to promote the reproduction of economic and social activities (Heeg,
2011). Heeg (2011) also states that the task of planning should include the
amelioration of the built environment that will improve the underlying infrastructure
for production and reproduction, circulation and consumption. Moreover, urban
planning should also include civic collaboration with the private sectors and the
utilization of private resources (Heeg, 2011). In the second place, conceptualizing
urban planning’s role includes summarizing the relationships between urban planning
and property-led economic development because property-led economic development
is also part of the relationship between the real estate industry and urban planning
(Heeg, 2011). To be specific, urban planning includes interest calculation, cooperation
with private actors, a degree of land-use intensification, the relaxation of planning
restrictions, the enhancing of returns for private actors, the role of the local state as
incentive providers, and the function of urban politics to activate and mobilize private
actors and capital (Heeg, 2011). This is similar to what Hackworth (2007) stated: the
local state can use land-use zoning power to protect real estate elites’ interests by
differentiating commercial space from other space. Heeg (2011) also explicitly
specifies the different features of various types of urban politics (such as
entrepreneurialism and managerialism).
For instance, entrepreneurialism stresses less on social welfare and mass
consumption but focuses more on utilizing regional resources in a liberalized local
market (Heeg, 2011). In the aspect of the built environment, managerial urban politics
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focuses on improving the built environment to ameliorate the underlying
infrastructure to improve residents’ mobility (Heeg, 2011). The main political actors
of urban management and governance are the public. Unlike current entrepreneurial
urban governance, the leading actors are the private ones. The government designs
most urban planning initiatives and receives state financial aid (Heeg, 2011).
Moreover, public planners determine the development arrangement of the urban area
(including industrial sites, housing, and transportation systems) (Heeg, 2011). This is
based upon the tenet that state-run urban planning would consider the best interests of
the entire population. However, as Hackworth (2007) states, the previous Keynesian
regulatory landscapes such as redistributive impulse, social service, and housing are
weakened by neoliberal entrepreneurialism.
The foundation of government-led planning is to ensure a sufficient amount of
tax income investment to finance the infrastructure projects so that the quality of
living of the urban poor will be improved (Heeg, 2011). Because of the transition to
neoliberal entrepreneurial urban governance, the urban built environment’s political
agenda has fundamentally changed (Heeg, 2011). Entrepreneurial politics could be
utilized to generate external funding, new investment, and new employment (Heeg,
2011). My study agrees with Heeg (2011)’s opinion. The Chinese urban
redevelopment coalition, made up of the city halls (including state-owned enterprises)
and private developers, extracts value from urban redevelopment projects. And my
study contributes to building a concrete mechanism of how that coalition operates.
The contemporary political actors of entrepreneurial urban governance are both
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private and public sectors, and one of their goals is to let private finance become the
crucial financial tool to ameliorate the urban built environment (Heeg, 2011). Stone
(1989) states that municipal governments across the U.S. are increasingly using public
money to leverage private investment to tap into local resources. And in Qingdao
Olympic Sailing Centre’s case, the Qingdao municipal government successfully
enticed private investment by using market mechanisms. Nevertheless, the situation in
second-tier Chinese cities such as Qingdao is different from the North American
context due to the nature of Chinese semi-autonomous state development companies
and the level of market system development. Generally speaking, under the context of
entrepreneurialism, the Chinese private-sector interest is playing a more important
role than before (Heeg, 2011). The public sector’s role decreases relatively,
functioning only as a facilitator (Heeg, 2011). All in all, planning and urban politics
play significant roles in terms of overcoming the city’s internal barriers to propel
property-led economic developments (Heeg, 2011).
2.1.5. The Transformation to Post-Industrial Service-oriented Waterfront
In essence, the fundamental reason propelling the transformation from the Fordist
industrial waterfront to the post-industrial service-oriented waterfront is the
twin-revolution: containerization and neoliberal revolution. Amid this transformation
process, the rationale of Chinese port cities’ urban politics is to channel and stabilize
the mobility and capital volatility to conform to the neoliberal doctrine. Moreover, the
role of Chinese municipal urban politics is to ensure the investment rate of return on
real estate speculative activities, and the municipal government plays an important
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role in maintaining the market mechanism to extract value from the land investment.
And the ultimate goal of Chinese urban politics is to promote “land finance,” which
refers to the return on real estate investment. Nevertheless, land finance also involves
borrowing to develop, which has raised many concerns (Pan et al., 2017). Scholars are
questioning whether mounting local debts are undermining the local fiscal system and
whether the local government’s debt would undermine the financial stability and
cause risks to the Chinese municipal governments (Pan et al., 2017). According to one
of my interviewees (Zhipeng Li), in the Chinese political language, the municipal
government must ensure “the preservation and appreciation of state-owned assets.”
The above description of Chinese urban politics manifests the entrepreneurial urban
governance nowadays in Chinese cities.
In a word, the current Chinese urban political ecosystem is to promote the
competitive edge of Chinese cities with a free-market mechanism amid the process of
economic restructuring. Under this framework of neoliberal post-industrial waterfront
redevelopment, the cost and price of neoliberal reformation and development have
been disproportionately absorbed by the relocated shipyard workers. Their situation is
very much similar to truck drivers who lose benefits and absorb the cost of enhancing
the voice of the shipping giants, which I introduce in the following paragraphs.
In the book Global Port Cities in North America, Vormann (2018) explains how
the industrial waterfront was considered the symbol of backwardness and how this
industrial polluted Keynesian-Fordist waterfront transforms itself into tourist and
recreational attractions. Schubert (2011) also concludes that the redevelopment of
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derelict harbours exemplifies transforming a Fordist industrial city into a
post-industrial service-oriented city. Therefore, this chapter’s key points analyze how
the realignment of institutions and restructuring of industrial patterns lead to the
challenge for the Keynesian-Fordist regime.
Vormann (2018) then examines how the Keynesian-Fordist system transforms
into neoliberal politics due to the twin revolution (neoliberal revolution and
logistics/containerization revolution). He argues that Keynesian-Fordism’s crisis is
due to the devaluation rooted in the stagflation of economic development and the
characteristics of the Keynesian-Fordist system (mass consumption and mass
production). Simultaneously, due to the “mobile and volatile capital flows” (Vormann,
2018, p. 53), people started to reassess national politics. Consequently, this results in
the “realignment of political structure” and the neoliberal political system (Vormann,
2018, p. 53). Vormann (2018) explains that Fordist production’s unbundling is also
partially due to the logistics innovation that plummets transportation costs. This
brings in the transformation from “bulk production and consumption” to “flexibilized
and niche markets” (Vormann, 2018, p. 62) so that “just-in-time production” could
meet the demand of changing consumer tastes (Vormann, 2018, p. 62). In order to
cope with the 1970s stagflation crisis, North American cities decided to conform to
the rationale of the market, to let it decide what to produce and to provide the right
incentives for entrepreneurs. People then reached a consensus that the market should
be liberated from government overregulation (Vormann, 2018). The concrete
strategies that North American cities adopted to cope with the 1970s stagflation crisis
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and to enhance their competitiveness are fiscal austerity and economic restructuring.
These neoliberal strategies could be considered North American cities’ urban
entrepreneurial governance strategies to respond to the collapse of Fordist production
(Vormann, 2018). Hackworth (2007) uses New York, Philadelphia, and Detroit’s case
study to unravel how bond-rating agencies promote neoliberal governance and
entrepreneurialism and eliminate the Keynesian welfare state amid the
Keynesian-Fordism crisis. Then Vormann (2018) explicitly explains the reasons that
led to the Fordist production system’s downfall: (1) the 1970s were the end of Fordist
oligopolistic public utilities; Fordist scale economies and bulk production were not
popular anymore and had been replaced by just-in-time and flexible production facing
the niche market to meet the demand of diversified customers, (2) decreasing
transportation costs due to the logistics revolution, and (3) the collapse of the
Keynesian-Fordist welfare state. All in all, the logistics revolution has a significant
impact on the political realignment of the neoliberal state, and the neoliberal political
realignment, in turn, reshapes the physical landscape of North American cities
(Vormann, 2018). And the neoliberal regime is based upon two essential rationales: (1)
free market, and (2) anti-welfarist free market. The logistics revolution
(containerization) reinforces the importance of global market forces, and the crisis of
the Fordist system was due to the state’s inability to cope with the free market and the
objective law of commodity society. The process of deindustrialization was promoted
and accelerated by the neoliberal political realignment. Thus, the neoliberal
technological advancement and the roll-out of neoliberal restructuring have destructed
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the previous Fordist industrial landscape, which shows the end of Keynesian-Fordism
and the beginning of the post-industrial era (Vormann, 2018).
In the next chapter, “The Redundancy of Fordist Infrastructure,” Vormann (2018)
explains that derelict harbour spaces are the symbols of declining American inner
cities. Hall and Clark (2011) strike a chord with Vormann; they argue that downtown
port use is incompatible with container terminals because of the revolution of
containerization since the late 1970s. Thus, industrial port facilities moved from the
port city’s core to the remote location and upgraded to large-scale port container
terminals. In this way, the cargo ports are relocated downstream and away from
traditional riverfront locations, so the city’s traditional maritime trade core becomes
blighted. The neoliberal reform is against the Fordist regime and its redistributive
welfare institutions. Meanwhile, the deindustrialization caused by the neoliberal turn
also obsoletes the industrial cityscape and leads to devaluation and redundancy. So
the Fordist industrial past has brought the impression of pollution and hard work. I
agree with what Hall and Clark (2011) have argued. And my study contributes to
evaluating the Chinese post-industrial deindustrialization of the previous
Keynesian-Fordism landscape by analyzing the dilapidation process of the Beihai
Shipyard and the relocation of the shipyard.
In Chapter 5, Vormann (2018) examines how global port cities’ waterfronts
become the stage for transforming to the post-industrial era and how to transform the
derelict waterfront. This is because the 1970s global stagflation had obsoleted Fordist
production, so the industrial waterfront went over devaluation. Amid the process, the
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global port cities began to turn to the service industry through property-led economic
development (entrepreneurial strategies). Therefore, the derelict industrial waterfronts
were transformed into more expensive and more attractive residential and commercial
use. New York City had adopted this strategy to combat the mid-1970s financial crisis.
The city municipality used entrepreneurial strategies to leverage private investment.
One example was the adoption of pro-business restructuring strategies to transform
Battery Park City into luxury housing and park to meet the demands of white collars
in the World Trade Centre. The social inclusiveness strategies were replaced by
growth strategies, which is reflected in the replacement of industrial sites by tourism,
high-end service industries and housing, and office buildings. According to Vormann
(2018), amid the transformation from inner-city industrial waterfront to post-industrial
redeveloped waterfront, the port facilities disappeared from the inner-city waterfront,
the industrial dock workers are replaced by white collars and tourists, and leisure
facilities replace danger/polluted port terminals. The waterfront post-industrial
redevelopments successfully cleansed New York City’s previous industrial labour
image, and tertiary post-industrial activities eventually replaced industrial production
activities (Vormann, 2018). All in all, the entrepreneurial strategies could be used to
promote post-industrial redevelopment and economic restructuring, but these all
depend on a city’s clean image that is free from industrial pollution. So, the classic
waterfront redevelopment strategies include (1) business district, (2) retail shops, (3)
recreational facilities, (4) entrepreneurial centres, (5) private sectors that are leveraged
to invest in commercial development, and (6) tourists flocking in (Vormann, 2018).
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Schaller and Novy (2011) also describe the deindustrialization process and the
decaying waterfront in New York City and explain how the dilapidated waterfront
became the space of hope for post-industrial growth and high-end redevelopments.
Vormann (2018) specifies that production and logistics systems’ costs are
externalized in the global production network. However, the author argues that the
costs of these neoliberal post-industrial waterfront redevelopments are absorbed by
the public and “capillary ends of the logistics industries” (Vormann, 2018, p. 133).
Vormann (2018) illustrates that containerization usage results in decreasing
transportation fees and promotes global production and consumption. Nevertheless,
the cost of decreasing transportation costs is disproportionately absorbed by industrial
workers in the transportation industry and the public living near the transportation
infrastructure. And amid this relocation of costs, politics plays an important role.
The transportation industry’s neoliberal reform has had two outcomes: (1)
cost-shifting, and (2) externalization of costs. Because of deregulation policies, the
multinational corporations’ costs of producing activities are externalized to each
industrial worker on the industrial chain. And the environmental costs of the decrease
in global container transportation are absorbed by the residents living near the port
terminals (Vormann, 2018). Vormann (2018) also emphasizes the pressing need for
deregulation to replace regulation because deregulation could bring in marketization
and transformative reform, which continues to lead to market efficiency. In contrast,
centralized government control could only result in restrictive labour practice and
consequent congestion. Therefore, the regulation (in NYC) was seen as a symbol of
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inefficient oligopolies and as enhancing the entry barrier. That is why deregulation is
so essential and necessary.
One of the consequences of deregulation is an improvement in shipping
industries’ power. Many reasons contribute to the result, but the most significant one
is decreasing transportation fees caused by intermodalism. In the late 1970s, shipping
companies started to gain more power for negotiating with the ports. And
proportionately, the ports have lost their bargaining power, so they have had to invest
more in the container infrastructure to be attractive to shipping companies, liner trade,
and global finance and to keep themselves competitive (Vormann, 2018). Therefore,
many ports have experienced privatization of assets and services, and this is reflected
by the shift in power from public ownership to the landlord model, which means that
the public authority leases the land and container terminals to private operators. And
due to the increasing demand for capital investment for container port infrastructure,
the capital of global institutional investors enters the market to invest more on
container infrastructure (Vormann, 2018). This exemplifies the liberalization of
international trade (Vormann, 2018).
Deregulation has shifted the balance of power from industrial workers to
management, and truck drivers are the most disadvantaged and oppressed in
deregulation. It led to the owner-operator model, and truck drivers’ interests have
been significantly impaired. This is because the owner-operator model’s operating
cost has shifted to independent contractors (truck drivers). Moreover, truck drivers’
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working conditions are terrible; they have to assume the overcapacity risks, and most
of the drivers are non-union minority workers (Vormann, 2018).
All in all, deregulation reform in the transportation industry has created
low-income groups (the truck drivers). The low-skilled and low-income dock drivers
are either relocated or displaced, so the risk to the transportation industry, the risk of
market fluctuation, and the cost of operations were shifted to individual workers.
Truck drivers have become the most exploited class, and it was created by the
freight-moving industry (Vormann, 2018).
In general, global shipping companies have benefited a lot from deregulation,
which destructs the Fordist regime of production. And the decreasing transportation
costs could further liberalize international trade. In a word, consumers, shippers
(especially multinational corporations and large retailers), and dock labour all benefit
from deregulation. However, truck drivers have had to absorb the cost of deregulation;
they became the class that has been exploited due to the “race to the bottom”
(Vormann, 2018). Nonetheless, deregulation does reduce transportation costs, and the
decrease in logistics costs was large enough to globalize the production process
entirely (Vormann, 2018).
In summary, the negative externalities of global production networks were
disproportionately absorbed by the community’s poorest residents. Truck drivers
assumed the cost of logistics and neoliberal revolution, which is commonly known as
the “double burden”: environmental and social costs (Vormann, 2018). Booming has
contributed to building a lucrative port industry, but it rarely contributes to the local
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economies. Meanwhile, the environmental crisis caused by industrial pollution has
created negative externalities for communities living near the logistics facilities, so
this creates an inequality problem (Vormann, 2018). Vormann (2018) finally argues
that the benefits and costs of neoliberalization have been unevenly distributed because
certain disadvantaged social groups have unequally paid the price of its social,
environmental, and security costs. Jacobs (2012) supports the viewpoint by
unravelling the entrepreneurial waterfront redevelopment projects that have further
deteriorated income inequality in the metropolitan Tokyo area. Tokyo’s Waterfront
City Project was intended to generate a “Japanese Silicon Valley” to be the base of
Japanese high-tech enterprises, and this initiative has been supported by the Japanese
central government “politically and financially” (Jacobs, 2012). However, the
previous low- and middle-income public affordable housing had to be demolished to
make way for new upper-class residential units to attract white-collar workers (Jacobs,
2012). In addition to that, the income growth rate (represented by household income
and per capita income) of the district where the project is located is not synchronized
with that of other districts (Jacobs, 2012). This has created severe social inequality in
Tokyo, though still far less pronounced than in the U.S.
The post-industrial waterfront therefore reflects a concentration of wealth, but the
adjacent port communities suffer from the logistics industry’s socio-economic
deprivation and pollution. In the same vein, Hackworth (2007) illuminates that
gentrification is the process of private development replacing Keynesian
egalitarianism in the real estate market. He continues to explain that gentrification is
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the neoliberalized space of exclusion that abandons attempts to ameliorate the
inequality of capitalism (Hackworth, 2007). The result is economic and political
inequality. And the middle class is stuck in stagnation and disintegration (Vormann,
2018). Vormann (2018) also argues that the post-industrial waterfront
propellers—free-market regimes and fair and environmentally friendly cities—are
international investors, the global chains of supply and demand, and international
organizations. However, these ideal markets do not exist because the state plays a
significant role. The state provides a friendly climate and uses tax incentives to attract
real estate developers. Nonetheless, shipping companies and big retailers benefit the
most from this post-industrial global production network, while the cost of neoliberal
liberalization is disproportionately assumed by the truck drivers’ class (Vormann,
2018).
2.1.6. Neoliberal Shift and Urban Development in Chinese Cities
The Chinese economic model before the 1980s neoliberal reformation may be
seen as a form of Keynesian planned economy. Though the state ownership and
five-year plans of pre-open door China were not the same as Keynes’ ideas, there
were similarities. Thus, the 1980s neoliberal reform and open-door policy are an
ideological rejection of Keynesian-Fordism. The major characteristics of the reform
are marketization, privatization, and the state’s withdrawal from social production.
But the extent of this reform differs and depends on different regions. The degree of
marketization in the southeastern coastal regions is relatively high. In contrast, in
second-tier Chinese cities and northern provinces, the close ties between municipal
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governments and real estate elites are still significant. Therefore, the current Chinese
cities are experiencing economic restructuring and eliminating backward production
capacities. Consequently, this could be seen as part of the neoliberal transforming
process. Amid the changing process, many industries and fields have experienced the
withdrawal of state intervention such as the central government’s cutbacks for
financing the regional development projects (Wang et al., 2011). Moreover, due to the
neoliberal devolution, the local Chinese growth coalition (city hall and business elites)
increasingly taps into local financing and business resources and absorbs the devolved
power and resources (Wang et al., 2011). The benefits of the devolution of
decision-making power include (1) the local governments have more autonomy, (2)
the central government can reduce outlays and reshape fiscal austerity, and (3) the
government policies become more efficient and specialized, targeting local issues.
Obviously, most Chinese port cities’ waterfront redevelopment projects no longer
receive the government’s large-scale direct subsidies. At least on the surface, the
financing mechanism of the redevelopment projects is very much marketized.
Although, in second- and third-tier Chinese cities, the localized special ties between
municipal governments and business elites are still important for developing
coalitions to win government support and guarantees. Other than that, the state-owned
development corporations are still important in financing waterfront projects and
propelling the projects’ proceedings.
Though Hackworth (2007) submits that bond-rating agencies are still playing a
critical role in determining the financing of cities’ redevelopment projects, the
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Chinese domestic bond-rating agencies’ role in similar projects is quite limited. This
is where the financing mechanism of urban projects in Chinese cities is incomplete.
Or, we could say that the capital market has not been fully utilized in the financing of
redevelopment projects in central cities.
In addition to that, the upsurge of Chinese port cities’ waterfront redevelopment
is the epitome of the opening and financialization of the real estate market. The
marketization and financialization of the real estate market in Chinese port cities have
contributed as pillar support to the increase of municipal governments’ income across
the nation. Municipal governments thus have ample financial sources to invest in
other public goods or urban redevelopment projects such as utilities and
infrastructure.
The entrepreneurial regime is discussed in detail in the following chapter. Here,
however, I would like to reflect on the governing coalition’s influence on Chinese
local government by enacting land zoning that excludes other social groups (such as
the demolition and relocation of existing neighbourhoods) to make way for elite real
estate developments. Generally, demolishing and relocating derelict neighbourhoods
amid the redevelopment process are some of the most difficult tasks. If a
redevelopment project is delayed for many years, it will most likely delay demolition
—especially if the redevelopment project is located in the centre of a city. With land
prices skyrocketing in urban areas, compensation for demolition is often quite high.
Similar to American cities, it can be challenging for the residents and private
developers to reach a consensus.
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The gentrification and redevelopment in inner-city downtown port areas unfold
according to how the neoliberal turn reshapes urban form and the built environment in
city centres. Therefore, in the U.S. and in China, neoliberalism is a kind of
gentrification process dominated by the market and coordinated by the government.
The book The Neoliberal City: Governance, Ideology, and Development in
American Urbanism is important for this study because author Hackworth (2007)
explores neoliberal governance and the ideological origin of the neoliberal turn in the
North American context, and because it lays the theoretical foundation for my work.
The theories examined in Hackworth’s work are useful for applying the concepts to
Chinese cities.
Hackworth’s book (2007) first evaluates the relationship between neoliberalism
and the Keynesian-Fordist welfare state. Hackworth (2007) argues that neoliberalism
is an ideological rejection of egalitarian liberalism and the Keynesian welfare state.
He then argues that neoliberalism is deeply rooted in individualism, market, and the
non-interventionist state because amid the ideological shift to neoliberal governing,
redistribution is seen as a disadvantage for international competition. Furthermore, as
Schubert (2011) mentioned, the neoliberal redevelopment projects after the 1980s
were designed against the context of privatization, deregulation, neoliberalism, and
marketization. Nevertheless, monetarism is seen by neoliberal proponents as the only
macroeconomic intervention needed by the nation-state (Hackworth, 2007). Moreover,
many Keynesian regulatory powers such as public sector-led land-use zoning,
redistributive impulse, social service, and housing are weakened (Hackworth, 2007).
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Also, as an ideological rejection of Keynesian-Fordism, Heeg (2011) argues that the
recent rise in neoliberal entrepreneurialism stresses less on social welfare and mass
consumption and focuses on using regional resources in a liberalized local market.
Hackworth (2007) further argues that actually existing neoliberalism is contingent
and involves both neoliberal destruction and creation. Brenner and Theodore’s (2002)
book holds a similar viewpoint. They identify three key points of actually existing
neoliberalism as (1) path dependence, (2) the underpinning of an inherited
Keynesian-Fordist regulatory landscape, and (3) the neoliberal capitalist
market-oriented restructuring (Brenner & Theodore, 2002). The neoliberal destruction
includes the dismantling of Keynesian artifacts such as public housing/space and the
removal of redistributive/welfare policies. In the U.S., it includes the removal of the
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), labour institutions, Fordist
labour arrangements, and federal government redistribution policies. Neoliberal
creation includes institutional cooperation, the establishment of new institutions, and
workfare (Hackworth, 2007). Brenner and Theodore (2002) also define the concept of
creative destruction. They describe it as “geographically uneven, socially regressive,
politically volatile trajectories of institutional/spatial change” (Brenner & Theodore,
2002, p. 2). In terms of creative destruction, I agree with what Brenner and Theodore
(2002) have defined. The redevelopment project of the Olympic Sailing Centre is
built upon the relocation of Beihai Shipyard and the blight of the Zhongshan Road
business circle. So my study contributes to analyzing the urban redevelopment and
gentrification of Chinese cities under a neoliberal framework.
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Meanwhile, creative destruction can also be defined as “destruction of extant
institutional arrangement and political compromises through market-oriented
economic growth, commodification and the rule of capital” (Brenner & Theodore,
2002, p. 15).
In order to better understand the concept of creative destruction, Brenner and
Theodore (2002) break it down as “destructive tendencies” and “creative tendencies.”
Destructive tendencies refer to “vestiges of the Fordist-Keynesian settlement that have
been threatened or undermined through the neoliberal offensive.” And creative
tendencies refer to “institutional realignments and political adjustments that have
imposed new forms of market discipline” (Brenner & Theodore, 2002, p. 19).
Generally speaking, the authors (2002) believe that creative destruction is a process
that generates inequality and polarizes social economic development. Therefore, amid
the neoliberal roll-back destruction and roll-out creation process, the
Keynesian-Fordist policies and artifacts are destroyed to make way for neoliberal
policies and ideologies. At the same time, the nation-state is hollowed out as an
institutional buffer between localities and the global economy. The reduction of
national interventions concentrates on public housing, local infrastructure, and
welfare, while the consolidation of state intervention is advanced in the field of
monetarism (Hackworth, 2007). Also, due to the neoliberal reduction of national
intervention such as federal cutbacks of urban renewal, the localities increasingly
have to rely on their own resources to finance the areas, leading to the phenomenon of
glocalization (Hackworth, 2007). According to Weber (2002), due to the federal
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cutbacks, the local development coalitions increasingly relied on their own resources.
And this is exactly what happened in the Qingdao Olympic Sailing Centre’s case.
After China’s 1980s neoliberal reform, the Qingdao municipal government undertook
the devolved financial power. Hence, they had to cooperate with the local private
sector to tap into their own resources.
Hackworth (2007) also illustrates that actually existing neoliberalism is a
contingent process, and it is incremental and uneven. It has characteristics of both the
roll-back destruction of Keynesian intervention and the roll-out creation of neoliberal
policy. And this can lead to a segmented policy landscape, which means Keynesian
artifacts (such as public housing) and roll-out neoliberal policies (such as workfare)
coexist (Hackworth, 2007). As mentioned earlier, both Brownill’s (2011) and Peck
and Tickell’s (2002) works define roll-back neoliberal destruction and roll-out
neoliberal creation.
Hackworth (2007) thus defines the neoliberal path as the reduction of public
subsidies and regulations. And it involves the economic liberalization and
privatization of public services. Neoliberalism should be considered, therefore, an
ideological rejection to Keynesianism, in which many regulatory powers such as
land-use zoning, social service, public housing, and the redistributive impulse are
undermined (Hackworth, 2007). Similarly, Peck and Tickell (2002) illuminate that
neoliberalism exemplifies the state’s withdrawal. After the 1980s neoliberal reform,
the Qingdao municipal government withdrew from directly participating in real estate
development by establishing semi-autonomous redevelopment agencies such as
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Dong’ao Development Corporation. The concrete economic liberalization policies
include privatization, austerity, deregulation, and free trade that hew to the philosophy
of individualism, market, and the non-interventionist state (Hackworth, 2007).
Then Hackworth’s book (2007) examines the reasons for shifting to neoliberalism
and dismantling the Keynesian-welfare national state. He believes that the shift to
entrepreneurial/neoliberal urban governance or the dismantling of Keynesian
managerialism is a result of the “institutionally rigid set of ideological constraints
imposed by financial capital” (Hackworth, 2007, p. 18). In addition, the financial and
regulatory institutions impose regulations to reward or punish the cities that adhere to
or disobey the rationales of neoliberalism. For example, in developed countries,
financial institutions such as bond-rating agencies are the institutions that promote
neoliberal urban governance, the shift to entrepreneurial city regulation, and the
dismantling of Keynesian managerialism (Hackworth, 2007). The bond-rating
agencies could decide the quantities, qualities, and geographical distribution of local
investments in developed countries. Therefore, whether or not local governments can
access the bond market depends on the bond-rating agencies (Hackworth, 2007).
Hackworth (2007) specifies two types of municipal bonds: general obligation
bonds and revenue bonds. And many infrastructure fields such as airport authorities
and water treatment service areas that generate revenue streams are increasingly
becoming bond-issuing districts, especially when the operating costs of the systems
are so high that even city halls cannot afford it. For example, the New York and New
Jersey Port Authority is one of the most powerful port authorities in the U.S. because
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of its bond-issuing power. Its financial independence has enabled the agency to carry
out large-scale redevelopment projects in the bi-state region (Doig, 2001). The
general obligation bonds require a citizens’ referendum, but revenue bonds do not.
Additionally, the bonds’ rating depends on municipalities’ financial history,
administrative structure, and economic outlook, and the ultimate rating is based on
whether a municipality could repay the debt and their economic health (Hackworth,
2007). The ratings of the bonds have a significant impact on the cost of cities’ loans
and the overall scope of local governments by enacting credit reports.
Generally speaking, Hackworth (2007) argues that bond-rating agencies have
three significant influences on local governance. First, the federal government is no
longer responsible for collective assumptions such as public housing and social
facilities, so the cities are increasingly facing federal cutbacks. Hence, they become
more dependent on capital markets. According to Weber (2002), the 1970s federal
cutbacks triggered the reformation of real-estate finance and its governance. Fordism
and Keynesianism were destroyed and displaced by neoliberalism, which has changed
the source of capital and Keynesian priorities for using the capital (Weber, 2002). As
mentioned earlier, since the 1980s neoliberal reform in China, the Chinese central
government no longer grants appropriation to Chinese cities, so the municipal
governments have to cut deals with the private developers to utilize their own local
resources.
Second, due to the turn to financialization, powerful financial institutions
generate a substantial amount of wealth. Therefore, institutions such as pension funds,
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money market funds, and insurance firms become essential components of the
securities industry. Third, more municipal lending is being made through volatile
direct lending instead of traditional banking institutions. Households and funds,
therefore, are increasingly relying on professional assessment from bond-rating
agencies because the banking industry’s intermediary functions have disappeared
(Hackworth, 2007). Since bond-rating agencies determine the financial sources for
cities’ development, cities are more relying on the assessment of rating agencies and
the municipal debt to pay for the social services and capital infrastructure. Thus, the
financial void after the federal cutbacks has rightly been filled by the increase of
municipal debt. Maintaining collective consumption, which is the Keynesian
economic intervention, has formally been replaced by unregulated neoliberal
economic growth (Hackworth, 2007). Nevertheless, this entrepreneurial urban
governance enhances the city’s exposure to the capital market. The three major
municipal bond agencies determine the municipal bond market, and city managers
have to yield to the rating agencies (Hackworth, 2007).
The federal cutback forced local government to act businesslike and cooperate
with businesses to foster tax generators that cover social service costs, which means
governments are propelling “public debt for private gain” (Hackworth, 2007, p. 26).
Namely, the municipalities raised debt to issue municipal bonds for private sectors to
provide tax-exempt financing. As Sagalyn (1990) states, the public authorities are
increasingly drawing upon their own resources that include city funds, which are
constituted by tax-exempt borrowing.
53
Hackworth (2007) continues to explain that, initially, local lending institutions
(mainly commercial banks) were the primary financial providers for redevelopment
projects because they are locally based, and they share the city’s fate. They will
benefit from a healthy macroeconomic condition. After a while, however, the banks
became increasingly unwilling amid the financial crisis to provide financial support
for cities because of events like budgetary debacles. So, the bank money became
increasingly expensive, and cities could no longer borrow directly from commercial
banks. They have had to turn to institutional investors and individual creditors, and
this process is called disintermediation (Hackworth, 2007).
All in all, due to the monopoly of bond-rating agencies as information providers
and the disintermediation of commercial banks, individual and institutional investors
are becoming the primary purchasers of municipal bonds (Hackworth, 2007). This
conforms to what Vormann (2018) has argued: entrepreneurial urban governance is a
response to the collapse of the Keynesian-Fordist regulatory landscape.
One of the results of debt market disintermediation, according to Hackworth
(2007), is the monopoly of only a few rating agencies as information providers. This
is because when disintermediation happens, commercial banks no longer provide
credit assessments, leaving an information vacuum. Investors have to rely on the
judgment of bond-rating agencies. The role of commercial banks was assessing the
financial situation of the cities, but after disintermediation, this work of research was
undertaken by the bond-rating agencies. Bond-rating agencies became the connectors
between the capital market, cities, and promoters of the neoliberal standard
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(Hackworth, 2007). Hackworth (2007) uses the case study of New York, Philadelphia,
and Detroit to unravel how bond-rating agencies promote neoliberal governance and
entrepreneurialism and eliminate the Keynesian welfare state.
In summary, neoliberal governance is established by non-local force and
propelled by the force of financial capital instead of the shift in local politics.
Bond-rating agencies are the principal promoters of the transition, and they connect
local and capital markets. Financial disintermediation and federal devolution
(cutbacks) remove the buffer—the commercial banks—between local state and
financial capital, reinforcing neoliberal local governance. This is an economical,
entrepreneurial, market-oriented method of governance, and rating agencies play an
essential role in facilitating the process.
Furthermore, the bond-rating agencies eventually become more capable of
influencing a region’s economic and political fate. Amid the neoliberal transition of
the above three cities, public jobs decreased by a lot, and there was more tax
abasement for the three cities as they became entrepreneurial. A growing global
consensus is that municipal governments should be economically efficient,
business-friendly, and anti-deficit (Hackworth, 2007). The application of Hackworth’s
theory in the Chinese case is introduced in the fifth chapter of the thesis.
The story in Qingdao (in the fourth chapter, on neoliberal uniqueness, you can
find the development of the real estate industry in Qingdao) resonates with
Hackworth’s (2007) description. The marketization and visible booming of the
Chinese real estate market after the 1980s neoliberal reform contributed to rising
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redevelopment projects in port cities. Hackworth starts with the statement that
decentralization of state power is one of neoliberalism’s expressions because
decentralization could hollow out the national state and dismantle the Keynesian
welfare state. The decentralization process also happened in the Qingdao Olympic
Sailing Centre case. The local development coalition absorbed the central
government’s devolved fiscal and administrative power to conduct local
redevelopment projects. Nonetheless, the globalization of state power and the
localization of regulatory power coexist. Therefore, the nation state’s previous
governing power has been shifted upward to the global level, meanwhile being
hollowed-out by the local governance.
Hackworth (2007) specifies that, as a subdivision of the U.S. welfare state, public
housing is very appropriate for observing the neoliberal process because (1) public
housing has never received too much political support and is very malleable ahead of
an ideological shift. Thus the impact of ideological movements will be much easier to
observe. (2) The American public housing system was created by the Department of
Housing and Urban Development (which was removed amid neoliberal destruction),
and the local public housing authorities (PHAs) have great autonomy (Hackworth,
2007). Therefore, institutional architecture and the public housing system’s inherent
nature determine that it is the best vehicle for understanding actually existing
neoliberalism (Hackworth, 2007). Nevertheless, the Chinese public housing sector
does not absorb the role of observing the neoliberal process, so this paragraph is just a
background introduction for your reference.
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Under the circumstance that neoliberalism gains momentum and Keynesian
nation-state politics gathers dust, the regulatory powers shift upward and downward
from the nation-state to global governance and subnational governance. The
subnational governance power is amplified because it is less constrained by the
Keynesian nation-state. Furthermore, the global institutions are much stronger. All in
all, localities and global governance become more significant stakeholders amid the
neoliberal nation-state restructuring (Hackworth, 2007). Thus the PHAs gain more
power as local institutions, though their power is qualified and constrained by global
institutions such as rating agencies and multinational banks (Hackworth, 2007).
What is more, the neoliberal process of public housing promotes entrepreneurial
and private governance, and the neoliberal trend establishes the principle that the
market is the best and most efficient mechanism for allocating housing resources. In
the same vein, Logan and Molotch (1987) argue that it is the same as neoliberal
theory; the growth machine activists believe that the market is the only legitimate
mechanism for deciding what to produce. The other two established principles of
neoliberal public housing policies are to encourage homeownership and to promote
working/entrepreneurial ethics. The most prominent example is HOPE VI, which has
characteristics of both neoliberal roll-back destruction and roll-out creation
(Hackworth, 2007). Generally speaking, like many other Keynesian welfare state
artifacts, public housing is fundamentally privatized and neoliberalized in the U.S.
And those regulatory functions previously on the national level have both shifted
upward to the larger institutions and economies and downward to the local level
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institutions such as PHAs. Even though PHAs have authorized power, they still need
to conform to the global notions of profit from international banks and rating agencies
because local institutions’ power is constrained by global governance (Hackworth,
2007).
Hackworth’s goal in the following chapter is to connect entrepreneurial urban
governance and regime theory. Hackworth (2007) states that cities have been
transferred from managerialism under Keynesianism to entrepreneurialism under
neoliberalism. Cities no longer impose regulatory barriers to capital; rather, they are
expected to lower the barriers. Hackworth (2007) aims to connect concepts of the
urban regime and broader policy changes and examine regime theory by studying the
local effects of a coalition. He defines an urban regime as a way for public and private
interests to function together to carry out governing decisions, and its goal is to
initiate development and retard disinvestment (Hackworth, 2007). Stone (1989)
defines an urban regime as city hall and downtown business elites operating together
to formulate a governing coalition, which is the informal partnership complementing
the formal government authority. In the Qingdao Olympic Sailing Centre case, the
Qingdao municipal government and private developers formulated a similar
partnership, although their relationship has special characteristics of the Chinese
government enterprise relationship. Moreover, studying regime theory helps
understand neoliberal urban governance. Hackworth (2007) explains regime theory’s
historical formation by comparing pluralism, elite theory, and regime analysis. The
pluralist emphasizes that power at the local level is made up of political coalitions
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rather than individual persons or individual organizations. However, pluralist theory
lacks the discourse of economics and the financial power in coalition participants.
Elite theorists have always criticized pluralists: that pluralist theory does not
contain any discourse of economics, because, under the existing economic power
structure, the business elites have enormous power. However, pluralist theory does
not reflect the power of business elites. This is similar to Stone’s (1989) argument that
urban regimes are constituted by social groups accessible to institutional resources so
that the governing coalition can make efficient governing decisions. Private interests
that possess the institutional resources therefore must be part of a stable governing
coalition (Stone, 1989). Nevertheless, the situation in Qingdao is slightly different.
Although the private sector in Qingdao also possesses a great number of institutional
resources, the municipal government has the final say amid redevelopment initiatives.
To make up for the above two theories’ defects and better understand local politics,
regime theories emphasize the importance of building coalition, leadership, and
economic and institutional power. Regime analysis recognizes that any group cannot
impose social control by themselves, meanwhile specifying that the lack of monolithic
control is standard and universal. Nonetheless, regime theory circumvents economic
determinism, believing that power is complicated and is not only about access to
financial and other tangible resources (Hackworth, 2007). Stone’s (1989) theory
regarding the key factors propelling urban regime resonates with Hackworth’s (2007)
argument: (1) a broad scope so that different types of institutional resources can be
mobilized, and (2) the cooperation between public sectors and business interests. In
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addition, the two rationales for how governing coalitions are formed are (1) popular
control of governments and (2) private ownership of enterprises (Stone, 1989).
However, the situation in Qingdao is different as the residents have no right to elect a
city mayor and government officials, so this point does not apply to the Chinese
context. Hackworth (2007) further explains three significant eras of regime formation:
directive, concessionary, and conserving against the North American context, which
could be referred to as a historical benchmark for regime formation in China. During
the directive period, federal urban politics supported slum clearance to facilitate urban
redevelopment projects. There were large-scale demolitions to make way for
disruptive projects such as freeways and bridge constructions. The concessionary
period is defined by the mild redistributive programs such as Great Society, War on
Poverty, and civil rights movements. The concession period’s emphasis is community
development but not community replacement. The development coalition therefore is
made up of regional programs and institutions. However, due to their redistributive
nature, these development programs cannot be sustained if they do not conduct
profitable redevelopment projects. Hence, the untenable situation ushered in the era in
which the programs and institutions of the concession period had to conduct profitable
real estate development projects. After 1973, the regime formation entered the third
age: the conserving period. This period’s focus is property tax generation and no more
social-service provision burden. The development coalition therefore becomes more
entrepreneurial under the context of economic restructuring. And the economic
statecraft becomes very different from the Keynesian era. Namely, it represents how
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neoliberal city governance differentiates itself from the Keynesian nation-state. Hence,
cities start doing business and becoming more like private corporations (Hackworth,
2007). Under neoliberalism, the entrepreneurial coalition has four primary
characteristics: (1) it starts to increase outlays of the costs of technology and labour
training, (2) industrial upgrading occurs, the service industry becomes more important,
(3) tax incentives (such as tax breaks) are used to attract multinational corporations,
and (4) redistribution policies are terminated (Hackworth, 2007).
Additionally, capital elites cannot undertake the devolved power from federal
level administration by themselves in fields such as zoning, policing, and utility.
Therefore, it requires the cooperation of an organized relationship between the local
state and capital to undertake the federal state’s devolved power (Hackworth, 2007).
The historical context of the Chinese case is not complex. The only important turning
point of the times was Deng’s 1980s reform when neoliberal devolution gave the
governing coalition more financial autonomy, and the central government no longer
invested heavily in the local projects. Thus, the 1980s Chinese neoliberal reform
results in the cooperation between the municipal government and the local private
sector to formulate a governing coalition that absorbs the central government’s
devolved fiscal power. I evaluate the Qingdao Olympic Sailing Centre case in the
following chapters.
Hackworth (2007) then examines the public and private partnership (PPP) case of
expansion and exclusion. He states that capital and local state work together to
undertake the devolved power from the federal government, and the local government
61
uses the land-use zoning power to protect the interests of real estate elites. The local
development regime comprises real estate elites, and city hall is the organizational
form of PPP; together they undertake the neoliberal federal power devolution. Stone
(1989) also indicates that it is difficult to build effective governance if city hall does
not have a close partnership with the business elites. The decisive market factor
(private sector's slack and influential resource power) also plays an essential role in
the Qingdao Olympic Sailing Centre case. The coalition formed by municipal
government and private developers effectively carried out governing decisions
because of close connections between the public authority and private sectors.
Furthermore, according to Peck and Tickell (2002), many social policies or regulatory
powers are shifted downward to the local governing coalition formed by the
municipal government and local private developers.
Additionally, Hackworth (2007) evaluates the contradictory and dialectic
relationship between exclusion and expansion. He explains that the local state can use
land-use zoning power to protect real estate elites’ interests by differentiating the
commercial space. As Heeg (2011) stated earlier, urban planning includes interest
calculation, the cooperation with private actors, the degree of land-use intensification,
the relaxation of planning restrictions, the enhancing of returns for private actors, the
role of the local state as incentive providers, and the function of urban politics to
activate and mobilize private actors and capital. Therefore, this could be seen as
differentiating the condition (excluding) to facilitate real estate elites’ interests
(expanding). The case of regime formation in New Brunswick, NJ, exemplifies how
62
the local development coalition uses land-use zoning power to differentiate CBD to
facilitate economic growth through excluding low-income residents (by demolishing
the public housing nearby CBD). Consequently, the low-income minority had to
relocate to expand the interests of real estate elites (Hackworth, 2007). Thus, the
capital’s need to exclude obstacles so as to facilitate expansion has been done through
the urban regime mechanism made up of capital and localities. Hence, the barriers to
real estate investment are eliminated. All in all, the regime’s acquisition power has
been amplified since the devolution of the federal state, and the regime thus gains
more power (Hackworth, 2007). This is also true in the Qingdao Olympic Sailing
Centre’s redevelopment initiative. And the local development coalition formed by city
hall and local private developers acquires more development power as the neoliberal
reform gains momentum. There is also demand for amplifying the local government’s
power because the local growth coalition does not regulate the “adverse distributional
impact,” and it needs to be covered by the local government concession (Cox, 1999, p.
27).
Hackworth (2007) further illustrates that the relationship between urban form and
the neoliberal turn can only be unfolded by small-scale processes such as
gentrification and inner-city redevelopment to unveil how the built environment is
connected to neoliberalism. He uses gentrification to illuminate neoliberal urbanism,
which shows that gentrification is the process of private development replacing
Keynesian egalitarianism in the real estate market (Hackworth, 2007). He also
illustrates that gentrification is a neoliberalized space of exclusion that abandons
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attempts to ameliorate the inequality of capitalism (Hackworth, 2007). As Vormann
(2018) states, the post-industrial waterfront reflects the concentration of wealth. Still,
the adjacent port communities suffered from socio-economic deprivation and
pollution generated by the logistics industry. Hackworth (2007) explains that
neoliberal gentrification is more corporate-oriented and more state-facilitated, and it
has tremendously changed the inner city and economics. And these changes have
connected neoliberalism and local real estate investment. This shows how
neoliberalism substitutes the Keynesian managerialism landscape. The urban
commercial cores and CBDs have become the “billboard” of exhibiting neoliberal
governance through constructing great mega projects (Hackworth, 2007, p. 171). The
redevelopment of the Qingdao Olympic Sailing Centre project exemplifies using the
neoliberal flagship project to obtain a favourable position in the interlocal competition.
According to Schubert (2011), flagship projects also exert an impact on regional
economic development.
2.1.7. Chinese Actually Existing Neoliberalism
Against the Chinese post-1980s neoliberal reform context, socialism with
Chinese characteristics best annotates actually existing neoliberalism. Though the
rationales of fundamentalist socialism with Chinese characteristics are still
marketization, deregulation, and competition, in second- and third-tier Chinese cities,
state-intervention and close ties between city halls and business interests are still the
fundamental forces driving economic growth in Chinese cities. This is similar to the
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state-intervention and rebuilding stressed by actually existing neoliberalism in the
London Docklands project’s redevelopment activities.
In the article “Cities and the Geographies of ‘Actually Existing Neoliberalism,’”
Brenner and Theodore (2002) state that actually existing neoliberalism represents the
destructive character of the previous regulatory landscape and the contradictory nature
of neoliberal ideology itself, and also that neoliberal policies misrepresent the real
effect of how neoliberal ideologies should be (Brenner & Theodore, 2002). I agree
with Brenner and Theodore’s (2002) viewpoint. My study presents that the Chinese
actually existing neoliberalism almost skips the neoliberal roll-back destruction part
but directly leaps forward to the neoliberal roll-out creation of active state-building. In
a word, the roll-out neoliberal state intervention dominates the Chinese actually
existing neoliberalism. And my study contributes to the analysis of the Chinese
actually existing neoliberalism (active state-interventionist) by specifically
introducing the neoliberal flanking system established by the local state.
For example, although the redevelopment projects in London Docklands were
initiated under the slogan of neoliberalism, they actually have the features of state
“interventionist agenda” (Brownill, 2011, p. 129). Brenner and Theodore (2002)
introduce five rationales to decipher macroeconomic structures and the evolutionary
trajectories of capitalism, because neoliberal ideology sometimes cannot truly reflect
the effects that neoliberal policies should have under this macroeconomic framework.
These are the five rationales that advocate the need for local development
regimes to manage the complex process of urban development:
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(1) coping with the problems of capitalist regulation, (2) coping with the
unstable historical geographies of capitalism, (3) complying with the uneven
geographical development, (4) hewing to the regulation of uneven geographical
development, and (5) adhering to the evolving geographies of state regulation
(Brenner & Theodore, 2002).
Brenner and Theodore (2002) believe the three linchpins for our interpretation of
actually existing neoliberalism are path dependence, the underpinning of the inherited
Keynesian-Fordist regulatory landscape, and neoliberal capitalist market-oriented
restructuring (Brenner & Theodore, 2002). To be specific, path dependence refers to
the ideological vestiges that actually existing neoliberalism inherits from Fordism.
Due to Fordism’s crisis during the 1970s, Fordist mass production and mass
consumption cannot sustain themselves because of intensified international
competition, deregulation, and dismantling of the Bretton Woods system. Capitalist
restructuring triggers the rearrangement of state regulation’s territorial organization,
which indicates the theoretical interaction between the emerging neoliberal
modernizing institutional infrastructure and the conservative Keynesian-Fordist
thinking (Brenner & Theodore, 2002). Moreover, the neoliberal restructuring
strategies always lead to interactions with pre-existing uses of space, institutional
configuration, and sociopolitical power. Thus, the neoliberal projects of capitalist
restructuring are highly influenced by prior regulatory arrangements, institutional
practice, and political compromise (Brenner & Theodore, 2002, p. 14). This can
reflect the characteristics of path dependence. The Dong’ao Corporation Company’s
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establishment (the autonomous redevelopment agency) follows the previous extant
government institute. The reason waterfront redevelopment activities are dynamic in
Qingdao is the close connection between the development coalition and the local
public authority. Therefore, to a certain degree, we can also attribute the booming of
redevelopment initiatives in Qingdao (a second-tier Chinese city) to path dependence.
Brenner and Theodore (2002) evaluate the concept of creative destruction, and
describe creative destruction as “geographically uneven, socially regressive,
politically volatile trajectories of institutional/spatial change” (Brenner & Theodore,
2002, p. 2). Meanwhile, creative destruction can also be defined as “destruction of
extant institutional arrangements and political compromises through market-oriented
economic growth, commodification and the rule of capital” (Brenner & Theodore,
2002, p. 15). Generally speaking, the authors (2002) believe that creative destruction
is a process that generates uneven development and social polarization. Hackworth
(2007) identifies the neoliberal destruction and neoliberal creation as the dismantling
of the Keynesian regulatory landscape and state institutions’ rebuilding. Still, it is also
an open-ended capitalist restructuring that causes conflicts, crises, and “governance
failures” (Brenner & Theodore, 2002, p. 19). The conditions under which creative
destruction happens are when “newly emergent projected space” interacts with an
extant regulatory landscape, which results in a new and unstable political-economic
space (Brenner & Theodore, 2002, p. 19).
Cities are essential to actually existing neoliberalism because central cities are
usually where creative destruction happens particularly intensely. A central city’s
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environment is characterized by monetary contradictions and financial capital
speculation (Brenner & Theodore, 2002). Moreover, port cities are the interface where
reconnection of the city and the hinterland occurs. So it is in Qingdao, which has
always served as a gateway port for the Yellow River Basin, and where there are
many economic uncertainties and social problems amid the city’s restructuring.
Neoliberal ideologies thus “interiorize” urban policy regimes (Brenner & Theodore,
2002, p. 20). Central cities become the arena of neoliberal experimentation and the
billboards of neoliberal policies (Brenner & Theodore, 2002). What is more, to
facilitate a stable entrepreneurial environment and enhance the competitive
private-sector advantage in the economy, there is neoliberal roll-out state institutional
creation involved amid the creative destruction to ensure economic actors are not
affected by the market, state, and governance failures.
2.1.8. Roll-back Destruction and Roll-out Entrepreneurialism
Due to the huge impact of capital driven by the neoliberal doctrine, the
government should reactivate its role as a redistributor to establish the supportive
extra-local framework. The aim is to prevent the powerful shock of neoliberalism for
the impoverished populations. Capital and government currently cooperate, so
municipal governments and real estate elites are the two most important components
of the local governing coalition. I believe that the redistributive role played by city
halls is far from enough. In contrast, the Chinese municipalities promote urban
entrepreneurialism, manifested by interurban competitions, and their guiding
ideologies are also entrepreneurial urban governance. To illustrate, regional
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competition has been one of the most significant roll-out entrepreneurialism features
(Su & Tao, 2017). The interurban competition among different localities has
intensified local government’s pressure to pursue revenue generation (Su & Tao,
2017). And this has induced local governments to compete for property-led economic
developments to reap the profits from land redevelopment projects. Deng’s 1992
southern tour officially made interurban competition the mechanism for resource
allocation (Su & Tao, 2017). The interurban competition also indirectly established
this model of local developmentalism. Local governments competed with one other to
build their own state-owned enterprises and Township and Village Enterprises to
generate incubators of tax revenues (Su & Tao, 2017). And the local governments
transformed themselves from “asset owners” to “tax collectors.” In summary,
municipal governments across the country compete to facilitate “their own
children”—the local enterprises (Su & Tao, 2017).
In Neoliberalizing Space, Peck and Tickell (2002) argue that roll-out
neoliberalism also refers to the “neoliberalized economic management, authoritarian
state form, and proactive policies” (p. 37). The process of shifting from roll-back
destruction neoliberalism to roll-out institutional creation exemplifies the
transformation to rebuilding state-interventionist, paternalist, and punitive
government disciplines (Peck & Tickell, 2002). For instance, the redevelopment
projects in London Docklands exemplify the neoliberal state “interventionist agenda”
(Brownill, 2011, p. 129). As mentioned earlier, Brownill (2011) also defines roll-back
and roll-out neoliberalism.
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Peck and Tickell (2002) examine the dark side of fundamentalist neoliberalism: a
deteriorating macroeconomic cycle; short-termism; the sprawl of capital; the
deepening of social, economic, and geographical inequality; the destruction of social
production; and limitations to market liberalism and socially progressive substitutions.
Hackworth (2007) believes that neoliberalism should be considered an
ideological rejection of Keynesianism, and many neoliberal regulatory powers such as
land-use zoning, social service, public housing, and the redistributive impulse are
undermined. Peck and Tickell (2002) explain that neoliberalism presents two
significant shortcomings due to the state’s withdrawal. First of all, neoliberal social
regulation cannot conduct sustainable reproduction. Second, the neoliberal assault
focuses too much on anticompetitive institutions instead of constructing alternative
regulatory institutions.
Additionally, neoliberal advocates introduce the competitive mechanism for
interlocal relations. Through interlocal competitive relationships, the different regions
are disciplined by the forces of marketized neoliberal spatial relationships (Peck &
Tickell, 2002). Cox (1999) elaborates on the definition of territorial ideologies
facilitating the growth coalition’s unity. Cox (1999) believes that the unity based on
local communities’ territory and ideologies is an appeal to local identity that could be
used amid interlocal competition by uniting people from different backgrounds with
other territorial interests to thwart other territorial oppositions. The Qingdao Olympic
Sailing Centre redevelopment project is also seen as a flagship project under
neoliberalism to unite residents’ regional identity.
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Nevertheless, Peck and Tickell (2002) state that it is challenging for neoliberal,
competitive relations to take “bottom-up” political actions without a proper
redistributive/supportive extra-local framework. This is because progressive projects
need an extra-local framework to respond to the hostile neoliberal environment in
order to avoid the neoliberalized regional relations and the “regulatory dumping,”
which is caused by the overwhelming political power owned by neoliberal
international organizations (Peck & Tickell, 2002, p. 39).
Furthermore, Peck and Tickell (2002) explain the development history of
neoliberalism, and this theory emerged from an intellectual to a state regulatory
project. From the 1970s to the 1990s, neoliberalism transformed itself from a
roll-back neoliberal destruction ideology to a neoliberal roll-out form of social
intervention and amelioration (Peck & Tickell, 2002). This corresponds with the
description mentioned earlier of neoliberal roll-back destruction and roll-out
neoliberal creation (Brownill, 2011; Peck & Tickell, 2002). Since the 1990s,
neoliberalism has transformed beyond a deregulation ideology and has become a new
social and disciplinary policy. It is also about a roll-out neoliberal creation of state
institutions, namely, a new form of state-building (Peck & Tickell, 2002).
Since the 1990s, neoliberalism has increasingly transformed from an academic
ideology to a state regulatory project, and it is more and more targeting its own
market, state, and governance failures. People found that in the deregulating era, the
market itself was not able to function as an economic regulating force, so other
institutional regulating power beside the market forces is needed. Neoliberalism
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therefore becomes a disciplinary force that introduces new market forms of
governance and regulation (Peck & Tickell, 2002). Moreover, neoliberalism also goes
through the change of the scalar constitution. Many social policies or regulatory
powers are shifted downward to the local level, while others shift upward to
international organizations (Peck & Tickell, 2002). The local governing coalition’s
amplified power exemplifies the devolved fiscal power received by the local
governing coalition formed by the municipal government and private developers
(Hackworth, 2007). Third, there was a trend of financialization in the field of
economic policy and social policy (Peck & Tickell, 2002). This is corroborated by the
financial deals cut by the Qingdao municipal governments and the local private
sectors. Due to the 1980s neoliberal reform, the Chinese municipal governments are
becoming more entrepreneurial and businesslike to cooperate with local private
sectors to facilitate the financing of redevelopment projects. Deal-making strategies
have been highly developed and widely used. The new financialization approach has
developed public and private partnerships into a new level from grantsmanship to
deal-making. San Diego’s downtown festival mall (Horton Plaza) is an excellent
example (Sagalyn, 1990).
Beyond that, in the Space of Neoliberalism, neoliberalism becomes an
“extra-local regime of rules and routines, pressures and penalties” (Peck & Tickell,
2002, p. 45). Cities thus become supporters of urban entrepreneurialism. And
interurban competition shapes urban entrepreneurialism (Peck & Tickell, 2002).
Cities compete with each other under the logic of interurban competition, and this
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process is underpinned by urban transformation and revitalization. Moreover, the
process is driven by a lack of regional substitution (Peck & Tickell, 2002).
All in all, interurban competition has a significant impact on reflexive and
entrepreneurial urban governance; as mentioned earlier, interurban competition
shapes entrepreneurial governance. Again, Cox (1999) argues that the territorial
ideology could be used to unite different interest groups in the city and create a sense
of identity within cities’ boundaries. Seven expressions are showing the domination of
neoliberalism, and they exemplify what entrepreneurial city governance manifests: (1)
in entrepreneurial city governance, growth, job, and investment always rank as top
priorities of neoliberalism, (2) the market competitiveness, (3) neoliberalism should
focus not only on small government, privatization, and deregulation but also on
efficient resource allocation and modified municipal lending policies. Moreover,
neoliberalism should also undermine other redistributive priorities such as social
redistribution, economic rights, or public investment, (4) neoliberalism has a positive
stance on local capital interests and state-building but negatively affects social welfare
and infrastructure, (5) some neoliberalism characteristics include capital subsidies,
regional boosterism, social intervention, and revitalization of central cities, (6)
meanwhile, neoliberal regimes use punitive measures to discipline disobedient cities,
and (7) the results of contradictory policies (such as welfare reform and labour-market
polarization) are “punitive institution building” and authoritarian state (Peck &
Tickell, 2002, p. 48). Neoliberalization, moreover, is a long-term gradual process of
interurban competition and intraurban development (Peck & Tickell, 2002). So the
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state’s withdrawal did not immediately liberate the market. The rise of neoliberalism
is a series of political arrangements, which means neoliberalism is a result of the
market’s political construction, and it is manifested by a competitive tenet and
privatization (Peck & Tickell, 2002). The neoliberal entrepreneurial regime has a
significant national/political/institutional context that exemplifies a macroeconomic
transforming process (Peck & Tickell, 2002).
Furthermore, entrepreneurial governance represents the interlocal competition
rules and the restructuring and rearrangement of extra-local resources, which reflect
the profound realignment of macroeconomic politics (Peck & Tickell, 2002). Only
when there are enough interurban competitions can urban governance reflect the
objective rule of capital accumulation. The concrete neoliberal city governance
projects include (1) political rearrangement, (2) state-intervention, and (3) neoliberal
roll-out institutional building (Peck & Tickell, 2002).
In summary, in terms of policy development, neoliberalism is reflected in the
fields of financial stability, management of urban low-income residents, labour
market regulation, the substitution of redistributive policies by workfare, and the
establishment of ethics for working and self-reliance (Peck & Tickell, 2002).
In the article “Liberalism, Neoliberalism, and Urban Governance: A
State-Theoretical Perspective,” Jessop (2002) evaluates the three forms of
neoliberalism: “policy adjustment, regime shift, and radical system transformation” (p.
111).
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Jessop (2002) goes on to analyze the four reasons that Keynesian welfare national
state theories (KWNS) are different from neoliberal theories (Schumpeterian workfare
post-national regime): (1) SWPR emphasizes technological improvement and market
competition, (2) SWPR gets people from welfare to work, (3) SWPR renders different
levels of government with new powers, and (4) SWPR increasingly encourages
different types of partnerships and networks rather than merely relying on market
forces, corporatist arrangement, or top-down planning (Jessop, 2002).
Jessop (2002) identifies three types of transformation from the Keynesian welfare
nation state to SWPR: neocorporatism, neostatism, and neocommunitarianism.
Specifically, neoliberalism refers to the promotion of competition, deregulation,
privatization of social production and collective rights, internationalization, and
austerity policies (Jessop, 2002). Neostatism refers to regulated competition, guiding
national strategies, auditing private industries’ performance, the partnership between
public and private sectors under the control of the central government, and the central
government’s protection of important industries (Jessop, 2002). Neocorporatism
refers to consideration to both competition and cooperation, “decentralized regulated
self-regulation,” more public and private stakeholders, more applications of public
and private partnerships, protection of critical industries, and levying high taxes to
invest social productions (Jessop, 2002, p. 114). Neocommunitarianism refers to the
termination of market competition, expanding the role of public sectors in the
economy, rebalancing of international trade, the promotion of social learning, and
allocating tax revenues to enhance people’s living standards (Jessop, 2002). The past
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30 years of development in Chinese cities have exemplified the shift from Keynesian
welfare nation-state to neostatism. In some coastal open port cities where the global
economy’s integration is deepened, the KWNS has gradually moved into neostatism
or neocorporatism. In the case of the Olympic Sailing Centre project, I argue that the
redevelopment regime is close to the interface between neostatism and
neocorporatism. This point is illustrated in detail in the 8th Result Analysis section.
In summary, the entrepreneurial urban governance pursued by Chinese municipal
governments helps local authorities to reap benefits from the speculative land
investments and extract value from the investments. Meanwhile, the central
government reduces the outlay and withdrawal from direct investment to reshape
fiscal austerity.
In the article “Extracting Value from the City: Neoliberalism and Urban
Redevelopment,” Weber (2002) states that obsolescence renders the decrease of
exchange value, and it is the reason for conducting creative destruction. Moreover, it
exemplifies spatialized capital accumulation (Weber, 2002). States have developed
many mechanisms, such as financial deregulation, the commodification of debt, and
the removal of credit shelter for the real estate industry, to make the built environment
more responsive to real estate investments. Thus, municipalities reduce land
development costs, while the capital elites do not have to do so (Weber, 2002).
Real estate investments, further, are illiquid, and their turnover period is very
long. The value of real estate is easily affected by immediate property values. These
real estate investment characteristics have made the real estate industry very sensitive
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to depreciation (Weber, 2002). Real estate capital elites seek profit to destruct
dilapidated buildings’ value and collect profits from new development (Weber, 2002).
In addition to that, the spatial-temporal boundaries restrict the range of decaying,
which means that once one sector of the city experiences declining, the geographical
boundaries can ensure that the rest of the city is not infected by the blighting
“disease” (Weber, 2002).
Weber (2002) also indicates that the states’ two responsibilities are ensuring the
proper capital accumulation process and the legitimization to manage external
political volatility. And the states can render themselves to become legitimate
regulatory regimes through the provision of expertise on law and science (Weber,
2002).
The 1970s federal cutbacks triggered the reformation of real-estate finance and its
governance, accompanied by the concomitant destruction of Fordism and
Keynesianism. Both were displaced by neoliberalism, which has changed the source
of capital and priorities for using capital since the Keynesian era (Weber, 2002).
Accordingly, Hackworth (2007) illuminates that the neoliberal federal government is
no longer responsible for collective assumptions such as public housing and social
facilities, so the cities are increasingly facing federal cutbacks.
Generally speaking, neoliberalism imposes the rule of “interlocal competition”
(Peck & Tickell, 2002, p. 40). As a social regulation mechanism, neoliberalism
establishes the marketized interlocal competition rules and the indicators of evaluating
the neoliberal artifacts (Peck & Tickell, 2002).
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Weber (2002) goes over the history of urban renewal projects. She explains how
blight becomes the new standard of creative destruction. According to Van Vliet
(1998), the Housing Act of 1949 was the legislative mandate to eliminate slums. The
enactment was for local redevelopment authorities to purchase and clear slums. And
Weber (2002) specifies that redevelopment legislation focuses on three characteristics:
(1) the decaying of the buildings’ use-value, (2) the construction of new affordable
housing to displace the dilapidated buildings, and (3) managerial state intervention to
protect public health and welfare (Weber, 2002). Weber (2002) also examines how a
large amount of federal money flowed into the construction and demolition of
decaying communities during the mega-projects era. The consensus has been that
eradicating the urban blighting area is the only way to achieve revitalization. The
Keynesian municipal government has the role of social redistribution to facilitate the
balanced development of different regions. The local level of urban growth coalition
undertakes the devolved power and resources from the national state. Thus, local
communities use federal financial stimulus such as CDBG to propel more efficient
urban renewal projects (Weber, 2002).
After the federal cutbacks, local development coalitions were increasingly relying
on their own resources, which leads to the phenomenon of glocalization (Hackworth,
2007). Moreover, the trades in real estate sectors are increasingly deterritorialized and
dematerialized, and securitization connects the local real estate market and national
capital markets. Thus, urban redevelopment projects started to get ample funding
from the credit market (Weber, 2002). Institutional investors were becoming more
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bank-like to conduct banking activities, and they eventually replaced the roles of
banks in the credit market. The deregulation of the financial sector and the
localization of urban renewal’s financial power have reinforced the importance of
locally oriented knowledge (Weber, 2002). Hence, the municipalities became more
entrepreneurial, and they developed many mechanisms to extract value from
redevelopment projects in the urban landscape, meanwhile eliminating obsolescence
(Weber, 2002). The Qingdao Olympic Sailing Centre’s development story
corresponds with Weber’s argument: the common interests of the three stakeholders
(the municipal government, private developer, and semi-autonomous agency) are to
extract value from property-led economic development and sustain the “land finance,”
which is the most important common interest between the stakeholders of the growth
coalitions. Land finance refers to the concept of local government acquiring financial
revenue through land development.
Last but not least, the municipalities develop a series of mechanisms to promote
entrepreneurial urban interventions such as tax increment financing (TIF). Sagalyn
(1990) illustrates that off-budget financial instruments (deal-making via PPP) and tax
increment financing were invented and developed during the era of “do no harm.”
And these instruments of entrepreneurial urban governance have constantly revamped
the built environment of urban space (Weber, 2002). Weber additionally analyzes the
details of TIF use and the impacts of this financial development tool (Weber, 2002).
All in all, entrepreneurial cities have increasingly differed from welfarism,
because urban development coalitions are relying more and more on local resources to
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“pay for themselves” (Weber, 2002, p. 190). The downward shift of states’ financial
power has made municipalities tap into local property tax revenues to rely on the
private real estate market. According to Schubert (2011), since the neoliberal
devolution of financial power, the municipal government had to rely on their own
resources via cutting deals with the developers to tap into local financial support. The
neoliberal redevelopment policies are thus used by the states to discipline speculative
and property investment activities. Moreover, financial instruments such as TIF
intensify how local states extract value from urban properties. Hence, obsolete
buildings make the best targets for demolition and creating empty sites for distant real
estate developments (Weber, 2002).
Neoliberalism has also caused institutional reform from the New York and New
Jersey Port Authority’s organizational form. Due to the loss of manufacturing jobs in
the older cities since the 1970s, the bi-state agency’s role was expanded to focus on
strengthening the region’s manufacturing industries and improving communication
within the region. The port authority also built a new office building in Newark’s
older town. The ultimate goal of these efforts was to stimulate the region’s economic
vitality (Doig, 2001). During the last quarter of the past century, when neoliberalism
gained momentum, the New York and New Jersey state governments repealed the
1962 bond covenant so that the port authority’s rail activities were no longer limited
by the ten percent rule to meet the demands for bond-revenue raising (Doig, 2001).
This shows that the American regulatory bodies (such as port authorities) are similar
to the Chinese redevelopment authorities’ financing mechanism.
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2.1.9. Neoliberal Socialization
In the article “Neoliberalism and Socialization in Compensatory City: Opposites,
Complements, and Instabilities,” Gough (2002) states that a new form of urban
socialization absorbs neoliberalism’s characteristics. These new forms of urban
socialization can better serve the purpose of neoliberalism. According to Gough
(2002), neoliberalism provides solutions for the tension between socialization and the
market. Neoliberalism is intended to free private property from collective rights and
the obligation to remove the social and political limitation. Moreover, actually
existing neoliberalism is accompanied by the urban socialization of production and
reproduction (Gough, 2002). In a capitalist society, socialization can enhance the
living standard of the working-class and generate job opportunities. So although
socialization contradicts neoliberalism ostensibly, it can promote neoliberalism by
offering more options and freedom for capital (Gough, 2002).
Gough (2002) considers the socialization of capitalism a neoliberal project, since
the technological revolution triggers the demand for socialization. He believes that
disadvantaged groups in society benefit from socialization, and even though the new
form of socialization is beneficial for capital accumulation, the disadvantaged groups
will ultimately undermine the capital command (Gough, 2002). Civil rights
movements since the 1960s have shaken the rule of the capitalist elite, who use the
ideology of neoliberalism as a response to defuse the threat (Gough, 2002). What is
more, the neoliberal ideology was mainly targeted at two problems: (1) the rate of
profit was too low, and (2) over politicization (Gough, 2002).
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Gough (2002) further believes that neoliberalism is a constrained intellectual
concept for capital elites to impose discipline on the working class. Nevertheless, he
explains that neoliberalism is a progressive and reflexive ideology targeting the
socialization of capital. In other words, it is complicated and contingent (Gough,
2002). He summarizes the nine essential sides that neoliberalism promotes: (1) the
mobility of capital, (2) capital dominance over the labour market, (3) the competition
for employment, (4) cuts in state service and commodification, (5) privatization and
deregulation, (6) the distortion of some local state service and protection of particular
capital interests, (7) the encouragement of individualism, (8) increasing allocation for
particular groups of residents, and (9) the regulation of private property (Gough,
2002).
Moreover, Gough (2002) states that the development of new technology requires
neoliberalism to continue with socialization. Class relations are in the form of
socialization, and they are an essential part of national path dependence (Gough,
2002). He argues that the improvement of business influence is through firms’
organized association. Regional clusters show the consolidation of capital power and
exemplify compensation for the neoliberal weakening of power at the national level
(Gough, 2002). Furthermore, the formation of regional clusters could promote
production efficiency and generate more surplus value, so it allays the conflicts
between workers and capital elites. Neoliberal socialization could make workers
self-disciplined in order to reach capitalism’s ultimate goal: the dominance of capital
over labour (Gough, 2002).
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Gough (2002) also explains that neoliberal socialization makes the urban poor
socially and culturally fragmented, with no access to collective actions. Poor urban
residents have to turn to private resources, and, as a consequence, the community
initiatives organized by private resources have no challenging power; their “radical
dynamics” are always easy to “head off” (Gough, 2002, p. 71). Hence, the urban poor
become the reserve army of capital production through neoliberal socialization
(Gough, 2002).
Under the context of neoliberalism, neoliberal socialization has been used to
prevent too much politicization, which means socialization plays a vital role in
promoting depoliticization (Gough, 2002). So neoliberal socialization (including
regional cluster and community initiative) is a systematic framework to undermine
socialization’s politicization. Although socialization and neoliberalism are
contradictory on the surface, they complement and reinforce each other, so the
so-called cooperative industrial relations mean that workers’ organizations are
fragmented by neoliberalism. The working class is bought and compromised by
capital (Gough, 2002).
Nowadays, the waterfront redevelopment projects in Chinese port cities
exemplify the neoliberal destruction of the previous Keynesian-Fordism industrial
waterfront and the roll-out creation of the post-industrial waterfront. And this
transformation process unveils how entrepreneurial urban governance has changed the
physical structure of urban space in Chinese port cities.
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2.2. Urban Regime Theory and Growth Machine Theory
The research question I am trying to answer in section 2.2 is: How do development
coalitions function to facilitate the waterfront redevelopment initiatives in Chinese
port cities? And how are the development coalitions formed?
2.2.1. The Regime Politics in the U.S. and Chinese Cities
In the book Regime Politics: Governing Atlanta, Stone (1989) examines how
public officeholders and private interests constitute the urban regime to let business
elites launch redevelopment initiatives. Stone (1989) explains that city hall and
downtown business elites function together to formulate the urban regime, which is
the informal partnerships complementing the formal government authority.
Hackworth (2007) defines an urban regime as a way for public and private interests to
function together to carry out governing decisions, and its goal is to initiate
development and retard disinvestment. A regime of informal social groups with
access to institutional resources, therefore, can make potent governing decisions
(Stone, 1989).
Since the urban regime constitutes social groups accessible to institutional
resources to make efficient governing decisions, private interests that possess the
institutional resources must be part of a stable governing coalition (Stone, 1989). My
study disagrees with Stone’s (1989) conclusion because, in the Chinese context, the
municipal government and the state-owned enterprises dominate the governing
coalition, while the private developers do not have the final say. My study contributes
to the application of urban regime theory against the Chinese second-tier city
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background. Nevertheless, in the first-tier Chinese cities, such as Shanghai, the
situation (mechanism of the governing coalition) is much similar to what Stone (1989)
has evaluated. This resonates with Hackworth’s (2007) argument that business elites
have enormous power. Nevertheless, Hackworth (2007) also advocates that regime
theory is not economic determinism because politics constitute a significant part of
power. Stone (1989) goes over the two key factors propelling the informal
arrangements, which are: (1) the broad scope so that different types of institutional
resources can be mobilized, and (2) cooperation between public sectors and business
interests. In addition to that, the two rationales for how governing coalitions are
formed are: (1) popular control of governments, and (2) private ownership of
enterprises (Stone, 1989). Stone (1989) pays particular attention to the business
interests because: (1) business interests are vital in giving strength to the economics of
the community, and (2) business interests are in control of critical political resources.
Stone (1989) also explores why cooperation is significant: politicians need to have
broader political connections to enhance their bargaining power.
Stone (1989) uses the case of Atlanta to explain that the condition of a successful
ruling alliance is not to set restrictions for investors, but to provide employment
opportunities for minority enterprises. Hence, the strategy unites the coalition and
promotes cooperation. The governing coalitions reduce popular control to head off
oppositions. They use the minimum level of a referendum to make long-term and
consistent development policies (Stone, 1989).
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Stone (1989) also mentions that the regime has a close relationship with political
practice and policy initiatives. The nature of the regime determines its action and
direction. Conversely, policy action can also affect the features of regime policies
(Stone, 1989). He explains that policy shapes the forms of political participation and
the features of politics. In the Atlanta case, biracial cooperation between the African
American middle class and white business elites sustained the governing coalition.
Politics therefore shape policy in the form of a governing coalition (Stone, 1989).
American cities increasingly use public money to leverage private investment to
avert neighbourhood opposition, and this has enhanced development capital, so using
public and private partnership becomes a widespread feature of urban politics (Stone,
1989). Business elites are the dominant force behind the formation of an urban regime.
They sustain civic cooperation by mobilizing their own resources. The contemporary
entrepreneurial political actors of entrepreneurial urban governance are both private
and public sectors, and one of their goals is to let private finance become the crucial
financial tool for ameliorating the urban built environment (Heeg, 2011). The new
system of interaction has bonded together the African American middle class with
white business elites. The provision of business opportunities to the African American
middle class undergirds the foundation of biracial cooperation (Stone, 1989). The
federal government had heavily subsidized Atlanta, so the Urban Development Action
Grant (UDAG) was widely used. Thus, numerous development projects significantly
impact neighbourhood preservationists’ interests (Stone, 1989). Stone (1989) specifies
that the reason downtown business elites can occupy the centre position of governing
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coalitions is due to their possession of political resources, and the reason that the
African American working class, unlike the African American middle class, was not
part of the governing coalition is that they did not possess ample political resources.
Stone (1989) explains that the business community’s internal personal bonding
reduces the possibility of a factional split. The fundamental reason for seeking
business unity is the sustainability of business cooperation. And whether or not
business cooperation can be sustained depends on the provision of “investor
prerogative” to business leaders (Stone, 1989, p. 170). The term investor prerogative
means that business leaders possess slack corporate resources so that they can provide
“small opportunities” or “selective incentives” to cement the governing coalitions or
sustain business cooperation (Stone, 1989, p. 190). He illustrates that public policies
are designed to support investor prerogative, which facilitates business unity (Stone,
1989). An investor prerogative is the guarantee of development activities, and it is
created by semi-autonomous institutes and public and private partnerships. Moreover,
investor prerogative protects development activities from the impact of popular
electoral control (Stone, 1989). The formation of a governing coalition involves
choosing the African American middle class as the coalition’s supporting
constituency so as to facilitate its cohesion.
In addition to that, Stone (1989) evaluates selective incentives offered by
business elites who have ample institutional resources to solve collective actions,
sustaining coalition. Moreover, investor prerogative and selective incentives are
closely correlated. The investor prerogative removes any disincentive factors for the
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prerogative class, and this reinforces selective incentives (“solidarity within the
investor class”) (Stone, 1989, p. 175).
In summary, the Atlanta regime’s key feature is that the solidarity of electoral
power made the African American middle class benefit more than the urban poor and
African American working class (Stone, 1989). Because the governing coalition in
Atlanta was effective and efficient, it could promote large programs and desegregate
and solicit the African American middle class to join the governing coalition. Thus,
the Atlanta governing coalition is capable of carrying out the activist development
agenda (Stone, 1989).
However, the situation in Qingdao is different. Racial politics is not an issue in
Chinese port cities. Instead, the linchpin of the governing coalition’s success in
Qingdao is the close ties between municipal government and local redevelopment
enterprises that I explain in detail in the eighth section.
The three primary characteristics of the urban regime are (1) the capacity to do
something, (2) a set of actors who do it, and (3) a relationship among the actors that
enables them to work together. And as mentioned earlier, the urban regime has been
defined as how private interests and the public sector function together to formulate
informal arrangements to carry out governing decisions (Stone, 1989). Public housing
is used as a tool to build a coalition. Reciprocity and loyalty work together to make
relationships dependable and reliable (Stone, 1989).
Stone (1989) also explains why the regime’s constitution should reflect the
government officials (elected by democratic elections) who are capable of promoting
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business activities needed by the communities. He examines the caretaker role in
ward politics. Given his study in Atlanta, he explains that ward politicians will exert a
special caretaker role to large firms, especially in the manufacturing sector, and they
offer subsidies such as low taxes. The caretaker role’s characteristics are that the ward
politicians are close to small property holders, and their supporters are the large but
politically inactive business. In Atlanta’s case, the activist redevelopment agenda
replaces the caretaker policies (Stone, 1989). Stone (1989) also states that the civic
and electoral sectors are closely related to each other. A governing coalition must be
able to promote economic development and civic cooperation. It must be able to do
more than win the election (Stone, 1989). He explains that selective incentives in
conjunction with emotional commitment are used as rewards and punishments to
solve the collective action problems (Stone, 1989).
Adherence to collectivism, moreover, means that cooperation could displace
individual opportunism (Stone, 1989). The lack of selective incentives is always
accompanied by a lack of discipline, which is why the challenge of the 1960s protest
to the governing coalition failed (Stone, 1989). The selective incentive helps sustain
the activist agenda and is significant to the regime’s durability (Stone, 1989). That is
why business elites and the African American middle class can centre the civic
cooperation stage: they possess ample institutional resources (Stone, 1989). The
selective incentives mainly come from the private sector, but they could also come
from government authority. And the reason that business elites in Atlanta were
against Maynard Jackson was to preserve the business influence and fight for the
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centre stage on civic cooperation (because Atlanta’s white business elites possessed a
large number of institutional resources). This explains why civic cooperation is
durable and effective (Stone, 1989).
In the Atlanta regime, the private sector actors had investor prerogative. The
governing coalition was not able to focus on civic cooperation without business elites’
support, so the progressive governing coalition led by Mayor Jackson could not
effectively govern. Jackson’s administration could have been Atlanta’s governing
coalition, but the city’s business elites controlled the essential resources and selective
incentives. The white business elites undermined Jackson’s leadership by restricting
the provision of selective incentives, and he could not use the neighbourhood
movements to solicit the African American working class to be their political
partners.
The way that business elites support civic cooperation is to impose investor
prerogatives on minority business in exchange for electoral support from the African
American middle class (Stone, 1989). Thus, selective incentives are critical resources
for forming civic cooperation (Stone, 1989). Stone (1989) summarizes that only the
white downtown business elites could formulate a network of civic cooperation and
promote the cohesion of cooperation, and they would support the politicians who
supported their business. By positioning themselves at the centre of civic cooperation,
the business elites could become an indispensable part of the city’s governing
coalition. So public officials could only cooperate with business elites to govern;
otherwise, their interests would suffer. Incorporation into the business system of civic
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cooperation, therefore, ensures empowerment, and being partners with downtown
business elites is attractive to public officials (Stone, 1989). Stone also states (1989)
that there are three crucial steps to reinforcing business power: (1) class unity, (2)
cooperation, and (3) shaping cities’ politics by constructing the network of civic
cooperation to help politicians who potentially could win the election and expand the
business influence. There would be no business cooperation without the activist
agenda because, in the Atlanta governing coalition, business elites are key allies who
possess slack resources (Stone, 1989). One of Atlanta’s governing coalition’s
significant features is the business control of investment activity, which is the critical
component of business influence. Stone (1989) states that Atlanta’s business
enterprises possess slack resources that have tremendous political value. And this is
exemplified by the political role of the business sector, which is reflected in how
Central Atlanta Progress, Inc. was organized: formed by the Atlanta downtown
property holders (Stone, 1989).
In summary, the Atlanta downtown elites shaped the local regime through their
political and economic influence. They solicited the African American middle class to
be their allies by offering essential resources as selective incentives to establish direct
business ties with the African American politicians. Hence, the business elites
dominated Atlanta’s civic cooperation by facilitating biracial communication. Stone
(1989) specifies that the slack institutional resources that business elites possessed
cannot be ignored, because white downtown business elites could use the institutional
resources as weapons to reward social groups who cooperate with them and discipline
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those who do not. In the end, Stone (1989) argues that the business elite cannot pursue
activist agenda without the government’s cooperation. That is why the African
American middle class is a vital political force, as they hold a significant position in
democratic elections. Thus, white downtown business elites’ strategic core is to use
their resources to construct the regime more efficiently and effectively. Meanwhile,
they undermine the black elected government’s ability to govern independently by
limiting the provision of selective incentives. Simultaneously, white downtown
business elites tried to establish strong private links with the African American middle
class to reinforce the network of civic cooperation (Stone, 1989). In doing so, they
maximized their interests.
Stone (1989) illustrates that it is difficult to build effective governance if city hall
does not have a close partnership with business elites. In other words, if there is elite
business involvement in the partnership, the governing coalition will be useful but not
equitable (Stone, 1989). Additionally, Stone (1989) explains that the concepts of
reciprocity, deal-making, and “go[ing] along to get along” are contracted to the
concepts of “enlarged, elevated, and grand versions of governing” (Stone, 1989, p.
206). Thus, the downtown business elites’ selective incentives were meant to lay the
foundation of concerted action. However, since selective incentives lack more
comprehensive representation, they cannot accommodate all classes’ interests (Stone,
1989). For the Atlanta governing coalition, broader representation means there will be
fewer business opportunities as the investors must take care of other social groups,
hence business elites’ opposition to widened representation (Stone, 1989). The white
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downtown business elites also support good biracial cooperation/relationship, so the
African American middle class has also been able to move broadly onto the political
stage as part of the strategy of cooperation (Stone, 1989).
Nevertheless, the younger generation of the African American middle class, who
grew up in the civil rights movement, started to question who the “insider
beneficiaries” of the selective incentives are, and why the reform had not benefited
working-class African Americans (Stone, 1989, p. 208). Stone (1989) reveals that
business elites offer selective incentives to limit insider privileges only to a small
group of beneficiaries. This could promote regime unity. Still, this is at the expense of
equity (Stone, 1989). Furthermore, Stone (1989) states that the characteristics of the
governing coalition—biracial cooperation—determine the regime’s effectiveness.
Once the regime contains the entire black working class, it cannot achieve
coordination work. There are two elements regarding the effectiveness of the regime:
(1) coordination of work to execute designated projects, and (2) whether the
governing coalition could consider broader community demand (Stone, 1989).
Stone (1989) also states that an inclusive regime generally does better in social
learning than a cohesive regime. That means that the coherent downtown elites could
use selective incentives to finish the projects, but they also lack social learning. And
the Atlanta experience unveils two principles: (1) selective incentives are instrumental
in promoting regime cohesion, and (2) the downtown business elites can thwart social
learning through restrained selective incentives (narrow coalition cooperation) (Stone,
1989). In addition to that, Stone (1989) evaluates the characteristics of reform politics,
93
which is full of autonomous voluntary associations that do not rely on corporate
business. The possession of institutional resources by downtown business elites is
essential because they can promote the city’s business investment and ensure the
continuity of development policies (Stone, 1989). Thus, selective incentives play an
important role in enhancing regime cohesion and making the governing coalition
more efficient (Stone, 1989). Stone (1989) explains that the Atlanta regime’s essential
characteristics are the private control of selective incentive and private leadership of
civic cooperation. Only when the regime is reorganized can there be broader
community representation. The encompassing governing coalition will construct a
pro-business climate, and a cohesive coalition is at the price of social learning.
Nonetheless, a diversified civic sector is always disunited and inefficient (Stone,
1989).
Atlanta’s regime experience reveals that democratic election is essential, and it is
also essential to solicit allies who have an independent/institutional capacity to govern.
Otherwise, business elites will get involved in the governing coalition sooner or later,
and they would use small opportunities to unite the community group closely around
them. Therefore, a reform regime must not rely on business elites. Instead, they
should establish their nonprofit enterprises or neighbourhood organizations to build a
long-term, stable, and cooperative partnership. All of these will be helpful in
constructing an inclusive governing coalition, because the foundation of cooperation
is no longer based on the acceptance of selective incentives but on deepened social
learning. The disadvantage is the decline in execution and efficiency of big projects
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(Stone, 1989). That is why the regime coalition primarily formed by downtown
business elites always intended to keep the governing coalition within a small group
so that the transaction cost stays low. In this way, it becomes impossible to improve
social learning, and the private control of selective incentives intensifies the tendency
(Stone, 1989). Stone (1989) reasons that the way downtown business elites dominate
the governing coalition is by sustaining the civic cooperation network by facilitating
investor class unity and broad investor prerogative. Thus, the concentration of
institutional resources (in the hands of downtown business elites) makes it difficult to
consider social learning and other community claims (Stone, 1989). As mentioned in
the very beginning, the informal arrangement is based on cooperation between the
public and private sectors and private control of institutional resources. The governing
coalitions can then mobilize resources to promote cooperation. And these informal
governing coalitions can complement formal government authority, thus propelling
civic cooperation (Stone, 1989).
Ultimately, Atlanta’s experience explains why government and business
authorities are attractive to each other. The institutional resources possessed by the
business sector are critical for policy-making. Cooperation with business, then, is
significant for empowering the strength of the private sector. This is the cooperation
mode between government and business emphasized by the social-production model
(Stone, 1989). The postwar Atlanta political dynamics are such that downtown
business elites actively use their own economic and organizational resources to
participate in civic cooperation. They were not satisfied with only providing
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investment capital; instead, they actively participated in the policy agenda, thus
becoming an essential part of the urban regime and governing coalition (Stone, 1989).
Business elites thwarted progressive social associations because of their possessions
of small opportunities. They were thus more capable of mobilizing institutional
resources to build an active civic cooperation network and more able to promote the
local governing coalition’s cohesion (Stone, 1989). According to Stone (1989), the
core of the Atlanta governing coalition is that business elites and
government/progressive social associations have different capacities to govern, which
is what the social-production model emphasizes.
Stone concludes by emphasizing that downtown business elites possess ample
institutional resources, which makes them the best allies of city hall (Stone, 1989).
And the small opportunities provided by business elites are the foundation of civic
cooperation, which makes the regime attractive to potential partners (Stone, 1989).
The key to regime building and cohesive unity, then, is how business elites use
selective incentives to facilitate civic cooperation and cohesion (Stone, 1989). He
reiterates the condition of having a progressive regime that is the middle class not
relying on business elites.
Nevertheless, policies are decided by resource controllers. Thus, the capacity also
determines the membership in governing coalitions. The key in Stone’s theory is the
formation of governing coalitions and why some coalitions are better than others in
terms of utilizing private resources. However, Atlanta’s experiences show that its
politics is not machine politics, because the election in Atlanta was nonpartisan, and
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there were no large-scale patronage politics. Nonetheless, this is not saying the civic
life in Atlanta was open and fluid, because nonpartisanship brings about civic, social
organizations’ reliance on business elites. The working-class organizations were not
the main participants of nonprofit organizations in the case of Atlanta’s civic politics.
That is why Atlanta’s postwar politics is an activist agenda rather than machine
politics (Stone, 1989). In the end, Stone (1989) makes explicit the essence of
Atlanta’s postwar regime in that at the core of the governing coalition is the
downtown business elite, and their goal of governing is the active redevelopment of
CBD and the protection of investor prerogatives. Meanwhile, their political allies are
the African American middle class. The two promote the agenda of change and
formulate the city’s governing coalition (Stone, 1989). The business elites could use
their own resources to shape their leading positions in the governing coalition and
defend their privileged positions, and they can construct their web of reciprocity
(civic cooperation) by offering selective incentives (Stone, 1989). However, Stone
(1989) also states that the governing coalition must widen their representation to
understand the city’s full situation, thus making city managers better understand the
consequence of their actions. And this is how the downtown business elites in Atlanta
built the governing regime.
Above is Stone’s classic theory of regime politics. As my description shows, the
Chinese government-business relationship has many Chinese characteristics in its
nature as a form of governing coalition. To answer my research question from the
beginning of section 2.2, these “Chinese characteristics” are based on path
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dependence, which is due to the Chinese municipal governing coalition’s birth and
development. The Chinese local governing coalition is created against the background
of the past forty years’ tremendous change in China’s social economy. So in an
absolute sense, the Chinese local growth coalition is different from North American
cities’ regime (development coalition) based on racial politics.
Amid this changing process, the difference between the Chinese and American
cities lies with the controllers of institutional resources and the different
redevelopment projects’ initiators. In the U.S., private developers are the ones who
have institutional resources, and they have initiatives and incentives to develop the
projects. In contrast, in China, the government controls the land resources to
cooperate with the state-owned development enterprises to initiate the redevelopment
projects (although in first-tier Chinese cities such as Shanghai, private or foreign
investors do have the final say amid redevelopment projects, as described by Fulong
Wu in the case of New Heaven and Earth redevelopment project).
In addition, the incentives driving the investment and redevelopment in central
cities are different. In the U.S., the developers who want to receive monetary profits
drive speculative real estate development. In contrast, in Chinese cities, the municipal
governments, as aggregators of land resources and the market mechanism’s
manipulators, drive the redevelopment project to promote the “land finance,” ensuring
the appreciation of land value to facilitate the local economic growth.
Accordingly, in terms of (1) the controller of land resources, and (2) investment
incentive, the Chinese development regime is absolutely different from the American
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development coalition. However, a comparison of the two countries’ redevelopment
coalitions allows us to comprehend their unique characteristics and the economic and
social differences between China and the United States. Moreover, the dynamics of
how the coalitions are kept together through the allocation of urban resources are
similar between the two countries. Business elites in the U.S. utilize institutional
resources to generate small opportunities to reward and discipline the social groups,
whereas Chinese municipal governments act like dictators. With their own public
power, land resources, and huge financial resources, the Chinese municipal
governments dominate China’s urban redevelopment projects.
Consequently, who will be the stakeholders to supervise and balance the
government’s behaviour in promoting waterfront redevelopment projects is an urgent
research topic. What we can foresee from similar developments in first-tier cities such
as Shanghai, is that with the evolution of the market system, many private enterprises
and even foreign developers are playing an increasingly important role. This also
shows that municipal governments in economically developed areas are making
rational use of the capital market’s resources. They are becoming more and more
sensitive and experienced with leveraging private investment. This is helpful for the
governing coalition to enact governing decisions and make them more effective and
efficient.
All in all, I argue that municipalities across the nation should let private investors
have more investor prerogative to make rational use of capital resources and balance
the overwhelming power of municipalities.
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2.2.2. Growth Machine in the U.S. and Chinese Cities
In the book Urban Fortunes: The Political Economy of Place, Logan and
Molotch (1987) specify that neighbourhoods are also like class/caste, and they have
the function of spatial segregation. The authors (1987) explain that the spiritual and
sentimental stakes are essential, so the use-value of one place is equal to the material
plus the non-material use of the place. The three significant conclusions are: (1) the
capitalists’ attachment focuses on whether land and building can generate profitability
for their businesses, (2) capitalists’ attachment to places is weaker than that of people,
as capitalists can move out more quickly, and (3) capitalists’ use of place is less
fragile than that of residents (Logan & Molotch, 1987).
Logan and Molotch (1987) also specify that the exchange value of place is rent,
explaining that the land market’s essence is monopolistic, which means the landlord
class has complete control over the land supply. Unlike other small commodities, the
housing market cannot increase supply as demand grows (Logan & Molotch, 1987).
They explain that rent levels depend on a property’s location (particularity), and the
differential rents depend on other parcels that are the spill-over effect through the web
of externalities (Logan & Molotch, 1987). So the increase and decrease of property
prices depend on the relations among properties. Thus, revamping the city’s spatial
organization can enhance the rent, which depends on the location of the
property—particularity (Logan & Molotch, 1987). The monopolistic nature of rent
keeps land relatively independent of market supply and demand. The monopolistic
characteristics of individual parcels come from situational/contextual elements, and
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they are not the result of entrepreneurial interventions (Logan & Molotch, 1987).
Moreover, they (1987) suggest that locational advantages and disadvantages result in
rent differentials.
Logan and Molotch (1987) reason that since governments decide the market
outcome, government activities promote the distribution and redistribution among
renters. They summarize the characteristics of place commodity: places cannot be
produced privately as the producers want to meet the demand. Government activities
accompany producers and consumers. As a result, place products are not merely
commodities, nor do they follow regular supply and demand relations (Logan &
Molotch, 1987).
Logan and Molotch (1987) also illustrate the three different types of
entrepreneurs and their relationships with place commodities: (1) active entrepreneurs,
(2) structural speculators, and (3) serendipitous entrepreneurs. They define the growth
machine as “An apparatus of interlocking pro-growth associations and governmental
units” (Logan & Molotch, 1987, p. 32). According to the authors (1987), the growth
machine activists do not care about the production process or the commodity’s
use-value. They stand against intervention that regulates development in the name of
promoting use-value. Nevertheless, they “share the spoils of aggregate growth”
(Logan & Molotch, 1987, p. 32). And the growth machine activists believe that the
free-market mechanism should be able to determine land use. In the authors’ opinion,
land-use regulation will endanger both society and localities (Logan & Molotch,
1987). Similar to the neoliberal theory, the growth machine activists believe that the
101
market is the only legitimate mechanism for deciding what to produce (Logan &
Molotch, 1987), including the provision of public housing. In the same vein,
Hackworth (2007) argues that the neoliberal process of public housing promotes
entrepreneurial and private governance, and roll-out neoliberalism establishes the
principle that the market is the best and most efficient mechanism for allocating the
housing resources.
Beyond that, Logan and Molotch (1987) examine the logic of the communities.
The communities do not evaluate the utility of their residents, but they want
everything that could be produced in their backyard to generate aggregate growth,
because this is a public good that will benefit the entire community. Due to the
benefits of increasing economic activities, city governments therefore generally strive
to attract investors by any means (Logan & Molotch, 1987). Real estate economists
hold similar opinions. Paul Peterson (1981) places cities’ well-being equal to the level
of capital investment because he believes that capital investment in the city is
beneficial to all residents. He believes that it is in the interests of all citizens if the
cities ardently pursue development policies. Peterson (1981), therefore, considers all
capital growth as net gains, and he believes development programs have only a
positive impact on the city overall. He believes the cost of development does not
affect the fortunes of places (Peterson, 1981). Nevertheless, the local rentiers’
behaviours contradict this point because the existing rentier class only serves for their
benefit and is an intermediary between corporate elites and local citizenry. So the
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beneficiaries of the rentier class are only themselves and the capitalists, but not the
general public (Logan & Molotch, 1987).
Contrary to Peterson’s opinion, Logan and Molotch (1987) do not think the local
economic growth will promote the public good because development would bring
regressive effects. And the development projects that enhance the scale of cities and
change spatial relations will invariably have impacted the distribution of life chances.
Additionally, Logan and Molotch (1987) evaluate the concept of the “ecology of the
game” (Logan & Molotch, 1987, p. 34). They (1987) believe that human activities
generate costs and benefits. The goals of rentiers who control places are to trap
growth, and these rentiers intend to transfer the internal costs while capturing the
benefits (mainly the rent/exchange value). Such ecology of the game relies on the
growth elites’ struggle for private fortunes through the development process, which
means the “rentiers’ pursuit of private benefit is sustained by the development
process” (Logan & Molotch, 1987, p. 34). Meanwhile, some other social groups
absorb the internal costs of the development activities. Again, this contradicts
Peterson’s opinion that development policies are in the interests of all citizens.
Logan and Molotch (1987) also examine the government’s role in bolstering the
growth goals. However, they (1987) state that government access is vital to the
growth coalition because they determine the content and range of public investment,
pollution control, and government procurement spending. This is especially true in the
development coalition of Qingdao Olympic Sailing Centre’s case. The waterfront
redevelopment initiatives are dynamic due to the development coalition’s close ties
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with the municipal government. Moreover, the growth coalitions are very enthusiastic
about making governmental decisions. If there are government units among the local
elites, local elites have insider prerogatives/advantages, and this is consistent with
Stone’s argument (Logan & Molotch, 1987). Logan and Molotch (1987) further state
that the government’s power devolution and consolidation are also about the strategic
manipulations of the distributional outcome of resources. They (1987) conclude that
urban reform’s propelling power is the entrepreneurs’ pursuit of higher investment
returns. And the legal creation and regulation of places are driven by searching for
exchange value. This is contrary to my study’s opinion that the propelling power is
the municipal government’s pursuit of the land (national asset) value preservation and
appreciation. Moreover, the municipal government seeks the local economic
development to manifest the political performance of government officials in the
public authority. Nonetheless, the fundamental force that propels the urban
redevelopment projects in the Chinese cities is to extract value from the land
speculative investments. And to gain benefit from the land development is the
common goal of the Chinese growth coalition’s three major stakeholders: municipal
governments, state-owned enterprises, and private sectors.
In the chapter “The City as a Growth Machine,” Logan and Molotch (1987) state
that the relationship between local elites is pluralistic cooperation, and there is joint
membership between the local elites to promote cohesion. They also illustrate that a
city is a growth machine that can enhance aggregate rent (for a definition, see p. 54)
and “trap wealth for people in the right position to benefit” (Logan & Molotch, 1987,
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p. 50). They (1987) analyze how governments create a pleasant business climate,
stating that the main participants of urban politics are local business people who are
dedicated to growth boosterism and business communities who are well-organized
and have many resources. The authors (1987) also argue that the rentier elites need to
rely on local government to promote structural speculation, which refers to
speculative investment in real estate properties. Logan and Molotch (1987) determine
that growth politics is undervalued because of: (1) symbolic politics and other
significant issues, and (2) government action and distribution of essential goods and
services that are much less visible to the public. The authors analyze how local
growth elites participate in growth politics: when inadequate public services may lead
to an obstacle to the environment of capital investment, the rentier elite will advocate
for improving public utilities through excessive taxation to prevent exerting a bad
influence on the macroeconomic situation (Logan & Molotch, 1987). Logan and
Molotch (1987) then illustrate how politicians, local media, utilities, universities,
cultural amenity facilities, professional sports, organized labours, self-employed
professionals and small retailers, and corporate capitalists participate in growth
machine politics.
Furthermore, Logan and Molotch (1987) state that the effects of growth are
highly contested. The growth machine activists believe that intensive development
could reinforce the local tax base, provide resources for solving existing social
problems, and provide housing for natural population growth. However, they (1987)
indicate that the real effects of growth need a realistic evaluation. They begin to
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question the real effects of growth from the perspective of fiscal health. Generally
speaking, housing development generates a net fiscal loss, and industrial and
commercial growth produce net benefits for the tax base. When local governments
offer special tax incentives and subsidies to attract new industries, development’s
fiscal costs will be very high. Nevertheless, sometimes growth can save much money
for local governments when the growth improves the physical plant’s efficient use to
reduce the costs. Otherwise, any increase in the demand for new public expenditure
will trigger substantial fiscal costs (Logan & Molotch, 1987).
An overbuilt infrastructure crisis can result in a drain on the public budget. Thus,
Logan and Molotch (1987) conclude that growth spending gradually leads to fiscal
deterioration due to the service costs generated by new development slowly exceeding
their revenues. They found that the added service burdens have quickly offset the
local tax base’s growth due to industrial growth. Industrial development therefore
only leads to service burdens, not the real benefit of growth (Logan & Molotch,
1987).
What is more, Logan and Molotch (1987) find that industrial development does
not generate jobs; it just redistributes them. The total number of jobs in a nation is
determined by the “rate of return on investment, national trade policy, federal
decisions affecting the money supply, and other factors related to local decision
making” (Logan & Molotch, 1987, p. 89). So the growth of places has nothing to do
with whether or not there is the provision for jobs (Logan & Molotch, 1987).
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Logan and Molotch (1987) also illustrate that some immigrant social groups are
advantageous in terms of their racial or social legacies, so once jobs are available in
one city, the immigrant workers will move there and take the jobs, while the local
unemployed population remains unemployed (Logan & Molotch, 1987). Therefore,
only the federal government can exert influence on the total number of jobs; local
government could do nothing in this case, and growth merely redistributes the stock
of employment (Logan & Molotch, 1987). Chinese municipal governments across the
nation are participating in this interlocal competition to compete for resources and
jobs. In addition to that, Logan and Molotch (1987) believe growth only deteriorates
urban problems such as racial segregation, inequality, separation, and disparities. But
it seems the Chinese development coalition pursues a different viewpoint on growth,
which I introduce in the Result Analysis section.
All in all, Logan and Molotch (1987) conclude that the essence of current local
growth is to transfer public wealth to rentier growth and their partners. The general
public has to sacrifice the use-value of their living places to exchange the interest
groups’ exchange gains.
The ultimate driving force of Chinese cities’ development politics is the pursuit of
economic returns, and I now introduce the concrete mechanism in Jonas and Wilson’s
book. This is also an integral part of the growth machine mechanism. Jonas and
Wilson (1999) describe the dramatic economic-political change over the past twenty
years under the context of globalization. They draw attention to the core of Molotch’s
growth machine theory: the coalition of land-based elites are highly associated with
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the economic fate of places, and they drive urban politics by their “pursuing of the
local economy and accumulating wealth” (Jonas & Wilson, 1999, p. 3). However,
they further specify that growth machine theory is not able to address the question of
power and social class hierarchy and does not reflect the concrete “everyday actions
of urban elites” (Jonas & Wilson, 1999, p. 4). Molotch and Logan add agency-centred
localism (only rentiers, no social hierarchy) into the growth machine theory.
Moreover, their theory puts growth (land-based interests) in the centring position
(Jonas & Wilson, 1999). The communities of growth elites try to unite the citizens to
solicit support for their redevelopment plans, but this is not easy due to the conflicts
between pursuing use-value from residents and the pursuing of exchange-value from
rentier elites. However, when it comes to attracting growth to the locality, the
communities of growth elites collude to mobilize around the government for
assistance (Jonas & Wilson, 1999).
Nevertheless, due to the disruptive effects of the built environment caused by
economic development, a counter coalition formed in a wealthy community (such as
many communities in California and Northeast) from environmental and
distributional concerns to slow down growth or prevent growth from the beginning
(Jonas & Wilson, 1999). The growth machine coalitions have to borrow the power of
national/international capital to thwart the local opposition (Jonas & Wilson, 1999).
Moreover, they (1999) criticize the fact that Molotch ignores the fundamental
question: growth machine theory does not specify whether it could shape everyday
social life. And daily life is significantly essential to people’s understanding of the
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growth machine (Jonas & Wilson, 1999). The formation of growth theory must adapt,
according to Jonas and Wilson (1999), to the prevailing philosophies and visions of
existing theories. And the territorial ideologies are made up of spatial structuring and
economic development politics (Jonas & Wilson, 1999).
The authors identify the new characteristics of urban politics: a fundamental shift
in the organization of the North American model of economic growth and the crisis of
Fordism (Jonas & Wilson, 1999). They compare the rise of growth machine theory
with the fiscal crisis. Molotch imported growth as one of the essential tools in local
politics. And the essence of the growth machine is distributional. Jonas and Wilson
(1999) believe that the focus of the growth machine’s thesis should be transferred
from the conflict between rentiers and residents to the impacts of local economic
restructuring and national politics. They also believe that even though growth
machine theory is contingent, one still needs to understand its social context: whether
a place is applicable to growth machines depends on the “level of local
commoditization” (Jonas & Wilson, 1999, p. 14).
2.2.3. The Behaviours of the Chinese Growth Coalition
But what are the concrete behaviours of the Chinese growth coalitions? I believe
the Chinese growth coalition’s essence is centred on using territorial ideologies to
unite private partners and promote interurban competition to promote growth, and city
development to reap profits. So this is an aggressive form of neoliberal
entrepreneurial public and private partnerships. The public and private sectors
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function together to undertake the devolution of neoliberal powers and resources to
improve the efficiency and accuracy of local economic development policies.
My study agrees with Logan and Molotch (1987)’s opinion.The ultimate goal of
the redevelopment of Chinese cities is to hew to the growth principle defined by
Logan and Molotch: Chinese development coalitions are pursuing the exchange value
of place: rent. Moreover, the value of land prices in Chinese cities also depends on the
projects’ locations. The Chinese development coalitions also conform to free-market
competition—the market mechanism for allocating goods and resources—although
state intervention does exist in the practical situation.
The attitude of Chinese municipalities toward real estate redevelopment is to
ensure the state assets’ preservation and appreciation. We could consider it the
preservation of the public good. State-owned investment companies are usually
responsible for the repair and renovation of utilities and infrastructures that affect the
development cost.
All in all, the nature of China’s growth coalition should be regarded as a growth
coalition with Chinese characteristics, which is nominally for the public good but in
fact is for the municipal government and developers to obtain the huge harvest of land
development.
In the chapter “Ideology and Growth Coalition,” Cox (1999) argues that
territorial ideologies could unite the city’s different interest groups. Cox (1999)
describes the definition of the dilemma of growth coalition, and he explains why
under the condition of distributional consequence, ideologies of territory are one way
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of solving the “problem of opposition and uniting all the potential advocates” (Cox,
1999, p. 23). He introduces the New Urban Politics (NUP) theory, believing that the
theoretical foundation of NUP is the “hypermobility of capital” (Cox, 1999, p. 25),
and this will lead to the relocation of local firms.
The hypermobility of capital will threaten the health of the regional economy,
Cox (1999) argues. Thus, in order to keep the health of regional sustainable
development, the growth machine coalition must create a business-friendly local
climate to attract firms and capital. The beneficiary of NUP, then, is local capital (Cox,
1999, p. 23). The local growth coalitions transfer their own cost of channelling value
to other regions through labour law (Cox, 1999). Peck and Tickell (2002) illustrate
that interlocal competition is undergirded by neoliberal rationales that advocate the
competitive mechanism for interlocal relations. Through interlocal competitive
relationships, the different regions are disciplined by the forces of marketized
neoliberal spatial relationships. Furthermore, interurban competition has a significant
impact on reflexive and entrepreneurial urban governance. As mentioned earlier,
interurban competition shapes entrepreneurial governance.
Cox (1999) explains the politics of siting branch plants in Great Britain. English
enterprises sometimes site their plants in high-unemployment depressed areas for
getting government subsidies. Meanwhile, local governments work together with
local business associations to attract firms. At times, however, there has also been
opposition (Cox, 1999). Cox unravels the similarities and differences between two
types of territorial ideologies: NUP and labour law in the U.S. He explains how the
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cost of economic development is internalized to be imposed on local labour, and
externalized to other regions (Cox, 1999). There is also demand for amplifying the
local government’s power because the local growth coalition does not regulate the
“adverse distributional impact,” and it needs to be covered by the local government
concession (Cox, 1999, p. 27). The municipal government’s amplified power
resonates because the local governing coalition obtains more financial power due to
the fiscal devolution (Schubert, 2001; Sagalyn, 2007). As Hackworth (2007) has
identified, the local development regime is made up of real estate elites, and city hall
is the organizational form of PPP; together, they undertake the neoliberal federal
power devolution. Cox’s chapter introduces different territorial ideologies, territorial
ideologies’ environment of formation, and the local community’s ideologies (Cox,
1999). To some degree, the differences between territorial ideologies and ideology of
community are how they entail local growth issues. The core work and behaviour of
the Chinese growth coalition’s public part, the Chinese municipal governments, is to
shape growth policies.
Logan et al. (1999) believe that “The City as a Growth Machine” theorizes
governing cities, and Logan and Molotch (1987) believe that growth policy is not only
the integral part of local politics but also a guiding concern of government. Then
Logan et al. (1999) introduce the background of what was against growth policy as a
guiding theory: urban politics and urban sociology. They (1999) also describe how
Molotch refutes the two viewpoints. Logan et al. (1999) further elaborate on the two
viewpoints that “The City as a Growth Machine” raise and then evaluate the two
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viewpoints with a series of questions. They (1999) raise their hypothesis regarding
Molotch’s viewpoint: the growth machine’s primary influence channels the policy
priorities of localities to development rather than to redistribution. They (1999)
further illuminate the three different types of regimes: pluralist political economies,
federalist regimes, and entrepreneurial regimes (Logan et al., 1999, p. 75). Stone’s
regime theory, Elkin’s three regime types, and Molotch’s growth machine theory are
all consistent: they emphasize the irreconcilable conflict between the business
community (exchange value) and the residents (use-value) (Logan et al., 1999). Even
though sometimes residents and local businesses can work together to prevent
development, people still do not get the real reasons for the formation of the
pro-growth regime and antiregime. So people do not understand the real balance of
power in a community (Logan et al., 1999). Furthermore, the authors (1999) evaluate
the impact of antiregime and why the antigrowth regime is essential to the city’s
growth strategies (Logan et al., 1999). Antigrowth regimes more often arise in
wealthy neighbourhoods. Sociodemographic and issue-related factors both affect
whether residents could organize environmental quality groups to force government
and business leaders to be more responsible to protect the environment and promote
neighbourhood preservationism (Logan et al., 1999). Wealthy communities are more
predisposed to raising growth-limiting regimes by generating restrictive growth
policies. Ultimately, these restrictive policies would balance the growth coalition’s
initiatives (Logan et al., 1999). The more active growth-promotion policies cities
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implemented in the post-federal period are market-based entrepreneurial development
policies in nature (Logan et al., 1999).
Lastly, the authors briefly describe Molotch’s theory’s two hypotheses (Logan et
al., 1999, p. 89). They develop several variants of the pro-development regimes: (1)
growth is invariably changing to adapt to the flow of politics and opposition, (2) the
balance between the pro-growth coalition and the antigrowth coalition needs to
consider outside factors, (3) there are different demands regarding different social
categories of residents, and (4) pro-development interests fail to be the centre of
power (Logan et al., 1999). In retrospect, the authors usher in a caveat to the
pro-growth strategies adopted by the local authorities.
Meanwhile, the Chinese place-bound interests, the private part of the growth
coalition, play a more important role in the redevelopment initiatives in waterfront
redevelopment projects. Their behaviours include promoting interurban competition
among different localities. Andrew Wood (1999) explains that the U.S. and the U.K.
are becoming more similar than ever in the local organization’s format in promoting
local economic development. The interurban competition and place-bound interests
are more getting into it (Wood, 1999). Regarding the definition of the growth machine
thesis, Wood (1999) raises three questions from the perspectives of organizing for
local economic development.
Wood (1999) finds that different economic development agents’ roles are
significant with regard to attracting manufacturing investments. So he (1999)
evaluates each of the primary agents’ activities and examines the form of their
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organizations. He (1999) first illustrates the activities of utilities, the role of the
chamber of commerce, and the local government. Then he (1999) analyzes the defects
of growth machine theory. In summary, the growth machine theory cannot explain the
division of labour in local economic development. It overemphasizes rentiers as the
significant growth propellers for local economic promotion. So these are the two
considerable growth defects in machine theory. This is important for us in
understanding Chinese port cities, because in the Qingdao Olympic Sailing Centre
area, the manufacturing industries have been relocated to urban fringes, so the
economic restructuring is complete. Moreover, small property owners are not
influential in most Chinese port cities, so it is difficult for them to play a decisive role
as their American counterparts do.
Meanwhile, the division of labour theory—the relationship between mobility and
immobility—is the theoretical evidence that could be used to analyze the politics of
organizing for inward investment. In the U.S., the institution attracting investment is
the localized network of private/state institutions (Wood, 1999). In retrospect, he
reviews the three significant growth defects machine framework again (Wood, 1999).
2.2.4. The Chinese Municipalities as Regulators
I have introduced the fundamental features of the urban politics of redevelopment
projects in Chinese cities, so I will not dig deeper. In a word, the Chinese
redevelopment model of urban flagship projects is highly government-oriented. As
the controllers of land resources, municipal governments are coordinating the
allocation of resources participated in by state-owned development corporations and
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private developers. Chinese private developers are not like their American
counterparts, and they do not have the investor prerogatives like their American
counterparts do.
In addition, the Chinese municipal governments, as the regulators and the
institutions managing the market, enact regulations, coordinate social relations, and
are in charge of any risks generated from the development process. For example, in
the Shanghai New Heaven and Earth redevelopment process, the Shanghai Luwan
District government must listen to all kinds of complaints from the people in the
process of demolition. Thus, just as the regulation theory has defined, the politics of
municipalities is just another kind of accumulation regime. This is against the context
of the development of politics in Chinese port cities.
In the book Reconstructing Urban Regime Theory: Regulating Urban Politics in
a Global Economy, Lauria (1997) mainly evaluates whether urban regime and
regulation theory are complementary and compatible. Lauria (1997) explains the two
structural characteristics of the political economy from where urban regimes emerged:
(1) local government has to rely on property tax income, so maintaining property
investment is necessary, and (2) capital economy means private control of production.
These two structural characteristics of the political economy determine the business
dominance of local politics (Lauria, 1997). The structural characteristics of the urban
regime (such as the definition of respective prerogatives of the controllers of
productive assets) determine defining axes of urban politics (such as public and
private growth alliance, electoral politics, bureaucrat politics) (Lauria, 1997). And the
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latter determines the constellation of the axes (pluralist, federalist, entrepreneurial).
The structural characteristics of urban regimes derive from the division of labour
between market and state, which is the respective prerogative of the controllers of
productive assets. These structural characteristics of urban regime give rise to the
three characteristics of urban politics, as mentioned earlier: “public and private
growth alliance, electoral politics and bureaucrat politics” (Lauria, 1997, p. 3). Lauria
(1997) defines regulation theory as emerging out of a critique of structural Marxist
theory as a historical and geographical explanation to capitalism’s development. The
focus of regulation theory is to use extra-economic forces to allow inherently
contradictory capitalist accumulation to survive. Moreover, regulation theory is
helpful in understanding the persistence of the fundamental capitalist social
relationship (Lauria, 1997). Therefore, the theory is about the management of the
capital accumulation process, but it is not about the principle of the capital
accumulation process. In contrast, it depends on a set of contingent social, cultural,
and political support factors. Lauria (1997) further describes the regime of
accumulation as the broad relationship between production, consumption, savings,
investment, and the geographical extent and degree of autonomy of capital circuits
(Lauria, 1997). Additionally, Lauria (1997) explains regulating mechanism as “social
institutions, social relations in civil society, cultural norms, and the activities of the
state apparatus” (Lauria, 1997, p. 6). In my study, the Chinese municipal governments,
as the regulators and the institutions managing the market, enact regulations,
coordinate social relations, and are in charge of any risks generated from the
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development process. Moreover, they function as the pacesetter to regulate the urban
speculative investments. What is more, the municipal governments in the second-tier
Chinese cities, as the owners of land resources, possess a dominant in the local growth
coalition because they are the stakeholders who have the final say regarding the land
use plan and the allocation of land resources. Therefore, I agree with Lauria (1997)’s
opinion, and I believe that the regime of accumulation in the second-tier Chinese
cities, centred by the municipal governments, is the mechanism that comprises social
institutions (municipal government, state-owned enterprise, and private developers)
and social relations (the way the governing coalition runs). In addition to that, my
study fills in the literature gap of how the local growth coalition functions against the
backdrop of the neoliberal second-tier Chinese cities with strong socialist
characteristics. Even though the neoliberal trend has struck a global impact, how the
influence of orthodox neoliberalism reaches the grassroots/local level depends on the
actually existing neoliberalism in different regimes.
State and local politics are part of the mode of regulation within a particular
accumulation regime: for example, the state is part of the Fordist regime of
accumulation. The particular method is that “state stabilizes production and demand
through the provision of Keynesian economic management, stabilizes consumption
through the provision of forms of service/welfare state, and stabilizes fiscal policies
and wage relationships through bargaining and corporatist politics” (Lauria, 1997, p.
6–7).
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Lauria (1997) compares urban regime theory and regulation theory. He (1997)
argues that regulation theory and urban regime theory could complement each other
because they have complementary strengths and weaknesses. For example, urban
regime theory is unable to theorize the relationship between local agents and a
broader institutional context. And regulation theory neglects local actors so it is
unable to explain the concrete construction of “regulatory mechanisms” (Lauria, 1997,
p. 8). In retrospect, urban regime theory, tying to “casual relations and relational
choice theory,” overlooks the value of “extra-metropolitan spatial scales.” In contrast,
regulation theory (causality) overlooks the “spatial variation of material and
discursive practices,” and it is more about “extra-local political and economic
influence, relating to the reproduction of capitalist relation” (Lauria, 1997, p. 31).
Urban regime theory thus combines with regulation theory to formulate the
hegemonic bloc and historic bloc (theory of practice), capable of explaining long-term
local economic development.
2.2.5. The Regulating Regime with Chinese Characteristics
In the article “Concrete Research, Urban Regimes, and Regulation Theory,”
Goodwin and Painter (1997) specify that the reproduction of capitalist relations is an
uneven process. Regulation theory is a means to explain this uneven pattern. The
theory “explains spatially and temporally uneven production of capitalism” (Goodwin
& Painter, 1997, p. 18). It is a sensitive process that needs to have a certain degree of
“complexity and concreteness” (Goodwin & Painter, 1997, p. 18). The mode of
regulation (such as Fordism) is part of regulation theory; and the mode of regulation
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refers to the change in the capital-labour relationship, the implementation of
Keynesian demand regarding “management policies and the emergence of a social
norm of mass consumption for manual workers” (Goodwin & Painter, 1997, p. 18).
Goodwin and Painter (1997) explain that regulation theory views regulation as a
process through time and across space so that it would be easier to cope with
“temporal and spatial variability” (Goodwin & Painter, 1997, p. 21–22). And since the
regulatory process is the result of social practice, it is crucial to understanding the
concrete context of practice. Moreover, social practice constructs institutions and
urban governance as a site of regulation.
Goodwin and Painter (1997) also illustrate that in order to understand the
development of the practice of regulation, one must understand the geographies of
regulation. And it will be easier to show the holistic picture of geographies of
regulation if we put the analysis of regulation into more detail. The authors (1997)
specify that regime theory could emphasize how regulation theory operates under the
context of a more complicated urban governance system. Regime theory is more
capable of highlighting the new forms of network and public-private partnerships and
letting them become part of urban governance (Goodwin & Painter, 1997). Moreover,
regime theory makes local government’s intervention more prominent, especially in
the spheres where private sector actors play a more critical role (Goodwin & Painter,
1997). So this type of research on the urban regime is an institutional and practical
response to the failure of Fordist regulation and the role of uneven development
(Goodwin & Painter, 1997). Understanding the actions of the urban regime and
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regulation theory is helpful in conceptualizing the organization and actors of the urban
regime.
Compared with the North American experiences of urban redevelopment politics
and social norms, Chinese cities’ development path and political, cultural, and social
system are utterly different from the U.S.’s situations. The Chinese municipalities’
regulation routines have shown complexity and concreteness amid the process of
regulating waterfront redevelopment projects. For example, as the owners of land
resources, Chinese municipal governments have enormous decision-making powers,
and they have the final say at each waterfront redevelopment activity. Local
governments in China have acted in ways demonstrated by regulation theory and the
regulating process with Chinese characteristics in managing waterfront redevelopment
projects: the public sectors and state-owned enterprises have played a decisive role.
Especially against the context of the neoliberal shift and the collapse of
Keynesian-Fordism, the regulating process with Chinese socialist features facilitates
social transformation.
2.2.6. Contingent Formation of Growth Coalition
In the case of Qingdao Olympic Sailing Centre, the growth coalition’s formation
is contingent rather than rational. (The concrete formation process is introduced in
Chapter 8.) The growth coalition’s contingent formation displays the complexity of
Chinese capitalism’s structure and the uniqueness of different regions.
In the article “Spatial Structures of Regulation and Urban Regime,” Feldman
(1997) compares urban regime theory and regulation theory’s main features. Feldman
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(1997) argues that regime theory takes into account local urban development policy,
so the essence of the theory is political. Also, regime theory is related to development
politics and the governing coalition dominated by business people. Regime theory,
moreover, explains how the growth coalition shapes local urban development policy.
Feldman (1997) believes it is more appropriate to see regime theory as economic
politics than political economics. What is more, regime theory emphasizes how
political coalition governs, though it does not theorize the link between broader
institutional contexts and local agents. Thus, regime theory underestimates the
importance of linkages between local actors and broader institutional contexts
(Feldman, 1997). Feldman (1997) believes that regulation theory focuses more on the
broad epochs in capitalist history and the large-scale regulatory process, and it
emphasizes contingency. Nevertheless, neither regulation nor urban regime theory
does an excellent job in explaining spatial scales or describing the geography of
capitalism. Painter (1997) believes that regulation theory can reconstruct urban
regime theory to formulate the theory of practice by using regulation theory to absorb
the urban regime’s impacts on local economies and using habitus to problematize and
question the key concepts in Stone’s regime formation theory: rational choice theory
and selective incentives. Moreover, Feldman (1997) introduces a new definition of the
spatial structure of regulation to emphasize the regional characteristic of capitalism
and enhance capitalism’s complexity. Qingdao’s redevelopment coalition’s success
depends on its unique cohesion between the local municipal government and the
state-owned development corporation/private developer. And this is in contrast with
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the more market-oriented development schemes in Shanghai (Wu, 2009). In Shanghai,
the dynamics of the urban redevelopment coalition are more like their counterparts in
the U.S., where private developers have a greater say. The uniqueness of the Qingdao
Olympic Sailing Centre’s development regime reflects the capitalistic characteristics
and complexity of the region.
2.2.7. Hegemonic Bloc, Historic Bloc, and a Stable Development Regime, Municipal
Politics and Transitioning Regime
The formation of a growth coalition in the case of Qingdao Olympic Sailing
Centre reflects a local hegemonic bloc formation. To be specific, this shows that
physical development is gaining momentum and that close political and business ties
have propelled the social coupling that generates economic profits brought by the
formation of the social management model and the establishment of a social
accumulation regime.
As a social relationship, this kind of political business alliance has a stable role in
crisis management. It can also be used as a spatial fix to stimulate local economic
development and retard disinvestment.
In the article “A Neo-Gramscian Approach to the Regulation of Urban Regimes,”
Jessop (1997) states that regulation theory, transformed by the neo-Gramscian
approach, can fully analyze regime theory as the combination of “political society and
civil society, of government and governance, of hegemony, armoured by coercion”
(Jessop, 1997, p. 51). Jessop (1997) continues to argue that the formation of regimes
is correlated with the formation of the local hegemonic bloc (power bloc) and historic
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bloc (accumulation regime/mode of regulation), thus as the theory of practice capable
of explaining long-term local economic development.
The neoliberal spatial fix is an ideological response to the 1970s Fordism crisis
and how city growth coalitions revive real growth in the urban economy. The root of
Fordism’s crisis can be traced back to the essence of capital. Capital consumes the
geographical landscape and transforms it at the same time, which is determined by its
inherent nature. Thus, the territorial capital organization is always unstable. The
Fordism crisis means the previous territorial organization that supported the Fordism
regime of capital accumulation needs to be reconstructed to forge a new configuration
of the neoliberal territorial organization for underpinning a new round of capital
expansion. The capitalist restructuring leads to the conflictual interaction between
older geographical order and neoliberal production of space to generate new territorial
formation. And this process exemplifies the path dependence feature of actually
existing neoliberalism (Brenner & Theodore, 2002).
The crisis of the reconstructing of territorial organization and the hypermobility
of the nature of capital reflects the regulationist approach’s necessity. Regulation
theory’s condition is that the complex capitalist social relations are always full of
conflictions, contradictions, and risks. These inherent characteristics of the capital
accumulation regime could result in systematic failures, collapse, and breakdown.
Therefore, people need regulation theory to mitigate these crisis tendencies and
facilitate the expansion of capital reproduction, which means that the general
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population needs regulation theory, and the economic relations need regulation to
facilitate economy.
The case of the redevelopment of the Qingdao Olympic Sailing Centre
exemplifies how the municipal politics thrust the transition to the post-industrial
service-oriented development from Fordism’s collapse.
In the article “City Politics in an Era of Globalization,” Leo (1997) evaluates
regulation theory and how the “large-scale production of manufacturing” under the
context of Fordism shifts to “customized small-batch production of post-Fordism” by
analyzing the changing of global/local politics (Leo, 1997, p. 81). In the case of the
development of Qingdao Olympic Sailing Centre, municipal politics is the major
propelling force promoting economic restructuring from heavy industries to service
industries in urban centres.
2.2.8. External Sources of Capital and Expertise and Local Development Regime
Amid the redevelopment of Chinese eastern coastal cities, the connection to
external sources of capital and expertise, including Hong Kong capital, is the essential
financial underpinning of the redevelopment projects across the nation. The external
sources of foreign capital eventually have an important impact on the urban outcomes
by becoming part of the local development process and the eastern coastal cities’ local
regime. This happened in many eastern coastal cities, including Qingdao.
2.2.8.1. The Definition of Globalization
According to Olds (2002), the development of a city’s spatial structure is highly
related to current globalization trends. Globalization can be further defined as the
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globalization of flows, a network of space characterized as some forms of ordering
that facilitate the transfer of “rationalities, technologies, living beings, and physical
properties” (Olds, 2002, p. 9). Moreover, the local authorities worldwide could carry
out governing decisions through globalization networks to gain mobility of production
factors. So the global space of flows is controlled by the network actors located within
the cosmopolitan and international network of global cities. Olds (1997) also
mentions that globalization has two dimensions: scope and intensity, which refer to
the intensification on levels of “interaction, inter-connectedness or interdependence
between the states and societies which constitute world community” (Olds, 1997, p.
110). In the cosmopolitan Chinese cities such as Beijing and Shanghai, investment
process or social policy reform process are increasingly determined by international
institutions (Olds, 1995). In turn, the Chinese institutions are increasingly cooperating
with these institutions in global cities to channel and facilitate global flows of capital
and information. Nevertheless, Olds (1995) indicates that the global flows are not
homogeneous because their characteristics are complexly multilinear and naturally
uneven. In addition, these global flows are becoming more and more deterritorialized,
which means that they are detached from their original local and national settings and
integrated into the new local ideologies (Olds, 1997).
2.2.8.2. The Hong Kong Capital
In the Pacific-Asia rim region, Hong Kong investors play a key role in facilitating
capital flows to the cities in the region, including Vancouver and Shanghai. One of the
key investment characteristics of the external capital from Hong Kong is that they
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propel their investment initiatives through the network of extended social relations
(Olds, 2002). In a word, the social and financial networks of overseas Chinese play a
critical role in restructuring real estate development activities in the Pacific Rim
region. The Chinese diaspora’s complex worldwide social network is the key resource
to accessing financial support for urban redevelopment projects, and its way of doing
business is famous for the preference for “deal-making” in real estate trading
activities (Olds, 2002). Overseas Chinese business networks have become major
players in the contemporary development of property markets worldwide (Mitchell &
Olds, 2000). The Chinese diaspora property entrepreneurs have formed network
capital, which underpins their global reach and helps them weigh overseas investment
options (Mitchell & Olds, 2000). Additionally, social relations are a key factor in
facilitating long-term and inter-firm connections to bind the flexible global production
networks. The overseas Chinese business network is the most important vehicle to
propel the world property market’s globalization process because it facilitates the
extension of property investment flows across space (Mitchell & Olds, 2000). After
the opening of Shanghai’s property market, the foreign capital flooded into Shanghai,
reinforcing the social relations between Shanghai and the Chinese diaspora in
Southeastern Asia. Among the sources of external capital, Hong Kong capital was the
first to be attractive. And among all the cumulative contracted FDI flows into
Shanghai, Hong Kong capital accounted for the majority: 55 percent (Olds, 2002).
Accordingly, a large amount of capital was channelled into Shanghai’s real estate
market. Hong Kong investors also play a role as catalysts, and they facilitate the
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participation of the service of Global Intelligence Corps (GIC) (Olds, 2002) in the
international consultation planning process (LICP). Most external sources of capital
investment in China’s eastern coastal cities since the 1980s came from Hong Kong,
Taiwan, and global pension funds (Olds, 1995). There was also some overseas
Chinese (such as Thai Chinese) capital investing in the eastern coastal cities. Thus,
many eastern coastal cities’ governments such as Shanghai’s could access concession
funds from foreign banks and sources for its projects (Olds, 1995). International
investors from different backgrounds therefore can participate in worldwide
speculative activities such as large-scale commercial property development (Olds,
1995). The Chinese property markets have also become increasingly integrated into
the world economy’s fluxes and regional development process (Olds, 1995). Similar
to Shanghai, Hong Kong and overseas Chinese capital also invested in Qingdao,
including in the Olympic Sailing Centre. The Shangri-La Hotel in the Olympic
Sailing Centre business circle, one of the most high-end hotels in the city, received
investment from the Malaysian Chinese businessman Robert Kuok. To honour the
overseas Chinese investors and further attract investment from them, in1997, the
Qingdao municipal government renamed the main street of the city Hong Kong Road.
Moreover, the overseas Chinese business community was impressed by the
administrative efficiency of the Qingdao municipal government. In a TV show, Kuok
recalled how efficient the investment department of the Qingdao municipal
government had been. He mentioned that it only took the investment department of
the Qingdao municipal government one day to complete all the necessary permits and
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documents for his investment in the Shangri-La Hotel. In terms of the efficiency of
facilitating investment, the investment attraction department of the Qingdao municipal
government has left a deep impression on overseas Chinese businessmen.
2.2.8.3. Beyond Hong Kong Capital: Support from International Organizations
Beyond Hong Kong capital, there was also the Asian Development Bank (ADB)’s
participation in Pudong’s redevelopment initiative’s initial funding. The World Bank
also contributes to the overall financing plan as an essential portion of the
international idea (Olds, 1997). In summary, more than half of Shanghai’s
development funding was foreign direct investment (FDI) (Olds, 2002). The most
important incentives for attracting the foreign investment flows, including the funding
from Chinese diaspora and international organizations, were tax incentives, imports of
equipment, export-oriented production, tertiary enterprises, and long land leasing
(Olds, 2002). And the major projects in Lujiazui (Shanghai) invested in externally
(ADB, World Bank, and Hong Kong capital) mainly lie in infrastructure: Yangpu
Bridge, Nanpu Bridge, two subway lines, Huangpu Tunnel, Waigaoqiao Port
Upgrading, and Pudong International Airport.
2.2.8.4. GIC’s Participation in Shanghai
Professional architectural knowledge is an invaluable global asset (Olds, 2002).
In the case of Shanghai’s Lujiazui redevelopment initiative, not only the foreign
investment from Hong Kong is significant, but also foreign architectural design
experts have made great contributions to the design and planning of Lujiazui (Olds,
2002). The foreign “Global Intelligence Corps” (GIC) are really the pioneers of
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globalization, and they eventually become part of the local development regime
through their contribution to designing and planning of Lujiazui’s master development
plan. Since the GIC helps localities improve their city’s image to meet the standards
of international investors, they indirectly help the municipalities boost the local and
regional economy and regenerate the city (Olds, 2002). To be specific, the GIC (such
as Richard Rogers Partnership) provides global flows of images and expertise for the
urban mega projects in the Pudong area, and was supported by its client, the Shanghai
Municipal Government (Olds, 2002).
2.2.8.5. GIC’s Participation in Lujiazui, from Shanghai Government’s Perspective
From the Chinese (Shanghai) side, most of the technocrats used to work or study
in Shanghai before the 1949 revolution; therefore, they understand how to cut deals
with western firms and GICs (Olds, 2002). The professional and social relations
formed by Parisian and Shanghainese politicians were the foundations that drove the
participation of the GIC into designing Lujiazui (Olds, 2002). Moreover, the
Shanghainese politicians’ personal leadership, such as Rongji Zhu, also promoted the
introduction of foreign expertise and technology. Zhu believes that Lujiazui needs a
strong international profile and foreign involvement. Thus, non-Chinese advice is
necessary in Zhu’s mind, as seen when he states that “outsiders sometimes have
greater wisdom because they can look at things from the outside” (Olds, 2002, p. 204).
So the non-Chinese design experts, the GIC, are an essential part of the Lujiazui
International Consultant Planning Process (LICP) (Olds, 1997). In summary, Zhu’s
support is the key factor that facilitates the involvement of international planning
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assistance, which is how LICP was born. In April 1991, Zhu signed an agreement with
French government officials to receive planning support from the French side
officially. French officials also worked with Shanghai academic officials (SUPID) to
propel the birth of LICP (Olds, 2002). Amid the redevelopment scheme of Qingdao’s
Olympic Sailing Centre business circle, the Shanghai experience was regarded as a
benchmark. As I mentioned elsewhere in this thesis, the municipal communist party
secretary from twenty years ago, Yu Zhengsheng, is from Shanghai. And in the 1990s,
there were some capable and visionary cadres from the Shanghai region in the
Qingdao municipal government (through delegation or exchange programs). Their
experiences and visions in city planning and construction had greatly helped to
facilitate the Olympic Sailing Centre’s redevelopment process.
2.2.8.6. GIC’s Participation in Lujiazui, Becoming Part of the Local Development
Regime
The existence of the GIC reflects the creative destruction of global capitalism
(Olds, 2002). The global city development regime incorporates the international
capital providers and the experts who offer professional expertise in terms of
designing and facilitating the development process. Furthermore, the GIC makes
“global city discourse” available and ensures that city development is in a
market-friendly environment (Olds, 2002, p. 33). The GIC also functions as a
counselor to advise the local authorities to construct urban mega projects that attract
international investors. Consequently, the urban mega projects come to be where the
global control functions and the channel of capital flows (Olds, 2002). The GIC’s
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primary role was facilitating the growth of foreign direct investment flows into the
built environment and promoting the tertiary industries in the cosmopolitan global
cities through constructing urban mega projects (Olds, 2002). Thus, urban mega
projects have a huge impact on the world economy. GIC and LICP involvement in
Shanghai’s Lujiazui’s design has a huge whitewashing and image effect because this
shows the successful result of China’s open policy. The monumental symbolic effect
needs to be expressed in the form of foreign involvement (Olds, 1997). As mentioned
earlier, the French GIC was invited by Rongji Zhu as a thrust to Shanghai’s Lujiazui’s
overall design. The French side attached great importance to this matter because they
realized this was the first time in China’s post-1949 history for such large-scale
foreign involvement in its engineering projects. The international consultation process
was very symbolic, and the French GIC felt quite honoured to be part of the scheme.
And the French government was optimistic that this would open the door for French
enterprises after the construction of the Lujiazui International Financial Center (Olds,
2002). During this international consultation process, the French side inserted their
image-improving expertise, and the Shanghainese technocrats also studied Paris as a
global reference point. As well, a member of the international GIC, Roger Firm, very
much appreciated the Shanghai government as a client for its “truly visionary
manner” (Olds, 2002, p. 211). In contrast, Zhu believes that the international
consultation process should be regarded as a social learning process to shock
Shanghai bureaucrats’ out-of-date minds with the foreign scholars’ creative thinking
(Olds, 2002). The international consultation process provides foreign experts with
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unconstrained creative options, so this could enhance the international profile of
Pudong.
The international GIC has truly become a pivotal part of the local development
regime because it connects Shanghai with global capital and technology. Lujiazui is
an ideal city that brings together the new political, economic, and social knowledge of
the present age. According to Olds (2002), the design of Lujiazui is “superior
architectural logic [that] has meshed with superior developmental state logic in the
aim of transforming Shanghai into a twenty-first-century node for international
finance” (Olds, 2002, p. 206). With the help from the GIC, the Shanghai municipal
government’s ambition of building a twenty-first-century international financial centre
for Shanghai, providing Shanghai with the means for a new economic boom, and
making it one of Asia’s major money and trade markets, has been achieved (Olds,
1997). Moreover, the involvement of the GIC helps the Shanghai municipal
government further leverage foreign direct investment because the GIC guides power
financial flows to the eastern coastal Chinese cities. The goal of the whole Lujiazui
project is to build an ultramodern international financial centre, a base for the
development of advanced financial industries, which will usher in the post-1978
Chinese neoliberal reform and the growth of the Chinese economy.
2.2.8.7. GIC: Official Part of the Local Development Regime
Additionally, the GICs need their clients to become professional elites to establish
their international social networks (Olds, 2002). Olds (2002) explicitly evaluates the
seven means that the GICs use to establish interpersonal relations networks. To
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achieve the goal of weaving their international social networks, the GICs usually
work closely with other international associations such as media, professional
organizations, and other municipal governments (Olds, 2002). Moreover, the GICs
rely heavily on global cities because most of their work/projects are acquired from
transnational corporations whose headquarters are generally located in the global
cities (Olds, 1995). This is exactly why architects are becoming part of the local
development regime, whose networks and institutions are located globally. Moreover,
since the progress of Deng Xiaoping’s economic reform and the increasing linkages
between Shanghai and the rest of the world, there were more and more foreign
transnational corporations entering the Chinese market, and they were all looking for
office buildings in Shanghai (Olds, 2002). Thus, the strong demand from the
foreigners’ side has made the GIC, who has expertise in how foreign business runs,
part of the local real estate development regime.
2.2.8.8. GIC: Acquiring Works in Pacific-Asia Rim
Since the 1980s and early 1990s, the European-based GICs started to acquire
projects in the Pacific-Asia Rim. The Asian commercial property market was
burgeoning at that time. One of the “sexy” investment destinations was China, where
billions of massive commercial complexes, hotels, office buildings, and
infrastructures are in demand (Olds, 2002). As the pioneers of global property
investments, the GICs were actively involved in the infrastructure investment boom.
From another perspective, the GICs in China play a significant role in facilitating the
global flows generated by real estate investments into the Chinese market (Olds,
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2002). To be specific, the local Chinese clients generally find the modernism design
technique pursued by the GICs quite attractive because they connect local projects to
the non-local world system (Olds, 2002). Especially in the Shanghai Lujiazui
development initiative, Chinese state-owned enterprises and semi-autonomous
enterprises hinge on the connection between Western GIC’s enterprises and the city’s
modernization process. In many scenarios, the GICs disseminate their expertise to
design for a modernism city model as modernism pioneers (Olds, 2002).
2.2.8.9. Historical Context
It is necessary to emphasize the historical context of the reform era, when the
Lujiazui Redevelopment Initiative happened. The GIC plays a significant role in
planning Shanghai’s new international financial centre. The GICs were invited to
reshape the spatial structure of Shanghai after Deng Xiaoping’s neoliberal reform.
Participation of the GIC in this redevelopment initiative is an indicator that reform is
open to western capital and expertise. Shanghai’s property market started to open to
the global flow of capital. One of the most important goals of Lujiazui’s reform is to
encourage the inflow of FDI that will flood into the Chinese property development
market in the coming decades (Olds, 2002).
Basically, globalization means opportunities for external capital sources like
Hong Kong investors. They reorganize the “intersecting, overlapping and
unconnected global flows” through investment activities, travelling, and networking
(Olds, 2002, p. 322). Like the Chinese diaspora tycoons and professional architectural
elites, these global actors work together to reinforce the transnational cultures and
135
develop holistic know-how as it regards investing in the spatial structure of cities in
the globalization era (Olds, 2002).
2.3 Financing the Urban Redevelopment Projects
The third research question I am trying to answer: What financial instruments are
available for the redevelopment projects? What market ways of mobilizing land
resources are used to finance the waterfront redevelopment projects in Chinese port
cities?
Financing in reform China (post-1980s) also involves external financial sources
(Wang et al., 2011). The concrete examples of off-budget financial instruments
include user charges and revenue bonds issued in the capital market (Wang et al.,
2011). Chinese municipal governments prefer off-budget financial instruments
because they facilitate capital accumulation in a market way so that the financing task
can be accomplished by market through public financing initiatives. Market investors
can thus recoup their investment through incomes generated from the operation
(Wang et al., 2011). Since the 1980s, market-based financing has become a significant
source of funding for urban redevelopment projects in Chinese cities. The first batch
of cities that started to sell state-owned land use are Shenzhen, Guangzhou, Tianjin,
and Shanghai (Wang et al., 2011). Generally speaking, the urban infrastructure
financing is featured by collecting taxes (urban construction and maintenance tax, real
estate tax, and resource tax), collecting administrative fees and charges (funds for
utility capacity improvement, user charges for public utilities, and water resource
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fees), and collecting self-raised funds (domestic non-state investment) (Wang et al.,
2011). In addition, the post-reform alternative sources of urban infrastructure
financing in Chinese cities include innovations like conveyance fees and fiscal
concession in economic development zones (Wang et al., 2011). The newly developed
sources of financing are used to support high-class roads and constructing
infrastructures (Wang et al., 2011).
To prepare to answer the research question, this section (2.3) examines the
fundamental concepts of financing the urban redevelopment projects. I summarize
just a few of the many financing tools used by American urban planners when they
initiated redevelopment projects in American cities. The two major concepts are: (1)
the Housing Act of 1949 and eminent domain and (2) concrete off-budget financing
and tax increment financing strategies.
2.3.1. Housing Act of 1949 and Eminent Domain
The first definition I have been working on is the facts of the Housing Act of
1949 and eminent domain. The former is the legal basis for the latter. The Housing
Act of 1949 was the legislative mandate of federal funding for urban redevelopment
programs until the 1970s (Van Vliet, 1998). The program’s rationale was the
elimination of slums but, increasingly, urban redevelopment became its goal. Weber
(2002) argues that, according to the act, blight becomes the new standard of creative
destruction. The Housing Act of 1949 provided appropriations for public housing and
for local redevelopment authorities to purchase and clear slums, then resell the cleared
land to private developers at a below-market price (Van Vliet, 1998). The federal
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government would pay two-thirds to three-quarters of the net cost for purchasing and
clearing the blighted sites, and the locality paid the remaining one-third to one-quarter.
Title 1 of the 1949 Housing Act does not have any regulations for replacement of
low-income housing, nor does it provide any funds for public housing construction
(Van Vliet, 1998).
The Housing Act of 1949 is also associated with property-led economic
development (Wolf-Powers, 2005). The funding of redevelopment projects in central
cities that urban development coalitions initially drew upon before the 1974 federal
cutbacks were through the 1949 Housing Act. Title 1 of the act possesses some
historical meaning in terms of slum clearance and urban redevelopment (Critchlow &
VanderMeer, 2012). It provides federal funding for clearance of significant sites and
resells the lands to private or institutional investors for developing. However, the act
only seizes land for slum clearance; it does not do anything for the replacement of
housing destroyed. The act was criticized for tipping the balance too much toward
interested groups (Critchlow & VanderMeer, 2012; Van Vliet, 1998).In China, the
government’s take-over of civilians’ properties used to be expropriated without proper
compensation. But recent years, China’s “new-type urbanization” emphasized
sustainable development and community participation in urban redevelopment. For
example, in Guangzhou, redevelopment projects cannot proceed without a certain
percentage of owner households (~60%-70%) signing redevelopment agreements and
appropriate compensation.
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2.3.2. Off-budget Financing and Tax Increment Financing
The second concept I have been primarily focusing on is off-budget financing and
Tax-Increment Financing (TIF). In order to cope with the financial demand of
waterfront redevelopment projects in central cities, the public redevelopment
authorities would first draw upon their own local resources, which include city funds
that are constituted by tax-exempt borrowing (city general obligation bonds, industrial
revenue bonds, and tax increment bonds), city budget allocation (CDBG, for example),
and redevelopment agency equity investment (Sagalyn, 1990). Accordingly,
Hackworth (2007) indicates that the municipalities raised debt to issue municipal
bonds for private sectors to provide tax-exempt financing for them. Public equity also
includes intergovernmental grants that entail federal categorical aids and UDAG
money (Sagalyn, 1990). Furthermore, the city general obligation bond is a common
type of municipal bond. Generally, it is debt bonds, but sometimes it is a
tax-increment bond when being used for tax-increment financing (Krohe, 2007).
Industrial revenue bonds use the project revenues as collateral to issue revenue bonds,
which is politically covered. And the tax increment bond could be used when
declaring a tax-increment district. Tax increment bonds are used to borrow against the
future tax increment generated from the property (Van Vliet, 1998).
What is more, the public redevelopment authorities could cut deals with a private
developer to privatize the financialization process of waterfront redevelopment
projects (Sagalyn, 1990). Namely, there was a trend of financialization in the field of
economic policy and social policy (Peck & Tickell, 2002). This new partnership
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between the private and public sectors is also emerging in Chinese redevelopment
projects. For example, one paradigm of the deal-making relationship between the
public sector and private developers is to come to the term of a profit-sharing
agreement. The loan payback is a method used by the public sector for their portion of
financial commitment. The public sector finances the redevelopment projects in the
form of lending the loans to avoid directly donating the public fund as public share of
projects funds (in fact, it is in the form of invisible public share). Therefore, the loan
(very often UDAG money) is banked at the private developers’ side and reserved for
future project funds as a form of repayment (Sagalyn, 2007). In this way, direct public
investment is reduced, and voters’ approval can be avoided. It also entices additional
private investment because the loan paybacks include interest payments added on to
the principal payment (Critchlow & VanderMeer, 2012).
The other way to conduct a framework of financial instruments for the
redevelopment project is to divide it into two major components (budget financing
and off-budget tools). Public redevelopment authorities can then rely on conventional
sources of funding such as budget financing instruments, including debt financing
(revolving loans, loan guarantees, interest subsidy borrowing, and tax-exempt
borrowing) and equity financing that entail tax abatement or credit (repayment is not
required, but due to tax exemptions for firms, the public stimulus could tease out
reciprocal investment in the community/specified hiring practice) and the gross
receipt tax credit (the gross receipt tax is on firm revenues—a form of corporate sales
tax) (Teaford, 1990; Van Vliet, 1998). The corporate income receipt tax credits (the
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corporate income tax is a tax on corporate profit) are based on how much investment
is generated and how many employees are created. Other forms of equity financing
also include grants or direct transfer (it does not require repayment either; it is also
one type of equity financing). Lastly, a royalty agreement is similar to near-equity, but
the difference is that near-equity is a private financing instrument (Hill & Shelley,
1990).
For the other approach, off-budget financing tools, we have evaluated most of the
above. The tax-exemption bonds include general obligation bonds and revenue bonds
(industrial revenue bonds and tax increment bonds) (Sagalyn, 1990). Other off-budget
financial instruments include development exactions, tax on the spin-off impact on
neighbouring property value (the rise in property value will have a spin-off effect on
immediate parcels of lands) (Paetsch & Dahlstrom, 1990). Through the profit-sharing
agreement, the public sector can use the project income as collateral and issue revenue
bonds as the financing source for redevelopment projects (Teaford, 1990). The
revenues from redevelopment projects include lease revenues, loan paybacks,
landings, terminal rentals, and concessions (Sagalyn, 1990). The profit-sharing
payment (specified rate and time of return on public investment, the public sector and
private investors cut deals in terms of revenues generated from the projects) entails
share in any mall revenues and in hotels and restaurant bills (tax on visitors to the city)
(Altshuler & Luberoff, 2003). There are also different types of invisible public equity
that include present value subsidies (hidden-value subsidies trade, property-tax
abatement, loans of public funds or lease of city property with the below-market term
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and deferred payment). The other type of invisible public equity is a value-creating
trade-off that includes value-creating density trade, tax collection: future tax
increment, loan swaps, and lease on office buildings (Sagalyn, 2007). The present
value subsidies and market way of mobilizing land resources are valuable evidence.
They are evaluated with empirical materials in Chapter 5 to answer my research
question II: the concrete off-budget financial instruments of urban redevelopment
projects in Chinese port cities.
2.4 The Chinese Experiences of Neoliberalism, Urban Regime, and Growth
Machine Theory
He and Wu (2009) evaluate neoliberalism with Chinese characteristics, and they
(2009) conclude that neoliberalism in China pursues a growth-first orientation. The
wealth-generating mechanism and neoliberal market discipline gained momentum in
North America and China because it provides the fundamental framework for
integrating into globalization, state restructuring, and rescaling against different
national and regional backgrounds (He and Wu, 2009). Moreover, He and Wu (2009)
indicate that China’s engagement with neoliberalism or neoliberalism with Chinese
characteristics reflects the integration of the strong capitalist globalization and
China’s inherited institutional landscape.
He and Wu (2009) illustrate how marketization reforms were implemented in
urban China. And they (2009) contend that the power of the market, rather than the
state's intervention, is transforming Chinese cities’ urban spatial structure. Across the
context of globalization and China’s transitioning economy, the competition between
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different regions becomes more intense, meanwhile, the cooperation is widening. In a
word, collaboration and interest conflicts between different stakeholders coexist in
China’s metropolitan cities nowadays. Nevertheless, the goals of these conflicting
interests between different groups are all aimed to promote the growth-first goal (He
and Wu, 2009).
According to Hackworth (2007), Peck and Tickell (2002), and Brenner and
Theodore (2002), in the 1970s, the goal of American neoliberalism was to make it an
ideological rejection to the Keynesian-Fordism in the central/federal level. And in the
local level, the western cities were adopting neoliberal growth-oriented strategies to
fight stagflation. Therefore, even though both Chinese and western neoliberal turns
are to facilitate growth, the Chinese neoliberal development strategies kept silent
regarding the total rejection of Keynesiam and inherited a more profound path
dependence feature of macroeconomic intervention.
The above Chinese scholars’ research (and most available researches on Chinese
neoliberalism) failed to discuss the Chinese Keynesian-Fordism regulatory landscape
during the pre-open door policy area. In order to complement the existing literature,
my study explicitly evaluates the pre-reform Keynesian-Fordism industrial relics,
filling the gap of how the Keynesian-Fordism strikes an impact on the subsequent
emerging neoliberal economic formats.
The elements of the Chinese neoliberal trend include commodification and
privatization of the land market. And the fierce competition between different urban
areas is transforming spatial and social space in China. What is more, the
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commodification and privatization of the housing market results in the change of
Chinese cities’ landscape and facilitates rapid economic growth. Therefore, the
Chinese municipal governments could reap the benefits of the emerging real estate
markets and promote land-based economic growth to win the territorial competitions
between different regions (He and Wu, 2009).
Thus, the neoliberal shifts have fundamentally restructured the institutional
regulatory landscape and the urban spatial architecture in China. Neoliberal
urbanization is emerging, featured by the revitalization of neoliberal urbanism and a
quick process of city-oriented capital accumulation (He and Wu, 2009). Hence, the
Chinese neoliberal reform is a market-centred reform under the pre-market
framework.
Specifically, the major characteristics of China’s emerging neoliberal urbanism
include the devolution of decision-making power downward to local state authorities
and the commodification and privatization in the land and housing market. This has
reduced the costs of providing public service and provides new sources of capital
accumulation for the private sector (He and Wu, 2009). In China, land and housing
reform propels the commodification of urban land and housing and the privatization
of public service provision. Thus, commodification and privatization have formulated
a regime of capital accumulation that has been formed to facilitate economic and
urban growth. The Chinese society transforms itself from an egalitarian society
featured by low production, low wages, high state welfare, and high state expenditure
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to a post-industrial society featured by just-in-time production, high wages, low
welfare, and low expenditure (He and Wu, 2009).
All in all, China’s current neoliberal urbanism is utterly a neoliberal reform under
cover of socialist urban governing in the name of people. The Chinese actually
existing neoliberalism emphasizes the roll-out of neoliberal state rebuilding to ensure
the optimal conditions for the market system. Nevertheless, the state did not have a
roll-back neoliberal destruction process for the previous existing Keynesian-Fordism
artifact but rather played an interventionist role in manipulating & supporting the
Chinese neoliberal process (He and Wu, 2009). For example, neoliberal flanking
system (the neoliberal market-supporting system) is established to propel the
institutional transformation for a better market system through the provision of
government support and service. Therefore, China's actually existing neoliberal
redevelopment is a hybrid product of market ideology and state ideology (He and Wu,
2009).
In addition to that, contrary to the western neoliberalism pursued by the American
and European governments (Brenner and Theodore, 2002) and studied by the western
scholars (Peck ad Tickell, 2002), China did not go through extensive roll-back
destruction of the Keynesian regulatory landscape, but instead directly leaped forward
to roll-out state rebuilding, unlike the orthodox European neoliberalism or America’s
actually existing neoliberalism (Brenner and Theodore, 2002). The existing Chinese
geography literature fails to build the transition from the roll-back destruction of
Keynesian-Fordism to the neoliberal roll-out creation. Or we could say the Chinese
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scholars omit the neoliberal roll-back destruction of the national state. My study
contributes to filling this empirical and theoretical gap by evaluating the case of the
dilapidation of Beihai Shipyard and illustrating how the blight of a Keynesian
brownfield relic sets the foundation of further neoliberal post-industrial
service-oriented revitalization.
Additionally, Hsing (2006), in her article Land and Territorial Politics in Urban
China, also evaluates neoliberalism with Chinese characteristics. She (2006)
explicitly discusses how municipal leaders gain urban land control under the threat of
socialist land masters. Hsing (2006) finds that under the socialist legacy and state land
tenure, China’s urban land lease market has evolved around two sets of institutional
actors: municipal governments and socialist land masters (Hsing, 2006).
Amid the competition for the city’s unvacant land control, the municipal
governments’ success is due to three different factors: (1) the municipalities are
politically prepared/capable of undertaking the top-down pressure from the socialist
land masters. (2) The municipal governments could use their political resources to
efficiently organize the fragmented sub-municipal units from inside to facilitate
capital accumulation. (3) The municipal governments are morally capable of being the
pacesetters of the market and protectors of socially disadvantaged groups to ensure
their hegemonic legitimacy (Hsing, 2006).
Comparing with the American urban growth machine, the engine of the Chinese
growth machine is the coalition and competition between different groups of
stakeholders (Hsing, 2006). Moreover, the Chinese neoliberal decentralization is not
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just about the level of central control and local autonomy but also about the process of
wielding the local government’s power given by the upper level of government
(Hsing, 2006).
Hsing (2006) also states that local state independence is treated as a natural
outcome of top-down fiscal and administrative decentralization policies in the
literature. However, Hsing (2006) believes that whether the centrally granted
authority can be transformed into the real power of municipal government is uncertain.
In this research, Hsing (2006) has shown that decentralization as a granted policy
scheme does not necessarily generate local municipal power. While the city
government enjoys the devolved authority of urban land management, whether the
municipal governments could actually transform this delegated authority into
effective control of the urban land remains to be examined. That is to say,
decentralization is not only about the level of devolved central control and local
autonomy undertaken by the local government; also, it is about the local states’
capacity to manipulate with granted power.
Stone (1989) does a comprehensive analysis of the regime building in Atlanta in
the 1970s. And he (1989) believes that the most important stakeholders in the city’s
racial political governing regime are the private sectors---the rentier elites who
possess slack financial and institutional resources. But this is contrary to Hsing
(2006)’s opinion that the most important stakeholders in a Chinese city’s political life
are socialist land masters and the municipal governments. In order to fill the gap
between the different viewpoints between the east and west and build a bridge to
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rationalize Hsing’s discourse, my study concretizes the specific regime-building
process and adds a new significant stakeholder---state-owned enterprise. Comparing
with Hsing (2006)’s discourse, my study is a bricks-and-mortar presentation of how
neoliberal redevelopment governing coalition is formed in the second-tier Chinese
cities.
Shin (2013), in his work China’s Speculative Urbanism and the Built
Environment, also evaluates neoliberalism with Chinese characteristics. Shin (2013)
believes that China’s urbanization has entailed a massive accumulation of the
country’s fixed assets through investment in infrastructure, facilities, and real estate
properties. For example, since the 2000s, more than half of the fixed asset investment
in Beijing went into the real estate sector (Shin, 2013). Therefore, urbanism in China
conforms to what Michael Goldman has defined as “speculative urbanism (Shin,
2013).” The local and central governments are transforming China into an urban,
industrial and modern country by financing infrastructure projects (Shin, 2013). The
great mega-events, such as Beijing Olympic Games, are building the first-tier Chinese
cities to be world-class cities (Shin, 2013). Therefore, urban redevelopment has
become a key area of government intervention.
Besides, according to Shin (2013), the land leasing fees generated by the
transaction of land use rights have chiefly contributed to government finance (Shin,
2013). Under the tax sharing system between central and local governments, the local
government can retain most of the land-based revenues as extra-budgetary revenues.
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Hence, this facilitates the grow-oriented municipal governments to seek more land
revenues.
Furthermore, Chinese speculative urbanism includes real estate speculation and
developmental projects that supply more than what can be consumed because city
managers expect more civic demand to follow the speculative investment.
All in all, the key features of neoliberalism with the Chinese characteristics also
involve the expropriation of rural and urban lands, the demolition of existing
neighbourhoods, and the large-scale relocation of the existing residents. Heavy
investment in the built environment in the real estate sector has been the most
significant factor leading to the rapid macroeconomic growth in China during the past
decade.
2.5 Summary of the Chapter
The previous sections summarize the books I have been reading as the academic
underpinning for the research. The Regime Politics: Governing Atlanta 1946-1988 is a
theoretical and empirical analysis of urban politics, power structure, and race relations
of American cities, with acute emphasis on the central role of urban business elites,
providing an academic framework for examining the dynamics of American city
politics. Reconstructing Urban Regime Theory: Regulating Urban Politics in a
Global Economy presents the necessity of reconceptualizing urban concepts through
reconstructing them by other extra-economic higher-level abstractions and regulation
theory. In The Urban Fortunes: The Political Economy of Place, Logan and Molotch
describe and define growth coalitions and their impact on society. The book explains
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how growth coalitions function together to carry out governing decisions to rebuild
the American cities. The Urban Growth Machine: Critical Perspectives Two Decades
Later offers a critical discussion of growth machine theory. The Neoliberal City:
Governance, Ideology, and Development in American Urbanism is a theoretical
description of the turn to neoliberalism and its consequences. Spaces of Neoliberalism:
Urban Restructuring in North America and Western Europe offers theoretical debates
on neoliberalism and city restructuring amid neoliberalism. Globalization and Urban
Change: Capital, Culture, and Pacific Rim-Mega Projects provides sources of
reference for the external funding to the Chinese cities’ redevelopment mega projects.
In addition to that, I present two major concepts related to the financing of urban
redevelopment projects: (1) the Housing Act of 1949 and eminent domain and (2)
off-budget financing and tax increment financing (TIF). In addition to that, I have also
summarized the Chinese experiences of neoliberalism, urban regime, and growth
machine theory.
The topics are covered in the following section and include interviews and
research design (the overall organization of the research effort, for example), why I
selected the six interviewees (their uniquenesses), how I recruited/interviewed them
(each interviews’ content and specific situation), result analysis, and why the
interviewees said that and what I can learn from that.
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3. Methodology: Constructivist Grounded Theory, Case Study and Interview
In this chapter, I reveal the main methodologies of my research, which are
constructivist grounded theory and case study. Then, in the following paragraphs, I
examine the case study as part of the research design.
3.1 Methodology of Research Design: Constructivist Grounded Theory
This study adopts the constructivist grounded theory as the research methodology
(Charmaz, 2006). Constructivism refers to a research method that denies the objective
existence of reality (Mills et al., 2006), and constructivists believe realities are
constructed by social minds (Guba & Lincoln, 1989). Moreover, constructivism
stresses the relationship between researchers and participants and the construction of
meaning (Pidgen & Henwood, 1997; Hayes & Oppenheim, 1997). Grounded theory is
a kind of methodology trying to construct a theory about the important problems in
people’s lives (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Glaser, 1978; Strauss & Corbin, 1998). Data
collection and subsequent analysis can help researchers conceptualize theories based
on case experiences (Mills et al., 2006).
Therefore, the primary reason I am using constructivist grounded theory is that
there are no prior theories or principles that can be used to generalize the experiences
(Mills et al., 2006) of the financing and growth-coalition building of waterfront
redevelopment projects in Chinese port cities. Moreover, constructivist grounded
theory can be used to collect data and generate new waterfront redevelopment theories
through participant interviews. Namely, data is collected for conceptualizing these
theories (Glaser, 2002). And this theoretical approach can help me to summarize these
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abstract concepts through practical observation during data collection and analysis,
which allows me to develop an overall hypothesis regarding the development of
coalition building and financing from practical experiences.
In addition, constructivist grounded theory can be used to guide data collection
and analysis (Mills et al., 2006). This method is the most popular and common
version of contemporary grounded theory (Charmaz, 2006). Moreover, this theory
does not only contain grounded theory’s original methodological strategies but also
transforms its epistemological basis to consider the methodological development of
qualitative research, which means that I could transform the study to develop new
qualitative theories based on the methodology. So this is one of the most important
reasons I adopt the constructivist grounded theory.
What is more, the grounded theory of constructivism provides a wide range of
guidelines and principles, not limited to the collection of formulaic data and analysis.
The advantage of this approach is that it provides flexibility for research design while
providing a general framework for data collection and analysis. This is another reason
why I selected the constructivist grounded theory.
Furthermore, the constructivist grounded theory emphasizes the construction of
philosophy rather than the exposition of the known theory. The background of this
study is to use a research methodology to provide strategies to analyze data and build
a theoretical framework. Choosing constructivist grounded theory as the research
methodology is conducive to a comprehensive analysis of the stakeholders in the
construction of the Olympic Sailing Centre project growth coalition. Moreover, it
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focuses on the interaction between public authority and private sector, as well as how
to carry out market-oriented transactions on the surrounding lands to recover the
investment.
In the next section, I explain the idea of the case study as part of my
methodology.
3.2 Methodology: Ideas of Case Study
In Case Study Research and Applications, Yin (2018) evaluates the research
study’s design. Yin (2018) generalizes the key components of designing a case study
research: a case study’s questions, its propositions, its cases, the logic linking the data
to the propositions, and the criteria for interpreting the findings.
In order to formulate the pertinent case study questions, Yin (2018) suggests three
essential steps to follow, the first of them a narrowing down of research interests and
not considering other research questions. Second, he suggests closely scrutinizing
several case studies that are within my research interests, and then ascertaining the
key research questions to summarize what could be used for future case studies. This
is important because the bullet points I summarized could further inspire me in many
ways to select my research questions. Third, he suggests evaluating some case studies
on the same topics to further deepen my understanding of the specialized knowledge
and help me develop in-depth research questions (Yin, 2018). He explains how to
formulate a study proposition to reach the study object properly, and he emphasizes
exploratory studies (Yin, 2018). In Yin’s (2018) discussion about the third component
in designing a case study—its cases—he introduces a case that involves two major
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steps: defining the case and bounding the case. In “defining the case,” Yin (2018)
explains that the case study could be a person or an entity. And the investigator could
also design specialized questions and study propositions to help gather pertinent
information. Besides that, Yin (2018) emphasizes that different types (geographical
locations or categories) of cases are easily defined, and they will affect the data
collection and the research questions raised by the investigator. Moreover, the case
study’s tentative definition could originate from how you develop your initial research
questions (Yin, 2018). Once the case study topic has been decided, the researcher
proceeds to bound the case. Yin (2018) defines the boundaries of a case as the
selection of a topic for my research study. The process’ essential components are first
to identify the key research questions that I will mainly investigate, and then to raise
the proposition to be studied by my case study.
Case studies’ role is to facilitate my understanding of the post-industrial
waterfront redevelopment in Chinese port cities. The way to master the topic is to be
familiar with some concrete cases in the area of expertise. The practical knowledge
and lore are the centres of specialized learning, and case study is a learning method.
According to Flyvbjerg (2006), case knowledge provides practical learning
experiences. Thus, it is critical to human learning experiences. The highest level in the
learning process is virtuosity and expertise. And there is only one way to reach that
level of virtuosity and expertise, which is through case studies learning and studying
rule-based knowledge (Flyvbjerg, 2006). What is more, the case study reflects
real-life situations, and researchers must use case studies to develop the skills needed
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to do good research. If researchers want to develop their skills to a high level, the case
study is central to their research design. Beyond that, a case study can minimize the
ritual of academic blind alleys (Flyvbjerg, 2006). As for my case, it is difficult to
conduct thousands of concrete studies in the case of the Olympic Sailing Centre, but
the concrete Olympic Sailing Centre case study is important for me to learn the
specialized knowledge. I can carefully design my research questions and carefully
prepare the interview process to obtain the relevant information in more detail (this is
especially important when I interview the official from the city’s Bureau of Planning).
The fourth component of the research design, connecting data to propositions, is
the preview of data analysis, while the fifth component is the criteria for interpreting
the strength of a case study’s findings. As Yin (2018) explains, the statistical
information is the standard for interpreting the findings. Yin (2018) also introduces
the four major broader analytic strategies of case study, illustrating that researchers
should be familiar with similar sources of evidence and with similar analytic
techniques.
The first analytic strategy is to compare the expected and actual patterns. The
“pattern-matching procedures” (Yin, 2018, p. 18) is the first type of case study
analysis methodology. I incorporate this strategy in my case study of Qingdao
Olympic Sailing Centre because I predict similar patterns based on existing common
knowledge of waterfront developments in U.S. and European cities. My hypothesis
about the off-budget financial instrument is framed by common sense and the
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financing story of other waterfront redevelopment projects in China. Moreover, the
hypothesis is the anticipated answer to my research questions.
The second analytic strategy is using evidence to build an explanation. The
results of my archival search and interviews are used to facilitate my analysis and
understanding of the results. They form the basis on which I analyze the data and
draw conclusions.
The third analytic strategy is to “ascertain and array the key events
chronologically” (Yin, 2018, p. 21). This strategy is important to my case studies
because I need to construct a concrete timeline for the relocation of Beihai Shipyard
to better present the city’s spatial transformation timeline. Moreover, the timeline of
the big events of major commercial complexes located in the Olympic Sailing Centre
business circle is constructed to reveal the private economy and service industry’s
development after the eastward relocation of city hall. Therefore, I have carefully
designed this section.
The final analytic strategy is building and proofing the logic models. For this
strategy, I analyze whether the waterfront redevelopment in the case of Qingdao
Olympic Sailing Centre reflects the progressive replacement of the Keynesian-Fordist
industrial waterfront by the post-industrial waterfront, and whether the Chinese
development regime building will be the same as their U.S. counterparts.
All in all, five different components constitute a case study as one type of
research design. The first three components—the study’s questions, propositions, and
cases—help facilitate the research design to identify the targeted data and help collect
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the data. The other two components help to connect data to the propositions and the
standard of analyzing data. This can reshape the design to facilitate case study
analysis and offer backup options for collected data (Yin, 2018). This is very similar
to how I develop my research study questions. I first comprehensively examine
associated literature on urban regime theory/growth machine theory to define my
major research questions. Then I begin the literature review and conduct interviews to
collect data. Finally, I use the examples presented by Yin (2018) to connect data to
propositions and analyze the results.
Additionally, the following paragraphs in this chapter of Yin’s book is important
to my study because it considers the role of theory in research designs. To construct
pertinent theories, theoretical development needs to be simple and plain. The author
argues that the research design, including the five components of designing research,
starts from developing theoretical propositions (Yin, 2018). Therefore, it is useful to
follow the author’s instruction to develop theoretical propositions and construct the
case study in exploratory, descriptive, or explanatory forms. Researchers could use
theoretical propositions to design research studies and collect data when doing a case
study. They also could use the theories as platforms to unearth new research results
and analyze key arguments (Yin, 2018).
This section is especially inspiring for me because I also develop and extract
many research questions based on the theoretical work about post-industrial
redevelopment, neoliberalism, urban regime theory, and theory of off-budget financial
instruments. The theories did function as a platform for me to hypothesize theoretical
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propositions. In the next few stages, the theoretical frameworks analyze data I have
collected. Besides the case study of the Olympic Sailing Centre, my study also
contains a background section on Fushan Bay Business Circle and Zhongshan Road
Commercial Street. The research questions I raise follow the theoretical structure of
post-industrial waterfront redevelopment, urban regime theory, and neoliberalism. So
the research study of cases is built on the framework of pertinent theories.
In addition, a well-designed case study, without needing to be able to generalize,
can be valuable to scientific creation, which means case studies are more likely to
produce correlative theories. A case study is considered a good way to identify a
“black swan” because of its “in-depth approach” (Flyvbjerg, 2006, p. 228): what
appears to be “white” can turn out to be “black” by closer examination (Flyvbjerg,
2006, p. 228). As for my case, I generalize the role of financing and development
regime building for waterfront redevelopment projects in Chinese port cities under
neoliberalism by studying the case of Qingdao Olympic Sailing Centre. No one has
conducted a systematic evaluation of the financing story and regime building of
waterfront redevelopment projects in Chinese port cities before, so it is important to
assess, through closer examination, the financing and coalition development of the
Olympic Sailing Centre project. I hope the research study can be taken as a reference,
making recommendations for future similar projects.
Further to say, a case study can generalize theories on the basis of individual
cases. The case studies can be used to generate and test hypotheses but are not limited
to the research activities alone (Flyvbjerg, 2006). According to Flyvbjerg (2006),
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Eckstein believes that a case study is useful to constructing the theory-building
process, and it works best when building a theoretical knowledge background.
Flyvbjerg (2006) illustrates that using case studies to generalize theories can be
improved by a strategic selection of cases. He (2006) also mentions the strategies for
the selections of cases and samples: (1) random selection, and (2)
information-oriented selection. I think the point that I can learn from for my case
study of Qingdao Olympic Sailing Centre is the information-oriented selection. I have
contacted the key informant from the city’s Bureau of Planning based on their
knowledge of the city’s spatial transformation and economic restructuring and have
found participants who know the financing story and the development coalition
building of the Olympic Sailing Centre project to make sure I obtain the pertinent
information. Furthermore, I have not randomly selected any developers of the
Qingdao Olympic Sailing Centre project to be my interviewee; the interviewee
participating in my interview is one who knows the project’s financing story. This is
my strategy of selecting information-oriented participants to formulate correlative
theories.
In Chapter 4 of Yin’s book, he (2018) examines the six most common evidence
sources for case study research. The researchers must collect and use the data properly
to ensure the quality of research results. The major sources of evidence used in my
research case study are mainly interviews and direct observations. I have ensured that
my interviewees are the pertinent informants of targeted information to answer the
relevant research questions. The participants’ insightful ideas have inspired me
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differently to understand the city’s spatial transformation from different perspectives
beyond post-industrial redevelopment and neoliberalism. Namely, the interviewees’
insights have broadened my vision about the dynamics between municipal
governments and private developers within a specific Chinese context, which means I
have had opportunities to see the characteristics of Chinese social connections (called
“Guanxi”). I have tried to design my interview questions as carefully as possible to
avoid inaccuracies and different definition of concepts due to poorly designed
interview questions and poor recall. Thus, I have reduced response different definition
of concepts as much as possible. When observing the spatial changes of the city, I
only used direct observation so as to understand the whole picture of urban spatial
change in a short time, thus avoiding timewasting.
In retrospect, I chose Qingdao Olympic Sailing Centre and Zhongshan Road
Commercial Street as case studies because these cases can draw people’s attention.
The Qingdao Olympic Sailing Centre is a unique flagship project used by the
development coalitions for territorial ideologies. Nevertheless, I have built an
attractive framework for my study, lest the research and interview questions are not
pertinent. In order to compare with the Olympic Sailing Centre, I built a detailed
background-knowledge framework on Shinan District and introduced Zhongshan
Road Commercial Street explicitly. The design of my study’s implementation process
is mainly documented/literature review and interviews. I first constructed the
framework of my methodologies under the constructivist method, but the details of
the documented/literature review and interviews have been fleshed out in the
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interview process. Moreover, designing a “two-case” study has beefed up the first
case study. The two case studies function together to challenge the existing notion
(Yin, 2018). Additionally, the case studies having two cases broaden the case studies’
coverage and increase the topics of contemporary interests. That is why I have
conducted two case studies, which are Qingdao Olympic Sailing Centre and
Zhongshan Road Commercial Street. The story of Qingdao Olympic Sailing Centre is
contrasted with the “failed” redevelopment of the Zhongshan Road Commercial Street,
the traditional trading and commercial core of the port city economy. Multiple case
studies ensure that they cover more topics than single case studies do (Yin, 2018).
Nonetheless, I still include detailed background and flanking information as much as
possible to better facilitate my understanding of the topics. I also resort to archival
resources for my literature review and document review sections.
3.3 Methodology of Data Collection-Interview Strategies
The interviews form significant parts of my overall methodology of data
collection because I can get the information I want from the interviews in my research.
This research collects essential data mainly through interviews. The interviews in this
research cover the topics of the financing of Olympic Sailing Centre, the ideological
motivation of the waterfront redevelopment project, the relocation of previous
industrial sites, the development of the Fushan Bay Business Circle, and the decline
of the Zhongshan Road Commercial Street. The interviews help “convey empathy,
build trust with the interviewees, and enable me to gain rich data” to better understand
the interviewees’ opinions and perceptions (Harrison, 2009, p. 333). Moreover,
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interviews are helpful to learn critical aspects that are not easily accessible through
standardized surveys—the organizations’ internal decisions on the relocation of
industrial sites, as an example. My method of data collection regarding interviews is
to conduct conversations with people who occupy management positions and have
essential roles in the targeted organizations or companies. I can collect valuable data
through the interviews and understand how the organizations and companies function
as crucial stakeholders amid the financing of the waterfront redevelopment projects.
Meanwhile, I gain direct knowledge of the interviewees’ perceptions regarding
interview questions such as how the Olympic Sailing Centre was financed and what
role the growth coalition played, for example.
The general logic of arranging interviews in my research is to relate the topics of
the interview questions to the interviewees’ backgrounds so that the most suitable
interviewees answer the questions and so that I can interpret and analyze their words
appropriately. I need to know an interviewee’s background because I must know
whether they are knowledgeable about supplying the information I look for.
Simultaneously, these interview questions are academically difficult, so only
interviewees with relevant backgrounds can appropriately answer these questions. The
interviewees can synthesize location information, occurrence time, and specific events
of the financing and development coalition building of the Olympic Sailing Centre
project, so this is why I can only get the above information from an interview. Besides,
the interviews allowed me to speculate about the interviewee’s perspective to get
more information than what I interviewed through analysis. My task is to prepare
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interview questions to fit the position and the position level of the interviewees. For
example, I had the retired cadre of Beihai Shipyard’s corporate culture office answer
questions about the relocation of the shipyard and some private information of how
the managers at that time made the relocation decision. My strategy was right because
even shipyard employees may not know the details if they come from other
departments. In contrast, the employees from other departments probably know better
about the resistance to the relocation of Beihai Shipyard because they are the most
aware of the relocation’s inconvenience.
In my research, each interview was conducted around a particular topic. During
an interview, when the interviewees did not have enough professional or academic
knowledge related to my questions, such as a lack of knowledge on roll-back
neoliberal destruction or roll-out institutional creation, I reworked the interview
questions to provide the interviewees with a set of more accessible questions as
guides to explain the concepts in a straighter way. This also makes the reworked
questions more appropriate to the interviewee’s actual situation (the distinctive
Chinese circumstance). Nevertheless, to provide a similar starting point for each
interview and cover all the important topics before I ran out of time, I still asked them
the original interview questions first. This is for two reasons. First, I wanted to ask the
most pertinent research questions to the interviewees. Second, I wanted to allow the
interviewees to better understand the questions. Generally speaking, these reworked
interview questions are pertinent in terms of the perspectives I want to know more
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about, and they provide the interviewees with flexibility. Therefore, the final results
show that my goal has been achieved.
The interviewees each have different career backgrounds. So their answers to my
interview questions on some level contain different opinions on similar subjects, and
these different opinions could have potentially led to different definition of concepts
or inaccurate data. Thus, I listened carefully to their explanations regarding the
interview issues and took notes about these different opinions to analyze the reasons
behind the differences in their statements.
The interviews with six interviewees helped me to build relationships of trust
with them. Some interviewees were willing to reveal some sensitive information
during the interviews, for example, about the nature of the municipal government’s
top-design of entrepreneurial city governance. This is significant to my research,
enabling it to reveal some essential content.
In choosing interviewees, I consider not only their positions (career relevance)
but some demographic characteristics such as age, education, and personality. Among
these criteria, the most important one is whether they have the information and
perspective I want to know about. Education is also important because this determines
whether they can easily and quickly understand these new concepts (urban politics
and neoliberalism, as examples).
The interviewee I selected for the Zhongshan Road Commercial Street is Linan
Tian, who is director of the committee of municipal and rural construction. I
interviewed Director Linan Tian to learn more about the gentrification of the eastern
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part of the city and why the revitalization attempts of Zhongshan Road failed.
Director Tian is the best person to interview about the development of that part of the
city because, during the Zhengsheng Yu mayor era (1992–1997, when Qingdao was
heavily developing the eastern part of Qingdao), she was in the prime of her career,
and involved in all the important and specific work of the projects’ planning. Both
director Linan Tian and my father are fellow alumni. That is how I know her. Our first
interview took the form of a casual chat. I met her twice in order to get all the
necessary information.
I also interviewed the director of Zhongshan Road Revitalization Task Force (a
government office under the Bureau of Qingdao Development and Reform), Xinan
Wang, to learn more about the previous situation of Zhongshan Road, the difficulties
in reviving the Zhongshan Road Commercial Street, governmental stimulus strategies,
and the reasons behind the difficulties. I was able to recruit Director Xinan Wang
because one of my friends introduced me to the background and knowledge that
Director Xinan Wang has, so I contacted him, asking whether I could interview him
regarding the rehabilitation initiatives of the Zhongshan Road area. He readily agreed
to help me, and I conducted the interview in January of 2020.
Other than that, I interviewed Xiaoyu Li, the general manager of the famous and
citywide supermarket Haibin Food Store in Zhongshan Road Business Street, to learn
why the development looks the way it does and what the linchpin of reviving
Zhongshan Road Business Street is. I chose him because of his position as the oldest
front shop’s manager in the Zhongshan Road area. Xiaoyu inherited the business from
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his father, a distant relative of my family, a few years ago. So I got to know him, and
with his consent, I recruited and interviewed him regarding the story of the rise and
fall of the Zhongshan Road area.
I also conducted three interviews to understand the three primary aspects of the
second case study (Olympic Sailing Centre). For my interview regarding the
development history of Beihai Shipyard, the relocation of the shipyard, and the initial
selection of the site of the Olympic Sailing Centre, I chose Mr. Yanjie Li. He is a
retired cadre of the office of corporate culture at China Shipbuilding Industry
Corporation, Qingdao (Beihai Shipbuilding Corporation is a subsidiary company of
CSIC), and he is currently writing a book about the development history of Beihai
Shipyard as a century-old enterprise. So he is very knowledgeable about the
information that I wanted to know. I recruited Yanjie Li to ask him whether he would
like to accept my interview request to disclose a little bit about what he is working on.
Since he is already retired, he readily accepted my invitation.
For my interview regarding the financing of Qingdao Olympic Sailing Centre and
the development of the Olympic Sailing Centre business circle, I chose the Deputy
Director of Qingdao Planning Bureau, Mr. Zhipeng Li. I selected him to be my
interviewee about these aspects because he knows the layout of urban development
today, and, most important of all, 12 years ago, Mr. Li was the secretary of the 2008
Beijing Olympic Sailing Game Organization Committee. Therefore, he knows how
the Olympic Sailing Centre Project was financed and he knows about Fushan Bay
Business Circle’s development. I got to know Zhipeng Li because a family connection
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who used to work with him introduced him to me and me to him. I added him to
WeChat and asked him whether he would like to be my source of information on the
Olympic Sailing Centre projects financing and operation. He agreed, and I
interviewed him in his office a few days later.
Regarding the development mechanism underpinning the redevelopment scheme,
the concrete financing details of the Olympic Sailing Centre project, and information
about the state-owned enterprises (Qingdao Dong’ao Group) that actually conducted
the project’s financing, I interviewed Ziyin Yao, the manager of Qingdao Dong’ao
Group (today the City Construction and Investment Group). He is the best person to
learn from about the bricks-and-mortar financing strategies of the Olympic Sailing
Centre project. Ziyin is a friend of an old colleague of my family, so I was able to
contact him, and he readily agreed to my interview request after knowing my
intention.
Please see the following table that compares the six interviewees, states how I
recruited them, and why I chose them to be my interviewees.


















































































































































































































































































































































































I also collected documents such as the Feasibility study report of the twenty-ninth
Olympic Games International Sailing Centre Construction Project, Policy
Interpretation and Practice of the Reform of Regulation and Service in
Shenzhen and Construction and Practice of Business Environment in
Shenzhen, and Zhongshan Road Rehabilitation Notes, Revival Plan for Zhongshan
Road Commercial (Tourism) Street, and Industrial Orientation of Zhongshan Road
Commercial Street from Zhipeng Li, Yanjie Li, Linan Tian, and Xinan Wang. These
documents are introduced in the Result Analysis section, and they support the analysis
of growth-coalition building in the Olympic Sailing Centre project, the nature of the
growth-coalition formation, and the success in second-tier Chinese cities.
In the previous sections, I explained the constructivist grounded theory, the
methodology of research design that this study adopts. In this chapter, I evaluate the
primary reason I am using constructivist grounded theory and the features and
advantages of the constructivist grounded theory.
Then I introduce my approach to the research and how it involves case studies as
part of my research design. Following the case studies and research design, I
generalize the key components of designing a case study research and case studies’
analytic strategies.
In addition to that, I unravel why I use interview strategies as the methodology
for data collection and the advantages of interviews. I explain how I collect data via
interviews and the general logic of arranging interviews.
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In Chapter 4, “Neoliberal Uniqueness: Choice of the City,” I discuss the
neoliberal features of the city I have chosen, Qingdao. I introduce the general
information of Qingdao, the city’s history and geography, industrial development, and
the evolution of neoliberal ideologies and economic development.
In the second part of the chapter, I unveil why I chose Zhongshan Road
Commercial Street and Qingdao Olympic Sailing Centre as the two case studies in a
comparison group. To deepen the discussion, I further evaluate why the traditional
street bordering a harbour declined while the emerging post-industrial waterfront was
booming. The ultimate goal of doing so is to analyze how the growth coalition is
constructed and its financing situation.
Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 are highly related to each other. According to Chapter 3,
the constructivist grounded theory can be used to generalize the experiences/empirical
case studies of the financing and growth-coalition building of waterfront
redevelopment projects in Chinese port cities, which is the primary subject of my
research. Moreover, constructivist grounded theory can be used to collect data and
generate new waterfront redevelopment theories through participant interviews.
The background generated by Chapter 4, neoliberal uniqueness of Qingdao city,
is where I apply the research methodologies introduced in Chapter 3. I use the case
studies of the Zhongshan Road Commercial Street and Qingdao Olympic Sailing
Centre and the interviews I conducted from the two sites to reflect and analyze the
more significant themes of the study. My ultimate goals are to explain how the
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Olympic Sailing Centre’s growth coalition was formed and how it implements the
waterfront redevelopment project’s financing scheme under neoliberalism.
3.4 Research Ethics
The interviewees follow the approved research ethics protocol, and all
respondents agreed that I may share their names.
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4. Neoliberal Uniqueness: Choice of the City
4.1 The Choice of the City: Qingdao
First of all, I would like to introduce the overview of Qingdao to unveil why the
case of Qingdao is a unique example of the neoliberal city. The total population of
Qingdao is 9.4 million, of which 6.4 million are urban residents. Qingdao has a large
population of foreigners: 170,000. This is because the westernization of its urban
construction and development mode lasted for half of a century since the beginning of
its establishment in 1891, leaving Qingdao with a large foreign population and a high
degree of openness. Therefore, Qingdao residents have a high sense of identity with
foreign cultures, social systems, and modernization; for this reason, Chinese
traditional culture has not accumulated much in Qingdao.
Please see below the map (Figure 4.1) of Qingdao to present the city’s strategic
location.
Figure 4.1 Location of Qingdao
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Source: Citypopulation.de
Please see below the maps (figures 4.2 and 4.3) thermodynamic diagrams of
Qingdao to reflect the city’s population distribution.
Figure 4.2 Thermodynamic diagram of Qingdao’s urban population
Source: NetEase Hao, https://3g.163.com/all/article/EF201GAJ05418TYM.html
Figure 4.3 Thermodynamic diagram of Qingdao City
Source: NetEase Hao, https://3g.163.com/all/article/EF201GAJ05418TYM.html
Qingdao is located in the north along China’s coastline, south of the Jiaodong
Peninsula, and it abuts the vast hinterland in the west. Due to its superior geographical
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location, Qingdao has been accorded great importance in modern times. Following the
Qing government’s establishment of a garrison in 1891, the Germans leased the
Qingdao port and constructed railways in 1897. Qingdao thus prospered because of
the port and railway and became the centre of German and Japanese trading activities
in China. In modern times, Qingdao completed the transformation from a remote
fishing village to a commercial city during the German lease period; during the
Japanese occupation period, the manufacturing industry, led by the textile industry,
rose, transforming Qingdao into an industrial and commercial city, and the degree of
urbanization was further improved. With the development of the city, Qingdao’s
industries of transportation, architecture, communication, education, and scientific
research all play an important role in China and even Asia.
What is more, the early built environment of Qingdao’s core totally reflects the
original urban design of the German colonists (Farris, 2011). This is mainly because
there were not many pre-existing traditional Chinese architectures or communities in
the Qingdao region before 1891. The old city was completely built by the Germans,
therefore, the architectural style of Qingdao’s old city is entirely Western (Farris,
2011). European architectural technology was widely used in Qingdao’s urban
construction. As Germany is the only foreign influence, German urban planners were
able to maximize their ideal planning, and their influence can be seen everywhere in
Qingdao’s historic quarter, where the neighbourhoods are separated by a European
parish, a villa quarter (please see figure 4.4 below), a Chinese trade and commerce
parish, and two parishes for workers (Farris, 2011).
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Furthermore, according to the German planning of Qingdao’s historic quarter,
leisure and work are separated. This unique leisure atmosphere gives Qingdao’s Bund,
Pacific Road (the Kaiser Wilhelm back then), a unique feature of recreational luxury.
Again, only in a city like Qingdao, where a German presence dominated and
communities are separated by functions and ethnicity, can urban design reach its ideal
form in full (Farris, 2011). The grand masterpiece of the governor’s palace, with its
radiating avenues (please see figure 4.5 below) and various Teutonic revival-style
architectures mixed with medieval and classical motifs, give this Oriental port city a
unique European Charm.
Figure 4.4 The villa quarter in Qingdao
Source: http://m.yao51.com/jiankangtuku/nnddpkdv.html
figure 4.5 German governor’s palace
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Source: Wikipedia. Gisling-Own work. License under CC BY-SA 3.0 license,
https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=17275501
Following Deng Xiaoping’s neoliberal reform and opening policy in the late
1970s, Qingdao’s economy has developed rapidly, and amid the growth, the
reputation of its manufacturing industry has become the city’s bright billboard. In the
early 1980s, the three pillar industries of Qingdao were the textile manufacturing
industry, transportation equipment manufacturing industry, and chemical engineering
industry. The most famous industrial cluster was the state-owned textile
manufacturing enterprises: Guo Mian 1-9 Chang (it means State-owned Textile
Manufacturing 1-9 Factories). The textile industry in Qingdao has been the pillar
supporting industry almost since the beginning of the city’s industrial history. Before
1937, the number of employees in the textile sector in Qingdao had been 3,3000. And
they are the core industrial workers in Qingdao. In a nutshell, Qingdao’ s light
industrial scale before 1949 ranked as the second largest in China (Shanghai ranked as
the first).
After the neoliberal reform and the opening-up policy, the speed of industrial
upgrading in Qingdao has accelerated. Since then, Qingdao has developed into one of
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the largest industrial cities and an important industrial base in northern China.
Qingdao has formed a comprehensive industrial system with a traditional textile and
clothing industry, food processing industry, chemical rubber industry, emerging
electronic instruments industry, home appliances industry, and other industries as
pillars, which play an important role in the country. By promoting technological
innovation, transferring of know-how, and expanding technological introduction,
Qingdao ranks at the forefront of domestic industrial cities in terms of industrial
technology levels. Qingdao’s light industry has many famous brands, including
Tsingtao beer (please see figure 4.6 below).
figure 4.6 Tsingtao Beer
Source Wikimedia. Radoslaw Drozdzewski. Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-Share
Alike 4.0 license
In addition, the mechanical industrial industry in Qingdao is highly developed.
The emerging industries represented by electronic instruments, household appliances,
and high-speed trains have risen rapidly since the neoliberal reform. They have
produced a number of famous and high-quality products in China and abroad. Among
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them, Haier, Hisense, and Chinese CSR (Qingdao High-speed Rail Manufacturing Co.)
are the most competitive in the global market. Qingdao is the real “city of brands” in
China.
Please see figures 4.9, 4.10, and 4.11, images of Hisense, Haier, and a Chinese
high-speed train.
figure 4.7 A Hisense advertising sign at the Iceland versus Argentina match in 2018 World Cup.
Source: China Daily
figure 4.8 Haier Headquarters
Source: Wikipedia, Haier Group - Own work, License under CC BY-SA 4.0 license.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Haier#/media/File:HaierHQ.jpg
figure 4.9 Chinese high-speed train manufactured in Qingdao
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Source: Wikipedia, By N509FZ-Own work, License under, CC BY-SA 4.0 License,
https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=63420090
Under the context of China’s post-1978 open policy and the neoliberal power and
resource devolution, as one of five Chinese municipalities with independent-planning
status (and also one of the fourteen coastal open cities), Qingdao’s growth in real
estate investment is important. The real estate sector’s growth exemplifies that the
provincial governments in China delegated part of their economic management
authority to major cities under their jurisdiction. Qingdao has a two-level local state
that includes municipal and district governments. All these have empowered the
Qingdao local government with a relatively strong decision-making power and more
responsibility. So the Qingdao municipal government began to initiate many local
redevelopment projects to tap into its local resources. Consequently, there has been
more cooperation between the local state and private sector in Qingdao. As the most
important economic centre in Shandong Province (the population of Shandong
Province is about 100 million, and Shandong is one of the most important provinces
in China, whether in history, culture, or contemporary economy), Qingdao should
play a leading role in the economic corridor of the Eurasian Continental Bridge (Zhao,
2018).
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In order to ensure the prosperity and booming of the city, it is necessary to
expand Qingdao’s urban space. Before the 1990s, the urban area of Qingdao was
concentrated on the narrow east coast of Jiaozhou Bay. Qingdao’s task of urban space
expansion, therefore, was urgent. Because to build a global city, the development
coalition composed of local governments and business elites believed that urban
construction needed to be vigorously carried out. The property-led redevelopment in
Qingdao thus can be viewed as a unique case of neoliberal entrepreneurial urban
governance.
With the manifestation of neoliberal governance, decentralization has shifted
down the direct control of the central government to Qingdao’s local development. In
the same vein, the high demand for economic growth and urban development led to
the concept of “small state, big society” (Xie, 2016). The small state, big society was
proposed by Xun Liao in 1986, and this theory exemplifies the separation of the party
from government, government from the enterprise. It builds a restricted government
and exercises the power of the market. This means that the Chinese central
government is gradually retreating from the social production and reproduction
process. So, the institutions/artifacts of former Keynesian welfare national states have
been hollowed out amid this neoliberal streak. Nowadays, the purpose of the Qingdao
local governments is to provide policy services and incentives to promote
marketization and operation, and to control the market through legislation. As a result,
the role of the Qingdao government has changed from the ubiquitous stakeholder to
the managerial institution. Accordingly, many private real estate developers are led
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and introduced by the Qingdao local government to urban redevelopment. Without the
fetters of central government, the development and construction of the city entered a
new accelerated period and began to expand rapidly. And the local government and
real estate developers eventually formed the governing regime, facilitating the urban
redevelopments in Qingdao. I discuss the detailed evolution of the urban regime in the
Olympic Sailing Centre case and the concrete financial instruments in Chapter 5
(“Arguments and Result Analysis”). At the same time, as competition between cities
becomes more intense, attracting international and domestic investment to promote
economic and urban development becomes more and more critical. So, the Qingdao
municipal government started to enact many favourable policies to attract business
and capital, adding entrepreneurial governance and the empowerment of local
government to the new Qingdao institutional reform.
After four decades of economic growth and place promotion, Qingdao has
exceeded other cities and become one of the most economically successful in eastern
China. It is well known for its entrepreneurship, and the city has experienced a
relatively high level of marketization and commodification since the economic reform.
Private developers are increasingly becoming an important part of the urban regime;
they cooperate with the local government to conduct urban redevelopment schemes.
And amid the process, there has also been a high level of private sector participation
(Zhang, 2019; Gong, 2019).
Under the centrally planned economy, local governments were mainly
responsible for implementing policies and regulations issued by the central
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government, thus lacking decision-making power and motivation to implement
large-scale redevelopment projects. However, due to the subsequent administrative
decentralization, most land development incomes and decision-making powers were
assigned to the local government. In the meantime, the central government withdrew
financial support for the local redevelopment projects. The Qingdao local state
therefore has to be entrepreneurial to gain the financial resources for urban
redevelopment. The Qingdao local government is becoming more businesslike to cut
a deal with the private sectors. It develops various mechanisms to tap into private
financial resources such as present value subsidies and value creation trade-offs. So
the Qingdao local government and private sectors are increasingly functioning as a
unified force to undertake the devolved administrative and financial power from the
central government. The Qingdao local government also encouraged market operation
and competition to promote local economic development. Consequently, urban
development and raising local revenue became the significant tasks of the Qingdao
municipal government. To optimize the business environment and attract capital
investment, the Qingdao local government has started large-scale redevelopment
projects to attract the attention of the world.
4.2 The Regional Background of the Shinan District
Table 4.1 The key economic indicators of the Shinan District
Total population 585,300
Total GDP-2017 22 billion CDN
Annual average GDP growth 9%
Added value of secondary industry 2.02 billion CDN
Added value of tertiary industry 19.9 billion CDN
Shinan’s local public budget revenue 2.1 billion CDN
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Local public budget expense 1.09 billion CDN
Annual revenue from national tax system 1.9 billion CDN
Annual revenue from local tax system 1.32 billion CDN
Self-employed businessmen 31,875
Total employment of self-employed sector 60,615
Number of private enterprises 43,709
GDP per unit-area of Shinan District 3.4 billion yuan/square
kilometres
Fiscal revenue of Shinan District 2 billion CDN
Manufacturing gross industrial output 4.6 billion CDN
Fixed asset investment in 2017 2.1 billion CDN
Retail sales of consumer goods of Shinan District 11.9 billion CDN
Wholesale sales 1.34 billion CDN
Total foreign trade volume of import and export 13.6 billion CDN
Source: Qingdao Shinan Statistics Bureau, 2018
Shinan District: The GDP per square metre is 3.4 billion yuan, Statistical Bulletin of National
Economic and Social Development of Shinan District, Qingdao city
The following section elaborates the regional background of where Qingdao
Olympic Sailing Centre is located: the Shinan District. The Shinan District is the
marrow of not only Qingdao but also the entire Shandong Province. In the most recent
2021 Chinese Hukou-system reformation stipulated by the Chinese Ministry of
Housing and Urban-Rural Development, the Shinan District is the only district in
Shandong Province that does not fully liberalize the household registration system,
which means unless you are a high net-worth individual or have a PhD or are
contributing a lot of tax revenues for the municipal government, you are not allowed
to be a Shinan resident. This is incredibly unique amid the current fierce interurban
competition between Chinese cities, whose policymakers have exhausted all their
efforts to attract people from other regions/cities.
This section presents various data such as the census population, the economic
indicators, and financial records of the communities and district to show the source of
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finance of local government/municipal revenue, how this changes over time, and why
they pursued real estate development.
This background introduction section is important because it elucidates how
economic reform of the area (taking Qingdao Olympic Sailing Centre as the hub) has
become primarily service-based, which is the manifestation of post-industrial
waterfront redevelopment. The background of the city’s financial situation illustrates
how the government used the revenue to promote urban development and what they
got from the revenue. Moreover, the entrepreneurial development strategies adopted
by developers in Shinan District reflect the trend of neoliberalism.
The Shinan District, taking Qingdao Olympic Sailing Centre as the central area,
holds a pivotal position on the economic territory of Qingdao. The total population of
the Shinan District is 585,300. According to data from Qingdao Statistics Bureau (Sun,
2017), the GDP of Shinan District has increased from 71.011 billion yuan (14.2
billion CDN) in 2012 to 109.52 billion yuan (22 billion CDN) in 2017; the annual
average GDP growth is 9 percent.
Moreover, according to the Statistical Bulletin of National Economic and Social
Development of Shinan District, Qingdao city (Qingdao Shinan District Statistic
Bureau, 2018), Shinan District’s added value of the secondary industry was 10.08
billion yuan (2.02 billion CDN); the added value of the tertiary industry was 99.44
billion yuan (19.9 billion CDN). Therefore, the economic restructuring has been
steadily moving forward. The added value of the tertiary industry accounts for 91
percent of the entire district’s added GDP (Sun, 2017). In addition, the sources of
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financing for local government and municipal outlays mainly come from tax
revenues.
In 2017, the Shinan District’s local public budget revenue was 10.56 billion yuan
(2.1 billion CDN), and the year-on-year growth rate was 3.3 percent. This level of tax
revenues and growth rate has lasted for nearly a decade. Beyond that, the annual
revenue from the national tax system was 9.5 billion yuan (1.9 billion CDN), while
the annual revenue from the local tax system was 6.6 billion yuan (1.32 billion CDN).
And the GDP per unit-area of Shinan District was 3.4 billion yuan/square kilometres.
The Shinan District’s total fiscal revenue was the first to exceed 10 billion yuan (2
billion CDN) among all the districts in Shandong Province. The economic data of
Shinan District has been ranked in the forefront among the central city districts of
large cities in China (Sun, 2017).
If we take a look at the specific individual industries—for example, the
manufacturing and construction industries—we can find that the manufacturing
industrial value added was 4.7 billion yuan (940 million CDN) in 2017; and the gross
industrial output was 22.9 billion yuan (4.6 billion CDN) in 2017. The total gross
output of the construction industry was 40.4 billion yuan (8.1 billion CDN) in 2017,
and the total value added of the construction industry was 5.4 billion yuan (1.1 billion
CDN) (Sun, 2017).
The Qingdao municipal government used the tax revenues generated by the above
industries to facilitate widespread urban redevelopment projects in the city. What they
got from the thriving real estate sector is the change in the city’s spatial structure. The
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fixed asset-investment in 2017 was 10.63 billion yuan (2.1 billion CDN), among
which real estate investment was 8.7 billion yuan (1.7 billion CDN) (Sun, 2017). And
in 2017, there were 81 fixed-asset investment projects, 25 newly started projects, and
seven of them were completed. Therefore, the total newly added fixed asset is 1.1411
billion yuan (228 million CDN). In Shinan District, the total commercial housing
sales area is 194,700 square metres, among which the residential sales area is 153,900
square metres (Sun, 2017).
Therefore, the development of the real estate market in Qingdao is booming, and
the real estate industry has become a crucial supporting industry. The real estate
sector’s contribution to the city’s total GDP has been continuously growing since the
2000s and rose to 9 percent in 2018 (Zhang, 2018). The real estate investment in
Qingdao has been dramatically increasing since the 1990s.
In addition, the land and housing reforms have been the catalysts of neoliberal
property-led redevelopments in Qingdao. The newly introduced land-leasing system
allows land-use rights to be traded in the market while the state retains land ownership.
This makes it possible to generate massive wealth through land transactions, so
property-led redevelopment has become a widespread phenomenon in Qingdao.
Getting land-use rights from the Qingdao local governments and rebuilding old and
dilapidated inner cities into high-value-added properties such as luxury hotels and
commercial buildings has become highly profitable and has attracted a lot of
investment. This is one of the most significant motivations of property-led
redevelopment in Qingdao. The increasing demand for the municipal government to
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receive revenues from land investment, the actually existing neoliberal informal
institution of land development (Brenner & Theodore, 2002), and the formation of an
urban redevelopment regime have all dramatically facilitated the property-led
economic redevelopment in Qingdao (Logan & Molotch, 1987). The development of
commercial housing and housing reform also facilitated the neoliberal property-led
redevelopment in Qingdao. The state and working units no longer allocate houses, and
the state has begun to encourage the privatization of housing. This has promoted the
neoliberal development of the real estate industry to generate land revenues for the
municipality (Weber, 2002).
The municipal government’s urban redevelopment investment resulting from
sustained economic growth and the completed urban infrastructure has maintained
market confidence and triggered society’s demand for commercial and residential
housing. In other words, the neoliberal property-led redevelopment has also been
propelled by the demand for commercial housing in Qingdao.
All in all, the booming urban redevelopment of the real estate sector in Qingdao
has been driven by institutional changes (administrative decentralization that enlarges
the financial power of the Qingdao municipality), economic factors (land and housing
reform), and social forces (high demand of the real estate industry).
The consumer market in Shinan District has remained active. The retail sales of
consumer goods of Shinan District achieved 59.63 billion yuan (11.9 billion CDN)
throughout 2017, and the year-to-year growth rate is 10.8 percent. The wholesale sales
reached 6.7 billion yuan (1.34 billion CDN) in 2017, while retail sales reached 42.9
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billion yuan (8.6 billion CDN), retail sales of the hotel industry reached 1.8 billion
yuan (360 million CDN), and retail sales of the catering industry reached 8.2 billion
yuan (1.6 billion CDN) (Sun, 2017). The total social consumer goods retail sales
achieved by enterprises was 32.18 billion yuan (6.4 billion CDN), which accounts for
54 percent of total retail sales of consumer goods in the Shinan District. The total
retail sales of clothing was 8.5 billion yuan (1.7 billion CDN), the year-to-year growth
rate was 9.8 percent; the total retail sales of petroleum products was 7.4 billion yuan
(1.48 billion CDN), and the year-to-year growth rate was 4.3 percent; the total retail
sales of appliances reached 2.7 billion yuan (540 million CDN) and the year-to-year
growth rate was 68.3 percent (Sun, 2017).
Other bright economic data of Shinan District (the Olympic Sailing Centre area)
lay in its foreign trade industry. In 2017, the total foreign trade volume of import and
export was 67.9 billion yuan (13.6 billion CDN) and the year-to-year growth rate was
18.4 percent (Sun, 2017). The total volume of exportation was 39.3 billion yuan (7.9
billion CDN), the year-to-year growth rate was 5.1 percent, while the total volume of
importation was 28.4 billion yuan (5.7 billion CDN) and the year-to-year growth rate
was 43.3 percent. The main exports are clothing, metal products, mechanical
equipment, and rolled steel. And the main import commodities are bulk resource
products such as iron ore, crude oil, refined oil products, and coal. Beyond that, there
were a total of 73 foreign-capital supported projects approved in 2017, a total of 450
million USD of foreign investment were utilized in Shinan District, and the
year-to-year growth rate was 49.38 percent. There were 576 domestic projects
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introduced to Shinan District in 2017, the total domestic capital actually used was
11.5 billion yuan (2.3 billion CDN), and the year-to-year growth rate was 15 percent
(Sun, 2017).
Shinan District has been developing rapidly in promoting the headquarters
economy. Fifty regional headquarters of Fortune 500 companies are located along the
Hong Kong Road, Shinan District. And there are 26 skyscrapers with tax revenues of
over 100 million yuan (20 million CDN), while a number of local companies became
listed on the mainboard market or overseas. Furthermore, the construction of the
central fashion area took shape, and by 2016 there were 18 commercial complexes in
operation, including the China Resources-Mix Shopping Mall and the second phase of
Hisense Plaza. The business circle of Qingdao Olympic Sailing Centre has emerged as
a booming and prosperous modern city as compared with the less favoured (because
the focus of city development in the early 1990s was the eastern area of the city) and
less successful old town commercial street, Zhongshan Road Commercial Street.
The above economic data and development stories illuminate that the Shinan
District, represented by the Qingdao Olympic Sailing Centre, has become the space of
neoliberalism. And the Qingdao Olympic Sailing Centre Business Circle has evolved
as the city’s economic restructuring arena. Moreover, the business climate was
promoted by increasing social reproduction privatization (Brenner & Theodore, 2002).
Benefitting from the entrepreneurial city governance, Qingdao, one of the first 14
coastal open cities (Wang, 2014), has been the pacemaker amid Chinese interurban
competition since the 1990s.
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4.3 Choice of the Two Study Sites
This research contains two case studies that help me to compare them and reveal
why the Olympic Sailing Centre Business Circle is booming and why the Zhongshan
Road Commercial Street declined. The ultimate goal of this research design is to
discuss the Olympic Sailing Centre’s growth coalition’s structure and its financing
situation.
Case Study 1 and the Recruitment
The first case study is the Zhongshan Road Commercial Street, which specifies
the development trajectory of the city’s old economic hub: Zhongshan Road
Commercial Street. This section’s case study illuminates the street’s rise and fall.
Furthermore, it analyzes what difficulties the revitalizing initiatives of Zhongshan
Road Commercial Street faces. This case study has been provided as a contrast to the
Qingdao Olympic Sailing Centre while also adding context to the development of the
city as a whole.
Before the city centre moved eastward in 1994 to the new business circle
surrounding Olympic Sailing Centre, Zhongshan Road, a north-south trunk road in the
old town of western Qingdao, had been the economic and commercial centre of
Qingdao for almost a century. Zhongshan Road was planned as the city’s main
business centre when Qingdao opened as a commercial port in 1898. It was initially
thriving because of liberalism and mercantilism in the late nineteenth century and
early twentieth century. Zhongshan Road originally arose because of its proximity to
the cargo terminal in Qingdao. It was the most convenient place to trade goods after
191
they are unloaded because the road’s north-south orientation runs parallel to the layout
of Qingdao port. It was also convenient for Zhongshan Road to become a trading
place for imported goods. As a result, Zhongshan Road gradually became a hub for
trading. In the early half of the twentieth century, as the main venue of Qingdao
business activities, Zhongshan Road gained considerable scale and fame during the
German occupation period. In the 1930s, the first golden period of Qingdao’s
development, Zhongshan Road upgraded from a commercial business street to a
financial street: Bank of China, Bank of Communications, Industrial Bank, and other
large financial institutions set foot in Qingdao, and most of the financial institutions
settled in Zhongshan Road. With abundant capital as a guarantee, the commercial
development of Zhongshan Road became more rapid after the 1930s.
Even though Zhongshan Road Commercial Street used to be very prosperous, it
declined inevitably due to Qingdao’s eastward gentrification, as the city’s commercial
centre also moved eastward to the Olympic Sailing Centre Business Circle. Moreover,
due to urban sprawl, the region lost its status as the city’s geographical centre, which
is why it is difficult for Zhongshan Road to gather popularity nowadays. Though most
historic buildings in Zhongshan Road Commercial Street have been renovated, not
many local customers like to go shopping there. The targeted customers of the shops
in Zhongshan Road Commercial Street are foreign tourists. The stark situation and
missing management are the grim realities faced by Zhongshan Road Commercial
Street merchants. Please see figures 5.12 and 5.13 for the current situation of
Zhongshan Road Commercial Street.
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Since the 2000s, the Qingdao municipal government has tried several times to
revamp the obsolete architectures to revive Zhongshan Road business circle. But the
costs of relocation and renovation are huge, so many businesses were reluctant to
participate because profits were too low. Moreover, the residential communities
surrounding Zhongshan Road business circle are losing the young population, and the
adjacent communities’ residents are mostly elderly, which has also led to insufficient
consumption vitality. Because it is an old town, the road network is dense, with
mostly small streets, so the logistics of access are extremely inconvenient. Therefore,
it is difficult to design and implement a modern large-scale commercial complex in
Zhongshan Road business circle. All in all, the revitalization of Zhongshan Road is
facing many difficulties.
Its current business model is mainly in the form of small commodities and the
catering industry, and there are no large, upscale commercial complexes. The street
shops are mostly small spaces with an area of about 20–80 square metres. Rents are
significantly low as well, about 3–10 yuan per square metre per day. With the
eastward shift of the centre of urban development, Zhongshan Road business circle’s
commercial environment has shown obvious signs of decline. The shops’ potential
customers are mainly foreign tourists and elder residents living in this community. In
a word, local people seldom visit here. Nowadays, the total volume of Zhongshan
Road business circle customers has been greatly reduced compared to ten years ago.
The most representative example is the Parkson Department Store, which was the first
Sino-foreign joint-venture retail enterprise approved by the Chinese State Council in
193
Shandong Province. Affected by the pallid overall economic environment in
Zhongshan Road business circle, Parkson’s current general economic condition is not
very good. Opened in 1998, Parkson Department Store saw annual sales of only 500
million yuan in 2017, lower by 20 percent from ten years ago.
figure 4.10 Zhongshan Road Commercial Street
Source: www.baidu.com
figure 4.11 Zhongshan Road Commercial Street
Source: www.baidu.com
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figure 4.12 Historical map of Zhongshan Road
Source: Qingdao Municipal Archives,
http://qd.ifeng.com/special/qdzsllj/tupian/detail_2013_05/27/841589_1.shtml,2016
Case Study 2 and the Recruitment
The second case study of the research is the historical background (including the
relocation of Beihai Shipyard) and the current specific situations of the centre of the
city’s most popular business circle: Qingdao Olympic Sailing Centre. This case study
unfolds the key actors in the Olympic Sailing Centre development coalition building
and reveals the financing process of the redevelopment project. It illustrates the
Fushan Bay redevelopment project: the Qingdao Olympic Sailing Centre. The 2008
Beijing Olympic Games signify the move of Qingdao’s commercial centre and
landmark from Zhongshan Road—a commercial street in the old town that was
booming because of its proximity to the harbour—to the business circle centring on
the Olympic Sailing Centre. The Qingdao Olympic Sailing Centre and its surrounding
parcels of land have become the most prosperous, dynamic, and booming commercial
business districts in Qingdao.
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The original site of the current Qingdao Olympic Sailing Centre, the eastern bank
of Fushan Bay, was the Qingdao Beihai Shipyard. The Qingdao Beihai Shipyard is a
century-old enterprise, initially a shipyard built by German colonists in 1898.




After nearly 100 years of development, the Beihai Shipyard has become one of
the largest shipbuilders in the region. However, the motion to move the century-old
plant out of Qingdao downtown began in the 1990s, mainly because the original site
of Qingdao Beihai Shipyard, the Fushan Bay, is not deep enough for the construction
of large ships. Consequently, the ship repairing business became stagnant, and the
shipyard facilities were partially redundant during the 1980s. In March, 1996, the
China State Shipbuilding Corporation and Qingdao municipal government decided to
build a large-scale base for shipbuilding and repairing on the west side of Jiaozhou
Bay and to move Qingdao Beihai Shipyard after construction was completed.
figure 4.14 The new location of Beihai Shipyard (the pin with 1 indicates the location)
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Source: Baidu Map
In 2004, the relocation of Qingdao Beihai Shipyard was completed. Please see
below the timeline of the relocation of Beihai Shipyard.
Table 4.2 The timeline of the relocation of Beihai Shipyard
1990 The motion of relocating Beihai Shipyard
has been initiated.
1991 Beihai Shipyard starts to look for new
sites.
1992 Haixi Bay on the west bank of Jiaozhou
Bay has been found as the ideal site of
future Beihai Shipyard (to move Beihai
Shipyard westward).
1996 The Qingdao municipal government and
China State Shipping Company (CSSC,
the holding company of Beihai Shipyard)
officially start to plan and prepare the
relocation of Beihai Shipyard.
2003 The relocation of Beihai Shipyard begins.
2004 Beihai Shipyard completely moved to
Haixi Bay, the west bank of Jiaozhou
Bay. The relocation of Beihai Shipyard
completed.
source: QDSQ, 2018, organized by author
Since the relocation of Beihai Shipyard, the Qingdao central city (the Fushan Bay
area) officially detached from the manufacturing and physical industrial activities.
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Meanwhile, property redevelopment was pursued by the urban regime/coalition,who
receive economic profits from investing in real estate redevelopment projects, as the
new Qingdao Olympic Sailing Centre replaced the original Beihai Shipyard (Logan &
Molotch, 1987; Stone, 1989). Thus, during this Fushan Bay landscape transformation,
blue-collar jobs have changed to white-collar jobs, and the post-industrial service
activities replaced the previously polluted, hard, and industrial harbour images.
What makes Qingdao Olympic Sailing Centre the marrow of the city is its
surrounding parcels of blocks and the supporting facilities. Today, as an urban
landmark, the Qingdao Olympic Sailing Centre is surrounded by the heart of Qingdao
city, the central CBD, and the headquarters of large local enterprises. figure 4.16
shows the map of Qingdao Olympic Sailing Centre and its surrounding area. And
figure 4.17 shows the aerial view of Qingdao Olympic Centre Business Circle.
According to the Overall Planning of Qingdao 2011–2020 (Qingdao City Planning
Bureau, 2016), the coastal area of the Shinan District of Qingdao, with the Fushan
Bay as the centre, was planned as the city’s central business district (CBD) (see figure
4.16). This “golden area” surrounding the Fushan Bay was positioned as the centre of
headquarter offices, financial business activities, and cultural and entertaining
activities. Further to say, the development orientation of the “golden” district was to
build the international business centre, fashion consumption centre, and the cluster of
headquarters of multinational corporations in order to support the key post-industrial
service industries: headquarter economies, finance, international business, and fashion
consumption industry.
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The Olympic Sailing Centre business circle thus has become the most prosperous
business centre in Qingdao, and its targeted customers are the city’s high net-worth
individuals. Nowadays, the major commercial complexes constituting Qingdao’s
eastern upscale business circle include the International Trading Centre, Gloria Hotel,
Hainan Airline’s Wanbang Centre, The Mixc, Carrefour, Wanda Plaza, Redoute,
Jusco, MyKal, Baili Square, Hisense Plaza, and In Zone commercial complex. Please
see figure 4.15 for the geographical distribution of the major commercial complexes.
figure 4.15 The major commercial complexes in Olympic Sailing Centre Business Circle: (1) Hisense
Plaza, (2) Baili Square, (3) Jusco Shopping Mall, (4) XInhai Square, (5) MyKal Shopping Centre, (6)
The Mixc, (7) In Zone Shopping Centre, (8) Carrefour
Source: Google Map, 2019, key sites are identified by author
figure 4.16 The red area is the business circle surrounding Qingdao Olympic Sailing Centre, and the
Shinan District is the most southerly area bounded by the purple line
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Source: Qingdao City Planning Bureau, Overall Planning of Qingdao 2011–2020, 2016
figure 4.17 Qingdao Olympic Sailing Centre Business Circle
Source: Ginmeng, https://tuchong.com/368226/ 2018
All in all, I summarize what I have collected from the core interviewees and
compare their (Director Zhipeng Li, Director Linan Tian, and Manager Ziyin Yao)
ideas here to better illustrate the value of the three major interviewees’ comments and
assess how their viewpoints contribute to answering my overall research questions.
Director Zhipeng Li believes that the party and government dominate everything,
and the current Chinese social regulation model is definitely not neoliberalism. He
insists that the Chinese Communist Party and government dominate the political life
of Chinese people. Moreover, government intervention is still active, and significant
state intervention was involved in the case of the Olympic Sailing Centre project. The
state-owned development enterprise is the primary promoter of urban redevelopment
projects. Furthermore, the limited level of market-oriented operation is guided by the
government and participated in by the capital of private sectors. Urban redevelopment,
therefore, is conducted through the market-oriented operation with the supervision of
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the municipal government. According to Zhipeng, this is “socialism urban
management with Chinese characteristics.”
From my conversation with Director Linan Tian, I can comprehend that the
current Chinese model of urban management is neoliberalism. She confirms that the
reason for fostering business activities and the city’s civic life is to facilitate
entrepreneurial urban governance. The ultimate goal is to extract value from
land-based speculative activities. I got to learn how big the role of the market could be
by interpreting how to empower the market via optimizing/improving the functions of
new government institutions.
To illustrate what I have learned from my interview with Manager Ziyin Yao, I
believe the redevelopment of the Olympic Sailing Centre project is led by the
municipal government and state-owned development companies because the growth
coalition in the Olympic Sailing Centre project is constituted by the municipal
government, state-owned development enterprise (Dong’ao Corporation), and private
developers. The municipal government controlled the land resources, and the
state-owned development enterprise (Dong’ao Corporation) was responsible for
leasing the land and mobilizing land resources in a market-oriented approach.
Therefore, they are the primary stakeholders. In contrast, the Chinese private sectors
in second-tier Chinese cities are only responsible for concrete property development,
and they do not have a voice amid the development decision-making process, unlike
their American counterparts. Nonetheless, the Chinese growth coalition is effective
and efficient because of its close ties with the government.
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On balance, Linan’s opinion is very much contrary to that of Zhipeng.
In terms of whether the current Chinese model of urban regulation adapts to the
“capitalist market economy,” Linan’s answer is yes, but Zhipeng’s is no.
In terms of whether the Olympic Sailing Centre project reflects market-oriented
social management, Linan’s answer is yes, but Zhipeng’s is no.
Thus, the three interviewees’ ideas have contributed a lot to answer my research
questions: Whether the waterfront redevelopment projects in Chinese port cities
reflect the transformation from the Keynesian-Fordism industrial waterfront to the
post-industrial service-based city. How development coalitions are formed and how
they function to facilitate the waterfront redevelopment initiatives in Chinese port
cities. What concrete off-budget financial instruments and the market ways of
mobilizing land resources are used to finance the waterfront redevelopment projects
in Chinese port cities?
Please see below the comparison table 4.3 for the three core interviewees that I have
collected data from to analyze and illustrate the three core research questions above:
Table 4.3 Comparison of the three core interviewees
Zhipeng Li Linan Tian Ziyin Yao
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Please see table 4.4, the chronicle of the major city redevelopment events.
Table 4.4 The chronicle of the major city redevelopment events
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Year Events
1992 City hall was relocated to the Fushan Bay
area.
1997 The first commercial complex— Jusco—
was opened, which marked the beginning
of prosperity in the Olympic Sailing
Centre Business Circle.
2004 The Beihai Shipyard was completely
relocated.
Source: baidu and QDSQ, 2019, organized by author
In Chapter 4, “Neoliberal Uniqueness: Choice of the City,” I discuss the
neoliberal features of the city I have chosen, Qingdao. I introduce the general
information of Qingdao, the city’s history and geography, the industrial development
of the city, and the evolution of neoliberal ideologies and economic development of
the city.
In the second part of the chapter, I compare Zhongshan Road Commercial Street
and Qingdao Olympic Sailing Centre as the two case studies in a comparison group
and introduce why I did that. To deepen the discussion, I further analyze why the
traditional inner-city harbour declined and the emerging post-industrial waterfront
was booming. The ultimate goal of doing so is to analyze how the growth coalition is
constructed and its financing situation.
In the coming chapter, I unfold and analyze the interviews I have conducted. The
results of the analyses are based in part on interviews with the interviewee from
Beihai Shipyard regarding the shipyard’s relocation. And I interviewed the Deputy
Director of Qingdao Planning Bureau regarding the financing of Qingdao Olympic
Sailing Centre and the development of the Olympic Sailing Centre business circle.
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Other than that, I interviewed the Director of the Committee of Municipal and Rural
Construction regarding the Zhongshan Road Revival Scheme. Moreover, I
interviewed the manager of Qingdao Dong’ao Group regarding the development
mechanism underpinning the redevelopment scheme, the concrete financing details of
the Olympic Sailing Centre project, and the information of the state-owned enterprises
(Qingdao Dong’ao Group) that actually conducted the financing of the project.
The two chapters (the neoliberal uniqueness chapter and the interview analysis
chapter) are highly connected to each other. The relocation of Beihai Shipyard is the
result of the manufacturing redundancies caused by the decline of the Fordism
industrial landscape, and the deterioration of Beihai Shipyard sets the foundation for
the post-industrial waterfront redevelopment of the Olympic Sailing Centre. In
addition, the decline of Zhongshan Road Commercial Street is the inevitable
by-product of the gentrification and loss of competition with the newly rising
neoliberalized Olympic Sailing Centre. The financing of the Olympic Sailing Centre
and the composition of the growth coalition of the waterfront redevelopment project
both reflect the neoliberal decentralization and the entrepreneurial governance of the
increasingly business-like manner of the local public authorities.
Introducing the neoliberal uniqueness in Chapter 4 sets the historical and
analytical foundation for the coming arguments and result analysis in Chapter 5. And
the cohesion and continuity of the two chapters contribute to the explanation of the
dissertation’s theme: the building of the growth coalition and the financing of
waterfront redevelopment projects under neoliberalism.
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5. Urban Growth Coalitions and the Transformation of Qingdao
This chapter examines how the Olympic Sailing Centre project manifests the
transformation from the Keynesian-Fordism industrial waterfront to the
post-industrial service-based city that happened under neoliberalism. And by
reviewing the market way (the investment pattern) of mobilizing land resources to
finance the redevelopment projects, I explicitly analyze the building of an urban
growth coalition in the case of Olympic Sailing Centre.
After I recruited the six interviewees, I introduced them to the purpose of the
study and explained why I chose them as my primary interviewees for the reasons
above. Then I gave each of them a series of interview questions to better inform them
of my research intentions.
5.1 The Transformation from Keynesian-Fordism Industrial Waterfront to
Post-industrial Service-based City under Neoliberalism: The Change of the
City’s Spatial Structure
The argument in this section is based on: whether the waterfront redevelopment
projects in Chinese port cities reflect the transformation from Keynesian-Fordism
industrial waterfront to the post-industrial service-based city (changes of the city’s
spatial structure).




The relocation of Beihai Shipyard reflects the change of the city’s spatial
structure: the decline of the western downtown centred by the Zhongshan Road
Commercial Street and the rise of the Olympic Sailing Centre Business Circle. The
city’s spatial structure’s change manifests the neoliberal transformation of the
Keynesian-Fordism industrial waterfront to the post-industrial service-based city.
To be specific, in the following paragraphs, I analyze how the transformation process
to the post-industrial waterfront and the ideological change to neoliberal
entrepreneurial urban governance reflect the change of the city’s spatial structure by
describing the history of Beihai Shipyard. Moreover, I compare the development of
the London Docklands project under neoliberalism and the physical changes of
American inner cities under Fordism based on Vormann’s (2018) discourse.
All in all, I illustrate how roll-out neoliberal entrepreneurial urban governance
and the city’s development regime result in the collapse of the Keynesian-Fordism
landscape, thus promoting the changes of the urban spatial structure: the city’s eastern
207
development movement, accompanied by the decline of the western Zhongshan Road
downtown area.
As explained earlier, Beihai Shipyard is important because it is the original site of
the Qingdao Olympic Sailing Centre. I learned about the development history of
Beihai Shipyard, the relocation of the shipyard, the initial selection of the Olympic
Sailing Centre’s site, and the current land use of the Fushan Bay area from my
interview with Yanjie.
According to my preliminary research, the original site of the current Qingdao
Olympic Sailing Centre, the eastern bank of Fushan Bay, was the Qingdao Beihai
Shipyard. The Qingdao Beihai Shipyard is a century-old enterprise, originally a
shipyard built by German colonists in 1898. After nearly 100 years of operation, the
Beihai Shipyard has become one of the region’s largest, and as Qingdao’s
shipbuilding industry leader, it is famous for repairing ships both at home and abroad.
However, the motivation to move the century-old plant out of Qingdao downtown
began in the 1990s. This is mainly because its original site, Fushan Bay, is not deep
enough for the construction of large ships. Consequently, the ship repairing business
became stagnant, and the shipyard facilities were partially redundant during the 1980s.
To adapt to the restructuring of the world’s shipbuilding industry and the development
of China’s shipbuilding industry, Qingdao Beihai Shipyard had to seek a new
location.
Please see table 4.2 (p. 212), which shows the historical development of Beihai
Shipyard. This study reviews the history of the relocation of Beihai Shipyard and the
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important stakeholders amid the process. Reviewing table 4.2 provides a more
comprehensive understanding of the shipyard’s relocation process. In order to know
more details, I first interviewed Yanjie Li, and our conversation mainly focused on
the relocation of Beihai Shipyard, how the corporation developed after its relocation,
the post-relocation service-industry development of the Fushan Bay area, and some
details about how the municipality and the CSIC worked together to facilitate the
relocation of the shipyard. The Beihai Shipyard story is correlated with two major
themes mentioned in the literature review section: post-industrial waterfront
redevelopment and neoliberalism. To be specific, the relocation of Beihai Shipyard
and the original industrial site’s redevelopment manifest how deindustrialization
happened on the urban waterfront. Hall and Clark (2011) indicate that due to the
global trend of containerization, more spacious channels and convenient land
transportation are needed for adapting to larger container ships. This renders
downtown port urban use incompatible with the container terminals, so the port
facilities relocate from the city’s core to a remote location and upgrade to large-scale
port container terminals. Similarly, in Beihai Shipyard’s story, the original industrial
sites could not accommodate larger container ships’ construction, and the shipyard
needed to move away to the urban periphery, where the deepwater harbour is located.
According to The History of Beihai Shipyard (QDSQ, 2018), the shipyard’s relocation
can be traced back to 1996 when the site of western Haixi Bay was chosen as the
future location of Beihai Shipyard. And the year 2001, when Beijing won the right to
host the 2008 Olympic Games and the original site of Beihai Shipyard was chosen as
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the venue for the Olympic Sailing Games, was a huge milestone. The municipal
government and the Beihai Shipyard corporation together had set the goal to
“Successfully Hold the Olympic Sailing Games while Promoting the Development of
the Shipbuilding Industry.”
In general, the relocation of Beihai Shipyard ushered in the redevelopment of the
Olympic Sailing Centre to manifest the transformation of the city’s physical spatial
structure. On balance, according to Schubert (2011), waterfront redevelopment is
significant because the waterfront provides space for cities to transform into a
post-industrial society. The Olympic Sailing Centre exerts a significant impact on the
“socio-cultural changes and spatial restructuring process” (Schubert, 2011, p. 75) in
Qingdao’s coastline. The London Docklands redevelopment initiatives were mostly
property and office-led redevelopments, and they were developed against the
backdrop of privatization, deregulation, neoliberalism, and marketization. The
Olympic Sailing Centre’s redevelopment also proceeded based on the market
mechanism, although the Qingdao municipal government coordinated the overall
financing process. Furthermore, Beihai’s previously empty warehouse and derelict
shipyard have been transformed into a commercial complex and tourist attractions.
The booming new Olympic Sailing Centre has made the previously isolated
waterfront and Beihai Shipyard become a “regional-oriented sustainable
development” (Schubert, 2011, p. 82). In addition, the deindustrialization process in
the Fushan Bay area exemplifies how the dilapidated waterfront became the space of
hope for post-industrial growth and high-end redevelopments. Schaller and Novy
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(2011) specify that one of Bloomberg’s prominent initiatives was to reconstruct the
deteriorated industrial waterfronts by initiating projects/property-led regeneration to
build marinas, hotels, office buildings, and apartments to create the post-industrial
service-oriented waterfront. Schaller and Novy (2011) also state that polluted
industrial waterfronts are dilapidated and declining, but they serve as the right niche
for commercial and residential development. Both the London Docklands and the
New York waterfront cases are very similar to the Qingdao Olympic Sailing Centre
project’s redevelopment trajectories, as the derelict and redundant Beihai Shipyard
was reconstructed into a service-oriented Olympic sailing centre.
From the perspective of ideological change, derelict Beihai Shipyard’s
redevelopment exemplifies the transformation from a Fordist industrial city to a
post-industrial service-oriented city. And it presents the industrial upgrading—from
ships to chips. Vormann (2018) also argues that the crisis of Keynesian-Fordism (the
industrial relic of Beihai Shipyard) is due to the devaluation that is rooted in the
stagflation of economic development and the characteristics of the Keynesian-Fordist
system (mass consumption and mass production). According to Vormann (2018), the
North American cities adopted neoliberal strategies (urban entrepreneurial governance
strategies) to respond to Fordist production’s collapse. The relocation of Beihai
Shipyard and the Qingdao Olympic Sailing Centre’s redevelopment initiative could be
seen as a means to enhance Qingdao’s competitiveness via overcoming the city’s
stagflation crisis. Vormann (2018) also states that the process of deindustrialization
was promoted and accelerated by the neoliberal political realignment. Vormann (2018)
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explains that derelict harbour spaces are the symbols of declining American inner
cities; the deindustrialization caused by the neoliberal turn also obsoletes the
industrial cityscape and leads to devaluation and redundancy. The progressive
technological innovation and politics-oriented economic restructuring thus have
obsoleted the previous Fordist industrial sites, signifying the end of Fordist
industrialism and the dawn of the post-industrial era. The Qingdao Olympic Sailing
Centre’s case exemplifies this transformation from Keynesian-Fordist industrial
artifacts to neoliberal post-industrial developments.
The destruction and relocation of Beihai Shipyard is the manifestation of the
collapse of the Keynesian-Fordist landscape, while the rise of the Shinan District and
the construction of the Olympic Sailing Centre reveal how the roll-out neoliberal
redevelopment replaces old industrial artifacts in urban centres. Amid the
transformation process, the redevelopment coalition centred by the municipal
government and state-owned redevelopment corporations in Qingdao mainly
spearhead the change.
The urban regime formed by the public authority and enterprise has a theoretical
root in North American urban politics. Hackworth (2007) defines an urban regime as
a way for public and private interests to function together to carry out governing
decisions, and its goal is to initiate development and retard disinvestment. Regime
theory helps to understand neoliberal urban governance in the Qingdao Olympic
Sailing Centre’s case. Brenner and Theodore (2002) also indicate that creative
destruction can be defined as “destruction of extant institutional arrangements and
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political compromises through market-oriented economic growth, commodification
and the rule of capital” (Brenner & Theodore, 2002, p. 374). Thus, the relocation of
Beihai Shipyard can be seen as the destruction of Fordism artifacts. As Peck and
Tickell (2002) define, roll-back neoliberalism refers to the destruction and
dismantling of the Keynesian welfare state, and the relocation of Beihai Shipyard
manifests the destruction of Fordism.
I learned more about the overall image of the city’s neoliberal movement of
eastern development from my interview with Linan Tian. She described the specific
tasks she had undertaken and the historical background at that time. Basically, she
confirmed that the city’s economic centre shifted from the Zhongshan Road area to
the city’s eastern part, the Fushan Bay area. She offered rich and detailed stories about
the dynamics of urban development at that time.
Moreover, she explicitly illustrated the municipality’s top-design for fostering
business activities and associations in the Olympic Sailing Centre business circle as a
means to promote entrepreneurial urban governance (Hackworth, 2007). Aimed at
transforming the derelict waterfront, entrepreneurial strategies were adopted to
encourage property-led economic development that extracts value from land
development (Weber, 2002).
5.1.1 My interviewee’s Opinion on Neoliberal Urban Spatial Transformation
My interview with Zhipeng, however, involved his denial of neoliberalism. The
questions I asked him focused on whether the shipyard’s relocation and the
redevelopment of Olympic Sailing Centre reflect the roll-back destruction of
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Keynesianism and roll-out neoliberalism of institutional creation, whether the
redevelopment of Olympic Sailing Centre reflects the neoliberal entrepreneurial urban
governance (Hackworth, 2007), what specific financial instruments were used to
finance the Olympic Sailing Centre project, and the role of private sectors. There were
some intellectual difficulties during the interview, not because he did not understand
my questions (or the specialized concepts in the questions) but because we had
different interpretations about the questions and the concepts. I talk about my
understanding of how he thinks in the following paragraphs.
Zhipeng believes that China’s previous state-planned economy was not
Keynesianism (as I have mentioned earlier, the state ownership and five-year plans of
pre-open-door China were not the same as Keynesianism, though there were
similarities). He holds that view because the planned economy requires the
government to formulate a detailed five-year plan. In contrast, Keynesianism is just
about government regulation without formulating a concrete five-year plan. Moreover,
he emphasizes that the current Chinese urban development strategies are not
neoliberal urban entrepreneurial strategies because the current Chinese model of
social regulation is not neoliberalism. Namely, neoliberalism cannot happen in China.
He states that in terms of social construction, the Chinese government still pursues the
people-oriented ideology, while the beneficiaries of neoliberalism are the corporate
elites.
Zhipeng argued that in terms of urban construction and economic development,
the Chinese government has adopted the model of government-led social participation
214
and market-oriented operation, which is embodied in the guidance of urban planning,
industry-oriented guidance, financial and financial support, and the policy of “Double
Attraction” (attracting investment, finance, and intelligence) to regulate and control
the trend of the market investment. The purpose of doing so is to promote the
combination of financial and market capital and jointly promote urban development.
Thus, Zhipeng explained, this is not neoliberal entrepreneurial urban governance but
the socialist urban governance with Chinese characteristics.
Zhipeng opposes what Hackworth (2007) believes about how neoliberal
development substitutes the Keynesian managerialism landscape. He believes that the
previous and current Chinese urban development strategies are both inherently
different from western experiences because of Chinese society’s existing realities.
I believe that the essence of Chinese cities’ waterfront development strategies
since the 1980s is leveraging market power to facilitate urban construction and revive
the older industrial inner-city port areas. Thus, the tenet of the Olympic Sailing Centre
development is neoliberal urban entrepreneurial governance under the cover of
socialist urban governance with Chinese characteristics in the name of the people.
However, there would still be variations between the orthodox neoliberal ideology in
the North American context and Qingdao’s actual situation because of the specific
relationship between the municipal government and the private sectors in second-tier
Chinese cities. The vitality of waterfront redevelopment projects in Qingdao is
affected by the closeness and dynamics of government connections. Amidst the
interurban competition in Chinese cities, the downward neoliberal shift of states’
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financial power has made the municipalities tap into local property tax revenues to
rely on the private real estate market (Weber, 2002). Neoliberal redevelopment
policies are thus used by the states to propel property investment activities (Weber,
2002). The Qingdao Olympic Sailing Centre’s financing process is an appropriate
paradigm of utilizing private capital under neoliberal ideology.
According to the redevelopment and financing story of the Olympic Sailing
Centre, the urban commercial cores and CBDs (Fushan Bay area) have become the
“billboard” of exhibiting neoliberal governance through constructing great
mega-projects (Hackworth, 2007). Central cities become the arena of neoliberal
experimentation and showcases of neoliberal policies (Brenner & Theodore, 2002).
The redevelopment of the Olympic Sailing Centre project instantiates “creative
tendencies,” which refer to politically reorganization and institutionally rebuilding
that have undergirded the neoliberal market discipline (Brenner & Theodore, 2002).
Cities therefore become supporters of urban entrepreneurialism, and interurban
competition shapes urban entrepreneurialism (Brenner & Theodore, 2002). So cities
compete with each other under the logic of interurban competition, and this process is
underpinned by urban transformation and revitalization (Brenner & Theodore, 2002).
In the same vein, the Qingdao Olympic Sailing Centre was used as a flagship project
and an entity of spatial capital accumulation for the neoliberal interurban competition
in China (Weber, 2002).
In retrospect, the relocation of Beihai Shipyard and the redevelopment of the
Olympic Sailing Centre project have manifested that waterfront redevelopment
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investments are designed to transform derelict waterfront industrial sites into
“communities of hope” (Desfor & Laidley, 2011, p. 3). The Olympic Sailing Centre’s
redevelopment story is a great paradigm of transformation from a Keynesian-Fordist
landscape to a post-industrial service-based city against a neoliberal context. The
relocation of Beihai Shipyard and the Olympic Sailing Centre’s redevelopment
exemplify the transformation process of a city’s spatial structure. The next section is
about financing the relocation process and the Olympic Sailing Centre project.
5.2 Market Way of Mobilizing Land Resources to Finance the Redevelopment
Projects: The Investment Pattern
The argument in this section is based on:What financial instruments are
available for the redevelopment projects? What market ways of mobilizing land
resources are used to finance the waterfront redevelopment projects in Chinese port
cities? What is the investment pattern amid financing the projects?
Figure 5.2 The new city hall and the May 4th Square in 1994, Olympic Sailing Centre Business Circle
Source: Zhang Yan, http://www.cnr.cn/sd/sd/20180524/t20180524_524245999.shtml, 2018
5.2.1. Financing of the Beihai Shipyard’s Relocation
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In my interview with Yanjie, he introduced the investment pattern of the
relocation of Beihai Shipyard and how the relocation process was financed. The cost
of relocating Beihai Shipyard was 1.78 billion yuan (329 million CDN), and it was
mainly undertaken by the state-owned development company called Dong’ao
Corporation. On February 12, 2002, the Beihai Shipyard, the municipal government,
and Dong’ao Corporation finally signed the “The Agreement of Relocation,” which
stipulated that the Qingdao Dong’ao Corporation would raise 1.78 billion yuan (329
million CDN) of commercial loans and pay the relocation land compensation fees in
installments according to the relocation agreement. On June 30, 2004, facilitated by
the city municipal government, Beihai Shipyard was relocated as planned, with a total
relocation cost of 1.78 billion yuan (329 million CDN) and a total of 148,000 cubic
metres of construction waste cleared and transported. A total of 736,000 square
metres and nearly 100,000 square metres of buildings had been demolished. During
the relocation phase of Beihai Shipyard, Qingdao Dong’ao Corporation adopted
syndicated loan financing to raise 1.78 billion yuan, of which the Qingdao municipal
government provided 1.5 billion yuan of credit guarantee while Qingdao Dong’ao
Corporation pledged 300 million yuan in cash. The financing of Beihai Shipyard’s
relocation and the Olympic Sailing Centre’s redevelopment project are two
independent events. Nevertheless, the Qingdao municipal government played a
leading role in spearheading the financing activities of both events. Please see the
following paragraphs for how the financing of the Olympic Sailing Centre
redevelopment project was conducted.
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According to Desfor and Laidley (2011), waterfront redevelopment projects are
designed to upgrade the waterfront industrial sites to improve commercial and
residential land use and extract value from property-led economic development. The
goal of waterfront redevelopment initiatives, then, is to revive older industrial
inner-city port areas. So, the essence of the Olympic Sailing Centre’s financing is to
ensure the appreciation and preservation of the value of the real estate investment.
Hackworth (2007) indicates that gentrification is how private development replaces
Keynesian egalitarianism in the real estate market. In the U.S., the 1970s federal
cutbacks triggered the reformation of real estate finance. Consequently, it was
synchronized with the destruction and displacement of Fordism and Keynesianism by
neoliberal production and neoliberalism. As mentioned earlier, the Qingdao Olympic
Sailing Centre’s case exemplifies the transformation from Keynesian-Fordist
industrial artifacts to neoliberal post-industrial developments. Correspondingly, the
financing of the Olympic Sailing Centre project is highly market-oriented.
After the Beihai Shipyard was relocated to the Haixi Bay area, the shipyard’s
original site was up-zoned and redeveloped into the Qingdao Olympic Sailing Centre,
where the 2008 Olympic Sailing Games were held. I needed to learn the concrete
development, financing situation, and the Olympic Sailing Centre redevelopment
project’s ideological motivation through this interview with Zhipeng Li.
5.2.2. The General Financing of the Olympic Sailing Centre project
During my interview with Zhipeng, he laid out how the Olympic Sailing Centre
project was financed. The financing was based on the platform of state-owned
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enterprises. The government coordinated, and state-owned enterprises raised funds
simultaneously to accomplish the construction task. According to the Feasibility
Study Report of the Twenty-ninth Olympic Games International Sailing Centre
Construction Project (Li, 2007), the total investment of the Qingdao Olympic Sailing
Centre project was 1.5 billion yuan, including the water-area and land-area projects.
The total cost of the water-area project was 315 million yuan, including the Fushan
Bay dredging project, primary and secondary breakwaters, measuring hall wharf,
Olympic Memorial Wall Wharf, berthing basin, and launching ramp. The total cost of
the land-area project was 1.185 billion yuan, including the administration and
competition management centre, Qingdao Olympic Village, athletes centre, media
centre, logistics support and supply centre, and the environmental supporting projects.
Since the Qingdao Olympic Sailing Centre project is located in the golden area of the
city centre, the total investment of 1.5 billion yuan (300 million CDN) was raised
through flexible market-oriented means such as mobilizing land resources, carrying
out market-oriented operation of the infrastructure facilities to attract private
investment.
According to the Feasibility Study Report of the Twenty-ninth Olympic Games
International Sailing Centre Construction Project (Li, 2007), after the competitions,
the land area available for development was 17.10 hectares, which was divided into
seven large plot areas. The types of land use include business offices, residential
apartments, and cultural leisure and tourism services, with a total construction area of
310,600 square metres. Please see table 5.1 and figure 5.3 (the land-use map) from the
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Feasibility Study Report of the Twenty-ninth Olympic Games International Sailing
Centre Construction Project (Li, 2007). Table 5.1 below shows the details of the
report and the utilization and development of the facilities following the Olympic
Games. The report also examines how the funds were raised through marketized
mobilization of land resources.
Source: author
Figure 5.3 shows that Plots 30 and 31 are far away from the Olympic venues,
however, the pre-competition development of these two plots was completed before
2006. The income of mobilizing these land resources was used for financing the
Olympic Sailing Centre project. The layout, the detail of building blocks, and the
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division of the parcels of land are very similar to that of HafenCity in Hamburg,
which is manifested in plan-led mixed-use office space, housing, and shopping and
recreation facilities, according to Schubert (2011).
Table 5.1 Post-competition planning of Qingdao Sailing Centre and surrounding land for the 29th
Olympic Games
Plot
The nature of land
use
Land area Development plan




























































Weighted plot ration 1.185
Source: Feasibility Study Report of the Twenty-ninth Olympic Games International Sailing Centre
Construction Project (Li, 2007)
To understand the details of the financing of the Olympic Sailing Centre project
and how the market mobilization of the seven pieces of land helps to recover the
investment, I interviewed one of the project managers, Ziyin Yao, in the Qingdao City
Construction and Investment Group (The Dong’ao Group was its predecessor).
5.2.3 The Detailed Financing: Ziyin’s Interview on Marketed Mobilization of Land
Resources to Recover Investment
Ziyin explained that the original site of Beihai Shipyard covers a total area of 450
hectares. Today, the land use of Plot 31 is Baili Plaza, a high-end shopping mall. The
land use of Plot 30 is Hisense Plaza, one of the shopping malls that has the highest
annual turnover in Qingdao. The land uses of Plot 28 and 29 are two residential
communities, and they are, respectively, Baili Plaza and Lanting Villa. The land use
of Plot 33 is the Olympic Sailing Museum and of Plot 32, the Qingdao Olympic
JLIFE shopping mall, which includes global shopping services, cultural and creative
industries, a featured food hall, and luxury collection stores. The land use of Plot
Long Dike is a street of bars.
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Plots 28, 29, and 31 were sold to Taishan Real Estate Group through a bundled
auction in 2007; later, the Taishan Real Estate Group developed the plots for Baili
Plaza, Baili Plaza, and Lanting Villa. The winner of Plot 30 was the Hisense Group,
and the deal was completed in 2008. This plot was eventually developed into Hisense
Plaza (commercial complex). The rest of the plots were not auctioned and still belong
to the Dong’ao Group. After the 2008 Olympic games, the rest of the plots were
transferred to the City Construction and Investment Group, under the operation of the
Qingdao Tourism Group. Neither of the companies participating in the auction (the
Taishan Real Estate Group or the Hisense Group) were government partners; rather,
both were market competitors.
Ziyin also told me that the land price per buildable square metre for Plots 28, 29,
and 31 (the Baili, Lanting Villa, and Baili Plaza) were 6,500 yuan, while the land
price per buildable square metre for Plot 30 (Hisense Plaza) rose to 9,000 yuan due to
auction bidding. Nevertheless, after the auction, the Hisense Group required auction
subsidies (present-value subsidies) from the government, arguing that they had been
contributing to the government’s preparations for the 2008 Olympic Games. The
Qingdao municipal government eventually agreed to provide the auction subsidies
(financial concessions) to the Hisense Group for the extra part (the spill-over value) of
the land price per buildable square metre. In this way, the municipal government
became more businesslike, cutting deals with the Hisense Group through hard
negotiations. This has shown that the Qingdao municipal government has become
more entrepreneurial, doing business with the private developers to facilitate the
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financing of waterfront redevelopment projects (Sagalyn, 1990). Ziyin told me that
the government’s compensation measure exemplifies how it flexibly used the land
leverage to increase investment in the tertiary industry (the case is the provision of
financial support for the development of Hisense Plaza) in promoting urban economic
transformation. As Lin and Yi (2011) state, land resources have been a significant
asset to increasing urbanization as well as promoting local capital accumulation. The
authors use the experiences of Jiangsu Province to illustrate how land development
contributes to the creation of local revenue and capital accumulation for the municipal
government to facilitate the development of local industries and local economic
development (Lin & Yi, 2011). Lin and Yi (2011) reason that the “system of fiscal
responsibility” reformation has enticed municipal governments in China to initiate
land development projects to promote local public finance because local governments
are allowed to keep the surplus profits earned from local redevelopment projects after
a lump-sum payment to the central government every five years. Thus, the fiscal
system’s decentralization has directly emancipated the motivation of urban
redevelopment projects in Chinese cities. According to Ye and Wu (2014),
urbanization across China is being used by the municipalities to extract revenues. And
this dependence on benefits from land development is a key feature of the Chinese
urbanization process because urban land is increasingly becoming the most significant
capital source for China’s local governments (local public finance) (Ye & Wu, 2014).
In China, the local governments are responsible for more than 80 percent of fiscal
expenditures, with only 50 percent of revenues mainly earned from capitalizing land
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resources (Ye & Wu, 2014). Urban land therefore is important because the
municipalities depend on extracting large profits from the process of land-use change
to promote local economic development and facilitate the urbanization process (Ye &
Wu, 2014). The strategy used by the Qingdao municipal government is very similar to
the American municipal government’s use of UDAG to leverage private investment
(Sagalyn, 1990). The strategy of “present-value subsidies” was used amid the
financing process of the Hisense Plaza project (Sagalyn, 1990), which resonates with
what was introduced in Chapter 2, the present-value subsidies (low-interest loans to
the private sector) adopted by the U.S. public sector in the Horton Plaza project in San
Diego. In retrospect, the financing of Beihai Shipyard’s relocation and the Olympic
Sailing Centre’s redevelopment project are two independent events. Nonetheless, the
Qingdao municipal government plays a leading role in spearheading the financing
activities of both events.
Private financing is involved in the process of raising funds in the form of
auctioning and developing the old site of Beihai Shipyard. The Taishan Real Estate
Group and the Hisense Group are the two private developers that contributed to
financing the redevelopment of the Olympic Sailing Centre Business Circle. Amid the
redevelopment process, as the initiator of the project, the Qingdao municipal
government chose the contractor of the Olympic Sailing Centre project—the Dong’ao
Corporation—through legal procedures. A special project company was formed and
funded by the Dong’ao Corporation to invest, finance, and construct during the
construction period. The government recovered the investment from the Dong’ao
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Corporation payment according to the agreement after the project’s completion and
the auction revenues received from the Taishan Real Estate Group and the Hisense
Group. Thus, the municipal government and private developers cooperated to form a
governing coalition, assuming their respective responsibilities, that facilitated the
financing and construction of urban redevelopment projects (Stone, 1989).
The market-oriented use of venue facilities after the Olympic Games also helped
the government investors recover part of their costs.
Table 5.2 List of post-competition facilities
numb
er




National Sailing Training centre
2 Olympic Village, athlete centre Five-Star hotel
3 Olympic Wall Wharf Tourism development, exhibition
4 Logistics Centre Supermarket
5 Media Centre Yacht club facilities
6 Berth Wharf Yacht club
7 Survey hall and auxiliary Wharf
Commercial development, cruise
terminal
In summary, Qingdao Olympic Sailing Centre invested 3.28 billion yuan (1.5
billion for the Olympic Sailing Centre construction + 1.78 billion for the relocation of
Beihai Shipyard), and with 340 million in hosting costs, the total direct investment
was 3.62 billion yuan. Through the market-oriented operation of transactions from the
surrounding land and post-competition use of venue facilities, the total income was
about 4.53 billion yuan, which not only recovered the investment but also achieved a
net profit of 910 million yuan, with a yield of 25.1 percent.
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In terms of the use of post-Games facilities, the Olympic Village was transformed
after the games into a five-star hotel with a one-off revenue of 1.221 billion yuan. The
media centre was transformed into the Olympic Sailing Museum and a yacht centre,
with an annual revenue of 324 million yuan. The athletes centre was transformed into
catering and leisure facilities, with an annual revenue of 640 million yuan. The
Logistics Centre was reconstructed as a government reception hotel, with an annual
revenue of 288 million yuan. There are about 600 marinas in total, which continue to
be rented since the competitions. The average rental unit price is 100,000 yuan per
year, and the annual income can reach 60 million yuan. There are 76 rooms in the
Long Dike pier, which are developed for commercial hotels, yacht maintenance and
management shops, tourism commodity retail stores, etc., with annual revenues of
100 million yuan.
In contrast, the Zhongshan Road Commercial Street has become deteriorated due
to its failure to leverage private investment, and I dig more in-depth into this in the
following section.
5.2.4. The Lessons of the Decline of the Zhongshan Road: Failure to Leverage Private
Investment and People Factor
Hall and Clark (2011) specify that since cargo ports are relocated and are far from
the traditional locations, the traditional maritime trade core of the city consequently
becomes blighted. Moreover, Schaller and Novy (2011) indicate that waterfront
revitalization initiatives promote property-led economic development that aims to
facilitate entertainment land-use development and the revival of old commercial
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districts in the unoccupied land. The decaying and revitalizing attempts of the
Zhongshan Road Commercial Street corroborate the above discourses.
Before the Olympic Sailing Centre business circle emerged as the city’s
economic centre, Qingdao’s economic centre was in the Zhongshan Road area. As
mentioned earlier, as the Director of the Committee of Municipal and Rural
Construction, Linan Tian is the best person to interview about the decline of the
Zhongshan Road area and the development of the eastern part of the city. During my
second meeting with Linan Tian, we mainly discussed Zhongshan Road Commercial
Street. She explained how the street was declining and neglected by the municipality
from the city planner’s perspective. And she elaborated on the importance of
leveraging private reaction and private sector participation. She explained that the
failure of Zhongshan Road Commercial Street, compared with the Qingdao Olympic
Sailing Centre business circle, shows that Zhongshan Road’s revival plan failed to
leverage private investment.
In order to fully understand the previous situation of Zhongshan Road
Commercial Street, the difficulties of reviving the area, and the reasons behind the
difficulties, I interviewed the director of Zhongshan Road Revitalization Task Force
(a government office under the Bureau of Qingdao Development and Reform), Xinan
Wang, who is the expert of the Zhongshan Road revitalization scheme. What he told
me is also supported by his work: Zhongshan Road Rehabilitation Notes, Revival
Plan for Zhongshan Road Commercial (Tourism) Street, and Industrial Orientation of
Zhongshan Road Commercial Street (Wang, 2010).
229
Figure 5.4 Part of Zhongshan Road Commercial Street (Pichai Yard Notes, Wang, 2010)
Director Wang has been in charge of the rehabilitation project of Zhongshan
Road for more than fifteen years. Talking with him was an unforgettable learning
experience. Moreover, talking with him has fundamentally changed my understanding
of the methods and difficulties of the Zhongshan Road rehabilitation scheme. Director
Wang provided me with many details of how the rehabilitation of Zhongshan Road
Commercial Street was implemented. Before communicating with him, I thought the
major difficulties or obstacles in the Zhongshan Road Rehabilitation Scheme would
be objective factors such as the dilapidated architectures or lack of private capital. The
difficulties of reviving most waterfront development projects lie in these two points.
According to Schubert (2011), the emphasis of urban redevelopment is to transform
derelict industrial warehouses, which are rebuilt into luxury residential and
commercial housing for the additional value added. Schaller and Novy (2011)
illustrate that derelict waterfronts are a space of potential post-industrial growth and
commercial redevelopment because of their dilapidated status. It is similar to what
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happened in New York City; the major obstacle for Bloomberg in reconstructing the
New York waterfront was clearing the abandoned industrial harbour. Other than that,
one of the key features of assembling financial support for waterfront redevelopment
after the Keynesian-Fordism crisis in the 1970s around the world was to solicit private
capital, but this is difficult as well (Sagalyn, 2007). However, I am wrong to assume
that environmental decay is a barrier to major urban development. Director Wang
illustrated the core of the Zhongshan Road Rehabilitation Scheme through
enumerating multiple instances of the struggle between government and residents. It
turns out the major difficulties in reviving the Zhongshan Road Commercial Street lie
in the human factor: people. At the core of Director Wang’s point of view is that only
by solving the problem of people can Zhongshan Road really radiate its original
vitality and achieve the actual effect of rehabilitation.
I got to learn the details from Director Wang about the rehabilitation scheme’s
difficulties as they relate to what, according to him, is the vital factor: people. And I
believe readers will not only get a glimpse into various aspects of Chinese urban
society today through his description but will also have a general understanding of the
social mentality of Chinese urban citizens. Readers will be surprised to find that the
greed of human nature itself, which is more subjective than other objective factors, is
the most important factor determining the success of the Zhongshan Road
Rehabilitation Scheme.
From my perspective, the Zhongshan Road Rehabilitation Scheme is more like
the U.S. postwar inner-city renewal scheme, which was an ill-fated program. This is
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because postwar inner cities in the U.S. were doomed to be unable to compete with
the new national economic engine: the emerging suburban areas (Critchlow &
VanderMeer, 2012). I believe the Chinese counterparts of the U.S. postwar urban- and
suburban-renewal program are the Zhongshan Road Revival Scheme and the Olympic
Sailing Centre Business Circle. Zhongshan Road Commercial Street is less
competitive than the Qingdao Olympic Sailing Centre Business Circle because the
latter has a competitive market advantage (it has economic vitality as a business
centre due to the concentration of commercial resources) and government support.
Director Wang introduced me to the past and present life of Zhongshan Road
Commercial Street. Before the German occupation in 1897, the Zhongshan Road area
had already been developed as a market for firewood and groceries. After 1898, the
German colonial authority planned the Zhongshan Road area as the residential and
commercial precinct of Chinese living in Qingdao. Over time, the area along
Zhongshan Road gradually developed from the original firewood market to a food
centre. Because many people who came to the market were hungry, there was demand
for a catering industry. Some people came from far away to go to the market, thus it is
natural that they were hungry when they arrived. This is the primary reason for the
rise of the catering industry in the Zhongshan Road area. From the early days of
German occupation to the late 1940s, the characteristic snack food industry of
Zhongshan Road was burgeoning and very famous in the region. Around the
Zhongshan Road area, there were many restaurants and food stalls. Fried dumpling,
steamed stuffed bun, wonton, and tofu pudding were the most famous. Zhongshan
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Road had become the earliest Food City in Qingdao. Later, a lot of high-end
restaurants opened near Zhongshan Road, attracting many middle-class customers.
Today, many long-established brands have been operating for a hundred years. Since
the 1920s, the Zhongshan Road area had all kinds of snacks, all kinds of department
stores, and a famous entertainment place. All types of cinemas, acrobatics, and other
entertainment activities dazzled and attracted visitors from all over the nation.
Eventually, Zhongshan Road as a business district was recognized by Qingdao
citizens.
However, I remember an old Chinese proverb, saying, “A man is never happy for
a thousand days, and a flower never blooms for a hundred.” The Zhongshan Road
Commercial Street eventually declined due to the construction of an expressway
around the northwest corner of the street in the 1990s. A rumour that the architecture
would be demolished and rebuilt frustrated the merchants’ confidence in maintaining
operations in Zhongshan Road Commercial Street. And this can be linked to the
American urban renewal experiences. The dilapidated building structure of central
cities, the derelict infrastructures, the narrow streets and limited space for parking
eventually led to the decline of American inner cities after WWII, but in the meantime,
stimulated demand for urban renewal activities. The American highway planners also
targeted dilapidated neighbourhoods as the objective of construction (Altshuler &
Luberoff, 2003). A few years later, in the late 1990s, the eastward relocation of city
hall and the rise of Olympic Sailing Centre Business Circle deteriorated the economic
vitality of the Zhongshan Road Commercial Street.
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But as I mentioned earlier, the most significant driving force and also resistance
to the rehabilitation of Zhongshan Road Commercial Street Scheme lies not in the
objective factors, but the subjective: people. Before the Zhongshan Road
Rehabilitation Scheme officially started in December 2007, residents of the
Zhongshan Road area had repeatedly petitioned the municipal government on
different issues, and their demands were also different. From May 2007, every week
about 20 or 30 residents, who had been enduring the dilapidated houses for many
years, came to the district’s government for petitions, demanding the immediate
demolition of their communities and their relocation, away from the dilapidated
homes and muddy roads. Over the years, the government had been neglecting the
ageing buildings on Zhongshan Road, thus the residents asked the government to
introduce policies to solve the problem.
The government’s rehabilitation policy was to adopt the old way. The road scale,
building height, building shape, and basic building material frameworks were
unchanged to maintain the area’s original historical style. In order to improve the
residents’ living environment, two ways of compensation were adopted for this
demolition: housing and monetary compensation.
Those first petitioners were the most eager to improve their living environment
and had been haggling with the government. When Director Wang got the demolition
compensation they had asked for, they chose to stay rather than leave because they
wanted higher compensation. They complained that the appraised valuation of houses
was too low because the government had asymmetric information. This eventually led
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to a delay in the rehabilitation scheme.
In China, the government’s take-over of civilians’ properties used to be
expropriated without proper compensation. But recent years, China’s “new-type
urbanization” emphasized community participation, citizen consent, and sustainable
development in urban redevelopment. For example, in some Chinese cities like
Guangzhou, the large-scale demolitions are forbidden until the redevelopment
initiatives gain 60%-70% consent from the local residents with appropriate
compensation.
Hence, it was their own greed that left their living environment unaltered for
even longer. According to the relocation policies won by Director Wang on their
behalf, their original living area of 15 square metres generally speaking could be
replaced by 65 square metres of residential housing in a newly gentrified area of the
city. The relocation policies therefore were very generous to the residents.
Nevertheless, some petitioners were still not satisfied with the compensation
policies. According to Wang (2010), many of the residents were actually gangsters.
One resident, Shujun Li, strongly opposed the demolition and revitalization scheme of
the Zhongshan Road area. Since the reconstruction project’s 2007 initiation, he had
been publicly cursing the district government and main government officials of the
rehabilitation project in his community because he believed that the appraised
valuation of his home was too low, and he would not leave without “proper”
compensation. In fact, his house was only nine square metres, and if he asked for
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monetary compensation, according to the compensation policy, he could get 320,000
yuan. Or, if he wanted to resettle in another place, he could get a house of more than
65 square metres. Even though the revitalization scheme had brought him such
tremendous benefits, he was still unsatisfied. He and his nephew were drunk every
day, holding a bottle of beer with a vicious dog to block the construction and revamp
of architecture in the community. No construction workers dared to dissuade Shujun
Li, who was just one of the thorny petitioners, for fear of being beaten. There were
many similar stories. Some residents who were not satisfied with the compensation
policies formed their own “house protection team” to prevent the construction team
from carrying out normal reconstruction. They organized more than 20 people,
holding knives and sticks, and often drove out the construction workers. The above
examples are of the residents. You might think the shop owners of Zhongshan Road
would not obstruct the rehabilitation scheme because they are the beneficiaries of this
transformation. The lesson in this story allowed me to realize that the merchants were
also part of the obstacles to this reconstruction process. They have also created many
troubles for the rehabilitation scheme. Shujun Li’ s story helps me to illustrate the
reasons leading to the failure of the Zhongshan Road revitalization scheme: the inertia
of people.
Director Wang mentioned that many shop owners required subsidies from the
government, even though the district government agreed to rehabilitate their
dilapidated buildings for free. One of the businessmen beat up the construction
workers and falsely accused them of stealing his two mahogany chairs, which were
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worth 500,000 yuan. The businessmen just wanted to coerce the government into
giving them more subsidies.
In terms of understanding the situation under a social science framework, it is
important to know why the Zhongshan Road residents were fighting so hard. The
Zhongshan Road residents had always insisted that their interests had been infringed
upon and exploited by the real estate developers’ redevelopment initiatives. They
devoted continuous efforts to acquire the Qingdao city government’s concessions, and
they believed that the Qingdao municipal government should always defend their
interests no matter what. According to the Chinese Communist Party’s ideology, the
government should “exercise power for the good of people,” which is the basis on
which they tried to coerce the city government to acquire its concession. The
Zhongshan Road residents deeply believed that they were legitimate in doing so
because they believed the traditional Maoist notion that the “masters of Red China”
are mainly constituted by workers and farmers, so the masses are legitimate for
requiring state protection (Harvey, 2005). Consequently, the residents were acting like
this to “make the state live up to its revolutionary mandate” (Harvey, 2005, p. 150).
This also reflects the fact that members of the development coalition (local
government and private developers) share a common interest, and they function
together to extract value from land investment, which can relate to my second
research question.
I think the main problem lies in the imperfection of the Chinese legal society, a
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society in which citizens abide by the laws. Most Chinese people simply do not have
the common sense to accept that society should be ruled by laws. This is because, for
a long time, the country has been governed by the rule of the Chinese Communist
Party (Ye, 2017). The Chinese people only understand the party rules but not national
laws, which leads to a situation where the party’s rules are more significant than the
national constitution in the minds of the masses (Yu, 2010). That is why the legal
consciousness of the people is so weak.
Eventually, the strategy that Director Wang adopted to grapple with the troubles
was to persuade the key petitioners first to win support from the relocated households
that supported government policies. Then the government officials persuaded the
waiting petitioners one by one and finally succeeded in convincing all the residents to
complete the demolition and relocation of a total of 370 households. The negotiation
process was extremely difficult. Director Wang showed me the verbal confrontation
(the exchange of angry words) between him and the relocated families when he was
describing the situation to me. I was deeply impressed by how they abused each other.
Director Wang was not so much negotiating with these residents about compensation
for demolition as they were verbally abusing each other. Whoever scolds and wins
was equivalent to persuading the other party. Please note that this is not the culturally
appropriate way of engaging in an argument for Chinese people. I am just saying this
to reflect the intensity of the verbal fight. Moreover, sometimes the only way to cope
with problems is to compromise out of consideration for the general interest, because
some petitioners’ demands were so unreasonable that you could do nothing about
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them. For instance, one resident came to Director Wang’s office, requiring the
reconstruction team to fix his air conditioner. The resident persistently insisted that it
was the reconstruction of Zhongshan Road that had caused the air conditioner in his
home to break down. And he insisted that he would not leave if Director Wang did not
agree to help repair his air conditioner. Later, all the family members of this resident
came to Director Wang’s office, not leaving without Director Wang’s agreement to
repair their air conditioner. Director Wang had to spend 300 yuan to have these
residents’ air conditioner repaired. And there were many similar situations for which
Director Wang could only make accommodations for the sake of overall interests,
without even a chance to reason with the residents. There was also no possibility of
forming a successful growth coalition here in the Zhongshan Road area because the
Zhongshan Road merchants were not organized; they could not offer any small
opportunities to solicit partners (Stone, 1987). Moreover, the Zhongshan Road
merchants were so selfish that they were not conscious of cooperating with the public
sector and complementing public authority to carry out governing decisions (Stone,
1987). Hence, there was no possibility of forming a successful growth coalition in
Zhongshan Road.
Urban renewal projects in the U.S. such as airports and highways had also caused
huge disruptions in older urban communities. Five years after the enactment of Title 1
of the Housing Act of 1949, the 1954 amendment required local citizen participation
in initiating urban redevelopment projects. These disruptive negative impacts (such as
large scale demolition) on the environment provoked intense resident protests. The
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movement of civil rights enabled African Americans, the primary victims of slum
clearance, to fight against the bulldozer approach and propelled participation from
local citizens. The campaign for citizen participation was based on the tenet that the
citizens must be consulted when governmental redevelopment initiatives might affect
their lives (Altshuler & Luberoff, 2003). Any environmental movement adheres to the
tenet that the government’s responsibility is to avoid damaging the environment due
to its programs (Altshuler & Luberoff, 2003). During the era of transition (the
1960s–1970s), social injustice increased due to more disruptive effects of urban
renewal projects; therefore, thereby causing more anti-urban renewal sentiment.
Large-scale demolition and relocation eventually caused the 1965–1967 riots in U.S.
central cities (Altshuler & Luberoff, 2003), and the result was that private developers
and civil rights leaders reached a compromise that would set aside relocation
assistance for relocated residents. Slum clearance was avoided to give way to
downtown revival and neighbourhood renovation (Altshuler & Luberoff, 2003).
Logan et al. (1999) further suggest that one variant of the urban regime was the
growth-management coalition, in which the neighbourhood community dominates
and formulates a balancing force against the city development coalition. The
growth-management coalition can lobby the government to enact zoning to regulate
urban renewal and redevelopment initiatives with environmental restrictions. For
example, Vogel and Swanson (1989) explain that there was a case in Gainesville,
Florida, in the early 1980s where city council was constituted by the progressive
antigrowth majority. It enacted a series of regulations against the city development
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coalition that was constituted by Chamber of Commerce and real estate elites.
Mollenkopf (1983) illustrates that urban renewal projects have provided a political
platform for urban politicians, real estate elites, and neighbourhood activists to
negotiate with each other. There were many grassroots activists standing out during
this uprising of a neighbourhood preservation campaign. These oppositions to
redevelopment initiatives built the foundation for neighbourhood rehabilitation
programs in the coming decades in the U.S. (Mollenkopf, 1983).
In contrast, the neighbourhood movement that balanced the large-scale slum
clearance in the U.S. did not appear in China. This is not to say that the Chinese
residents would not have fought against private developers and local governments, but
the Chinese neighbourhood movements have not ended up with something substantial.
This is mainly because most of the organized protests have been limited in scale. As
well, the lawsuits and protests against Chinese private developers and local
governments have not drawn enough public attention. And the Chinese local
governments do not care about civil movements, in part because they have absolute
power to thwart any opposition because of public land ownership in China. Civil
society in China traditionally has the least amount of power. In a word, the
community movement organized spontaneously by the Chinese people can hardly
gain momentum in today’s Chinese society. So, the failure of the Zhongshan Road
resistance was mainly due to the inertia and unconsciousness of its merchants; they
did not realize they could gain greater interest by uniting, and only pursued their own
short-term interests.
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These quarrels, fetters, and trivia in the process of demolition are small compared
with the following things I introduce. In the process of demolition and reconstruction
in Zhongshan Road, there were also important interest disputes, which made some
merchants and residents begin to carry out a series of personal attacks on Director
Wang. This caused an adverse social impact, seriously affecting Director Wang’s
personal safety, life, and career development.
In order to obtain ownership of the ancillary buildings built by the government
(the government built additional buildings to facilitate merchants’ operations, but
ownership belonged to the government, and merchants only had leasing rights), some
merchants wrote to the District Commission for Discipline Inspection and Supervision
to falsely accuse director Wang of “being late for the meeting, being arrogant and
proud, not considering the interests of the masses, engaging in corruption activities,
living in Shangri La Hotel at night, and eating in Shangri La as well” (Wang, 2010, p.
105). This is part of the letter that some merchants wrote to the District Commission
for Discipline Inspection and Supervision. Some residents had special connections
with the municipal government, and they made use of their special relationship with
senior government officials, demanding better relocation compensation or better
rehabilitation standards. However, Director Wang adhered to the principle of treating
all the residents and shop owners equally, so their requests were not satisfied. Thus,
they used their connections with the municipal government to write a letter of false
accusations to attack Director Wang. Since he had not been involved in any type of
corrupt activity, he was not afraid of the personal attacks. Eventually, these false and
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groundless accusations all disappeared.
One night in November 2008, when Director Wang left the office building after
work, he was kidnapped by some bruisers. He was first bundled into a van and then
into a car. Later, they took Director Wang to a very secluded hotel in a suburban villa.
He was taken to a private room where about 15 men had been waiting for him. The
leader of these guys introduced himself as Bin Li, and he explained that the reason he
had Director Wang brought here today was for his mother-in-law, who was living in
the Zhongshan Road area. Bin Li said that his father-in-law had passed away a few
years ago, and that his mother-in-law was completely bedridden, so he wanted
Director Wang to give them special consideration and provide a more convenient
location for the resettlement. Director Wang went over the relocation and monetary
compensation policies with him and helped Bin Li interpret the pros and cons of the
different options. That night he went home safely.
Hence, the major difficulties of the Zhongshan Road Commercial Street
reconstruction project lie in the subjective factor: people—in addition to the reasons I
stated earlier that showed residents fighting so hard because they believed the
government and the Chinese Communist Party were obligated to defend their interests.
They did all they could to demand concessions from the government. Chinese society
is imperfect in terms of the construction of the legal system, as the Communist Party
rules are more significant than the national constitution in many people’s minds,
which also leads to the way the people behaved to acquire improvement from the
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government.
Nevertheless, I believe that the root cause of Chinese people’s greed and
money-worshiping can traced back to Deng Xiaoping’s neoliberal reform. Deng’s
neoliberal reform fundamentally changed Chinese people’s lives. From an ideological
perspective, the Keynesian Welfare National State (KWNS) was dismantled following
the enactment of open policy in the late 1970s. The Schumpeterian Workfare
Postnational Regime (SWPR) became the governing rationality of Chinese
governments at all levels in the economic and political lives of Chinese people
(Jessop, 2002). The market economy has replaced the centrally planned economy in
China. And this can reflect the transformation from the Keynesian-Fordist industrial
city to the service-based post-industrial city, which relates to my first research
question. With the reduction of social welfare, the Chinese people lost many forms of
social assistance that were common in the Mao era (even though the level of free
education and medicare was very low, they were free!). Chinese society thus has
transformed from an egalitarian society marked by “low production, low wages, high
state welfare provision, and high state expenditure” to a market-oriented society
marked by specialized production, “higher wages, lower state welfare provision, and
lower state expenditure” (Wu & He, 2009, p. 285).
Han (2009) suggests that the growth of money worship is related to the
imperfection of market economy rules after Deng’s neoliberal reform. This is because
the weaknesses and negative aspects of the market economy itself also are reflected in
244
the subjective orientation of people. Market actors always pursue the maximization of
interests or profits in economic activities. At the same time, the market economy is
still a kind of “consumption economy,” relying on consumption to guide production
as a driving force to propel economic growth. The results are as follows: first,
material interests and wealth play a prominent role in promoting economic and social
development, which may stimulate people’s desires for material interests or money,
and thus breed excessive worship of money, leading to “all looking to money”; second,
“all looking to money” is generalized from the economic field to all fields of social
life. Consequently, all social transactions are based on equal monetary exchange. All
interpersonal and social relations are regarded as money interest relations.
Han (2009) also specifies that under the condition of the neoliberal market
economy, it is easy to cause money worship, which is also related to the
symbolization of wealth and economic activities. The market economy is inseparable
from commodity exchange and commodity exchange is inseparable from currency. As
an intermediary, the currency becomes the embodiment of wealth and the
representative of universal value. With currency, it seems to be able to buy everything
and occupy everything. It is easy for people to have the illusion that money is
omnipotent, which makes people worship money and leads to unbridled pursuit and
possession of money, thus resulting in wealth worship. Deng’s reform had been
attacked by conservative forces for steering the country toward money-orientation and
betraying communist ideals (Zhang, 1996).
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On the one hand, since the 1980s, with the market economy replacing the planned
economy, the pursuit of material wealth has become the mainstream of social values.
Harvey (2005) keenly observed the rise of the newly introduced consumer culture.
There was a famous saying in China back then that “A billion people, 900 million
already had become businessmen, and the remaining 100 million are considering
becoming businessmen.” This can indicate that Chinese society after the 1980s has
become extremely money-oriented.
On the other hand, after the 1980s, in the absence of any social security, the
Chinese people desperately need money to pay for (1) education, (2) medicare, and (3)
retirement. The latter two expenses are especially vital for any ordinary Chinese
citizen without a public job (the pension of a public official is relatively high) because
the general social pension is meagre. As a result, most Chinese have to spend the first
half of their lives desperately trying to earn enough money to ensure a well-off old
age.
All in all, ordinary Chinese people have to earn money desperately to make a
basic living without any social welfare. Since neoliberal reform, the Chinese
government has no regard for the plight of the poor both in cities and in the
countryside. The Chinese Communist Party today stands side by side with
cold-blooded capitalists against the workers (Harvey, 2005). In addition to some
traditional factors, there are more realistic social objective reasons contributing to
Chinese people’s money-worshiping culture today, which include the sense of
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insecurity from knowing that material life cannot be guaranteed. And I believe this is
why the residents of Zhongshan Road were fighting so hard to strive for as many
benefits as possible from the demolition compensation.
However, in addition to the human factor, it was also very difficult to rehabilitate
the old and dilapidated buildings. The architecture of Zhongshan Road Commercial
Street had been in disrepair for a long time; almost all the buildings were dangerous.
Since most of the buildings in the area had been built in the 1920s, from the
perspective of historic preservation, the reconstruction of Zhongshan Road still faces
difficulties in the following aspects: the layout of architectures, building design, the
laying of network pipes, fire control, and the treatment of construction wastes.
According to Director Wang, it was difficult to completely restore the layout of
the architecture because nobody knew exactly what the Zhongshan Road architectural
complex looked like originally. At the same time, the architecture twenty years ago
was extremely dilapidated and occupied a large space. The buildings needed to be
demolished; however, nobody dared to do so because they were afraid to take the
responsibility of demolishing historic buildings. Moreover, the construction team did
not know how to restore the architectural style of the buildings, which increased the
difficulties of designing and construction. At this critical moment, Director Wang
resolutely decided to demolish the dilapidated buildings to make space for the new
construction. Then the construction team rebuilt the historic architectures based on the
memories of elderly residents, who had lived there for a lifetime, to restore the
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buildings’ historical style and features.
The rehabilitation scheme’s design was also difficult because the degree of
dilapidation of each building was different, making it hard to enact a unified design
standard. In order to tackle this problem, Director Wang raised the strategy of “Design
while demolishing and reconstructing, specific problems should be analyzed
specifically” (Wang, 2010).
Furthermore, the network of pipelines was rusty and aged, so new pipelines
needed to be laid in the ground. The challenge that the construction team faced,
however, was that the Zhongshan Road area’s streets were narrow, and there was not
enough space to allow so many pipelines to be laid underground at the same time. In
order to cope with the problem, the construction team dug the trench deeper so that all
the pipelines could be buried underground.
What is more, there were basically no fire-control facilities in the Zhongshan
Road buildings before the rehabilitation scheme, so fire prevention was very arduous.
The construction team was able to add all the necessary fire-fighting facilities.
Due to the Zhongshan Road area’s construction activities, there was a large
amount of construction wastes piled on both sides of the Zhongshan Road.
Consequently, the construction team had to mobilize a lot of manpower every day to
remove these construction wastes.
Director Wang summarized that besides the difficulties of leveraging private
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investment and relocating the residents, the determining factor of whether the
reconstruction and rehabilitation scheme would be successful lay in people.
State-owned investment enterprises mainly conducted the investments of
revitalization projects. And the government often faced the problems of insufficient
funds. Moreover, due to the merchants’ lack of confidence in Zhongshan Road’s
rehabilitation, the whole area was facing many difficulties in attracting investment.
According to entrepreneurial urban governance, one of their goals was to let private
finance become a crucial financial tool to ameliorate the urban built environment
(Heeg, 2011). However, this is especially difficult in the Zhongshan Road
revitalization case because leveraging financial market power is hard to implement.
The revitalization scheme of Zhongshan Road could thus be carried out by mobilizing
people. If young people were willing to come to Zhongshan Road and take it as an
excellent place to rest, then the reconstruction project would achieve the expected
goals. The problems that still exist in Zhongshan Road Commercial Street today
include limited space inside the stores and too-narrow streets. Furthermore, the
long-established shops are disappearing, leaving behind more fast food and foreign
snack stores. Such fast foods very much lack local characteristics, and international
snacks are criticized for being inauthentic, resulting in fewer and fewer local people
coming here. Thus, improving the services of Zhongshan Road’s restaurants is the
focus of the next step of planning.
5.2.5. Voice from the Zhongshan Road Business Community
After learning the explanation from city officials (Director Xinan Wang) who
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govern the community and lead the redevelopment initiative, I decided to hear how
the business community in the Zhongshan Road area views the barriers and
difficulties of reviving the Zhongshan Road Business Street. Therefore, my sixth
interview was conducted with Xiaoyu Li, general manager of the first food business
opened by the Chinese in the Zhongshan Road back in 1924, to see what he thinks
about the reviving scheme initiated by city hall.
Xiaoyu Li is 37 years old this year, and the general manager of Qingdao Haibin
Food Store, the famous, citywide, and time-honoured chain supermarket.
Xiaoyu mentioned that the government’s redevelopment initiative has included
the Haibin Food Store. But because the popularity of the Zhongshan Road area is still
low, the revitalization plan has not had much effect. At present, the popularity of
Zhongshan Road is declining year by year, and the shock of the COVID-19 pandemic
has further deteriorated the area’s popularity. Many shops along Zhongshan Road are
unsustainable. The iconic food street is deserted, and most shops are closed.
According to Xiaoyu, the negative factor that hit the Zhongshan Road
Commercial Street the most is the shrinking population (or people who go to
Zhongshan Road to shop) of the surrounding neighbourhoods. This is the most
significant element contributing to the low popularity of the Zhongshan Road area.
This description of Zhongshan Road’s low popularity leads to my main argument
here: that the Zhongshan Road redevelopment initiative’s failure is due to a lack of
ability to leverage private investment despite the government’s efforts to attract
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private funding. There is no significant capital from the private sector favouring
Zhongshan Road Commercial Street because of the enormous difficulties of soliciting
development funding.
Xiaoyu proceeded to unfold the brick-and-mortar difficulties of redeveloping
Zhongshan Road Commercial Street in detail. As mentioned by Director Wang, the
physical condition of Zhongshan Road’s architecture does not allow large-scale
demolition and reconstruction, mainly because Zhongshan Road Commercial Street’s
architectural layout is a planning result of 100 years ago. The structure and density of
the buildings are unsuitable as modern office or residential buildings. Moreover, most
architectures are second-storey low-rise buildings, so they could only accommodate a
very small number of residents. The population density and plot ratio are thus both
low. Furthermore, there is not much public transportation available in the area, and the
parking spaces are very much limited. Consequently, the traffic and flow of visitors
are also low. The deteriorating buildings are mostly historical buildings, and the
revitalization scheme also has to consider the protection of the city’s historical
quarters. This reinforces the difficulties of large-scale renewal through demolition and
reconstruction. From the physical condition perspective, then, the Zhongshan Road
Commercial Street is hardly attractive to private capital.
Xiaoyu also talked about the shift in the city’s core economic region. Since the
beginning of the twentieth century, Qingdao’s economic centre has shifted eastward to
the Olympic Sailing Centre Business Circle, which aggregates quite many popularity
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and business activities there. In contrast, Zhongshan Road is relatively unattractive
due to the problems of deteriorating architectures and decreasing population.
Accordingly, it is hard for Zhongshan Road to woo customers and aggregate
popularity. The small business owners in Zhongshan Road Commercial Street could
only profit during the peak tourist season lasting from May to October each year.
Even so, the situation is getting worse due to continuous urban sprawl and the
development of the emerging eastern part of the city. The exploitation of tourism
resources along Zhongshan Road Commercial Street tends to be stagnant, and the
tourist population is constantly diverted, which leads to further decline in the
popularity on Zhongshan Road.
Xiaoyu raised several flanking suggestions that could improve city hall’s
redevelopment scheme. He believes that what is needed to revitalize the Zhongshan
Road Commercial Street is to deeply excavate tourism resources and create
characteristic tourism, ultimately establishing new industries and attracting
employment-population with new industries.
The municipal government should then help the small business owners upgrade
their businesses by rehabilitating the deteriorating store buildings and introducing
some high-end international brands to open stores along Zhongshan Road. Eventually,
even the entire Zhongshan Road could be diverted to the pedestrian street to attract
both tourists and Qingdaoers.
Generally speaking, Xiaoyu corroborates Director Wang’s viewpoints: the
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problems of Zhongshan Road itself, the neoliberal inter-community competition
within the same city, and the failure to leverage private investment result in the fall of
Zhongshan Road’s development regime.
As far as Zhongshan Road merchants themselves are concerned, they have not
formed a strong joint force. There is only one time-honoured brand association
formed by the most important merchants in the Zhongshan Road area. Nevertheless,
the association is also relatively loose, with little financial resources and no major
resolutions regarding the revitalization initiatives in Zhongshan Road Commercial
Street. According to Xiaoyu, most of the association’s members are over 65 years old
and lack the necessary modern business vision and knowledge. The Zhongshan Road
merchants’ weak and loose organization also contributes to the fall of the Zhongshan
Road development regime.
There is an extra note regarding the change of ownership in the Zhongshan Road
area. Many time-honoured brands were capitalist entrepreneurs before 1949. After the
Chinese Communist Party came to power in 1949, many previous Zhongshan Road
merchants fled to Taiwan. So in the 30 years from 1949 to the 1980s, most of the
time-honoured Zhongshan Road shops had no business owners because almost all
were publicly owned. The current managers or owners of the businesses here in
Zhongshan Road were mostly elected by the employees after the 1980s neoliberal
reform across the nation. Thus, most merchants in the Zhongshan Road Commercial
Street are beneficiaries of the neoliberal reform.
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On balance, the eastward move of city hall and the relocation of Beihai Shipyard
both exemplify how state policies promote capital investment within a strategic
city-region and district (Brenner & Theodore, 2002). The change of the city’s
economic dynamics in light of the eastward relocation of the economic centre has
directly caused the decline of Zhongshan Road Commercial Street. And this
corroborates the uneven spatial development effect of neoliberal creative destruction,
which is manifested by the “selective withdrawal of state support for declining
regions” (Brenner & Theodore, 2002, p. 19). Furthermore, the eastward gentrification
(the relocation of city hall) is the neoliberalized space of exclusion that abandons the
attempts to ameliorate capitalism’s inequality. I believe the decline of Zhongshan
Road Commercial Street could be considered the victim of creative destruction by
extant institutional arrangements (Zhongshan Road Commercial Street) to make way
for market-oriented economic growth, commodification, and the rule of capital
(manifested by the development of the Olympic Sailing Centre project). In retrospect,
the decaying story of the Zhongshan Road Commercial Street exemplifies that
creative destruction is a process that generates uneven development and social
polarization (Brenner & Theodore, 2002). The changing dynamics between the older
Zhongshan Road Commercial Street and the emerging Olympic Sailing Centre
Business Circle uncovers how a capitalist restructuring process causes conflicts, crises,
and “governance failures.” The conditions for how this happened are when emerging
neoliberal spatial creation (the Olympic Sailing Centre project) interacts with the
extant regulatory landscape (the Zhongshan Road Commercial Street), which results
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in a new and unstable political-economic landscape (Brenner & Theodore, 2002).
Nevertheless, the main reason contributing to the blight of Zhongshan Road
Commercial Street is people. For the reasons I have explained, Zhongshan Road
Commercial Street, the city’s original economic centre, is doomed to decay.
Based on these descriptions and analyses, we can see that the linchpin of Olympic
Sailing Centre’s successful financing process is adopting a market way to mobilize
land resources with private partners to finance the waterfront redevelopment project
and recoup the capital outlay. However, in stark contrast and to a large extent, the
failure to leverage private investment is a big reason for the ill-fated failure of the
revitalization of Zhongshan Road. Though the failure of leveraging private investment
is significant, the deeply rooted reason leading to the revival scheme’s failure is the
people factor: the local residents’ inertia.
5.3 The Evolution of the Growth Coalition of Olympic Sailing Centre: The
Assembly of the Investment Regime
The argument in this section is based on: How do the development coalitions
function to facilitate waterfront redevelopment initiatives in Chinese port cities like
Qingdao? And how are the development coalitions assembled?
And the arguments in this section answer the research questions (which have
already been analyzed in the literature review sub-sections 2.1 and 2.3) based on
empirical cases about how development coalitions function to facilitate the waterfront
redevelopment initiatives in Qingdao. Additionally, this section illustrates how the
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development coalitions are formed in the case of the Olympic Sailing Centre project.
Another core research question is analyzed in this final section, which is relevant to
the projects’ financing: market ways of mobilizing land resources to finance
waterfront redevelopment projects (the investment regime) in the case of Qingdao
based on the empirical materials.
After reviewing the lessons of Zhongshan Road Commercial Street’s decline, I
analyze the reasons why, nowadays, the Olympic Sailing Center business district is
Qingdao’s economic centre, and the driving factors behind it. This leads to the theme
of my final interview: The growth coalition of the Olympic Sailing Centre. For this
subject, I interviewed Linan Tian and Ziyin Yao, respectively.
5.3.1 Land Mobilization Mechanism of How the Coalition Runs: Control by the
Municipal Government and Institutional Innovation (The Role of the Municipal
Government and the Institutional Innovation for a More Efficient Municipality)
The top priority of our analysis of the growth coalition of the Olympic Sailing
Centre project is to understand how the Qingdao municipality plays a huge role in the
redevelopment regime. The marketed mechanism of mobilizing land resources is
dominated by city hall. I would first like to emphasize that my interview with Zhipeng
also involves the Chinese municipal government’s role in redevelopment projects. By
analyzing the process of how a redevelopment regime is formed, we could infer how
the financing process is conducted to generate financial underpinning for the Olympic
Sailing Centre project. Consequently, we could answer the second research question
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about the investment regime of waterfront redevelopment projects in Chinese port
cities (in this case Qingdao, based on empirical cases).
Zhipeng admitted that the government-authorized state-owned development
companies played a leading role in financing the Olympic Sailing Centre project.
Although seemingly market-led planning was pursued by relevant agencies, the
municipal government intervention was still active. In a word, waterfront
redevelopments in Chinese port cities involve strong state intervention under the
cover of neoliberalism. Also, some semi-official agencies (state-owned development
corporations such as Dong’ao Corporation) were responsible for specific project
financing.
Zhipeng compared urban governance between China and the U.S. He said that in
contrast to the American minimalist government, local Chinese government is
significant—its tangible hand still plays an essential role in regulating resources and
controlling the market, and it continues the Communist Party’s ideology that to
“exercise power is for the good of people.” In the same vein, although Keynesianism
is a shadow of the government’s efforts to boost investment to cope with economic
weakness, it is not the same. He concluded by emphasizing once again that the
western neoliberal governing coalition could not emerge in China or become the
dominant economic and social force.
In my other interview, Linan explicitly explained the formation of the growth
coalition amid the process of developing the Olympic Sailing Centre project. She
agreed with Zhipeng’s opinion on the municipal government’s role amid the local
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redevelopment projects by arguing that the growth coalition was formed by the
municipal government, the state-owned development corporation, and private
enterprises. The municipal government functions as the controller of the primary land
market, and it prepares and aggregates the lands. The structuring of Chinese
waterfront redevelopment projects’ regime, therefore, involves more control by local
government through local state development enterprises than the direct involvement
of private sectors in the case of Qingdao Olympic Sailing Centre, unlike their
counterparts in the U.S. (Stone, 1989). Due to the municipal government’s control of
land resources, the public authorities possess predominant power to propel the
redevelopment initiatives, including waterfront redevelopment projects. This is very
similar to situations in Chicago and Vancouver (Eidelman, 2018). The waterfront’s
public ownership, featuring strong leadership and agile coalition building in the two
cities as mentioned earlier, paves the way for the redevelopment initiatives to proceed
as planned. And this is also why the progress of Toronto’s waterfront redevelopment
initiative has been delayed and slow: the public land ownership of Toronto’s
waterfront is fragmented, which slowed down project implementation (Eidelman,
2018). In the Chinese context, free lands were given to state-owned enterprises as
subsidies. Then the state-owned enterprise resold the lands to private developers at a
good price. The private developers (the secondary land market) were in charge of the
concrete development of the lands. Their specific development includes building
hotels, apartments, etc. The role of state-owned enterprises is to establish the special
purpose vehicle with the goal of boosterism for promoting businesses around the
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Olympic Sailing Centre Business Circle. The special purpose vehicle was mainly
formed by the Dong’ao Corporation, a semi-autonomous state-owned enterprise. And
this reflects that the new-established para-apparatus has the power of government and
the flexibility/initiative of a private enterprise. The special purpose vehicle is also
responsible for facilitating the land bid invitation, auction, and listing system and
soliciting additional private capital investment. The establishment of the special
purpose vehicle is thus a reflection of institutional innovation. Besides the functions
mentioned earlier, the special purpose vehicle was also aimed at implementing the
government requirements to build public accessory facilities such as public
transportation. Thus, the three stakeholders facilitated the land bid invitation, auction,
and listing system together and promoted the preservation and appreciation of land
value.
Additionally, the municipal government has initiated institutional reform and
innovation to improve its role in the redevelopment process of the Olympic Sailing
Centre Business Circle. The purpose of this is to empower the force of the market by
optimizing the functions of government. The Administrative Examination and
Approval Bureau was established to reform the procedures for the approval of
projects. The Market Resource Allocation Office was established to facilitate the role
of private enterprises and social organizations, communicating up and down and
promoting the devolvement of the central government’s power. The purpose of this
office’s establishment is also to clarify the boundaries of government authority and
limit the role of government. These institutional innovations aim to give greater
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importance to the role of the market and support/complement the market by
improving the governmental system.
Therefore, the purpose of institutional innovation is also to transfer government
functions and foster social organizations. These two newly established institutions
have listened extensively to public opinions and held notarial meetings, reflecting one
of the rationales of top-design entrepreneurial urban governance: emphasizing the
importance of third-party opinions for significant decisions. This enables social
organizations to participate in government decision-making, encourage social
non-governmental organizations to participate in decision-making, and make
suggestions. This is in line with Stone’s (1989) viewpoint about progressive politics.
It would be inspiring and exciting to anticipate what kind of western-style progressive
politics could emerge in Chinese coastal cities. Linan revealed the truth of these types
of entrepreneurial urban governance: It is the way of market-oriented social regulation,
and its purpose is to integrate with the capitalist market economy. However, this is
contrary to Zhipeng’s opinion.
Other recent institutional innovation policies and results applications include: the
governmental departments’ change from administration-oriented to service-oriented.
They are changing from passive acceptance to active service, from closed
management to business synergy, strengthening information sharing, and achieving
cross-departmental business synergy. They are strengthening the construction of
institutional norms and guaranteeing the innovation of the service model. They are
improving performance evaluation and strengthening reform and innovation.
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Supported by the two documents given by Linan, Policy Interpretation and
Practice of the Reform of Regulation and Service in Shenzhen and Construction and
Practice of Business Environment in Shenzhen, these institutional innovations reflect
the ongoing trend of China’s reform at the municipal level. However, the real
implementation needs to be tested in practice.
5.3.2 The Developmental History of the State-owned Enterprises in the Development
Regime against the Neoliberal Backdrop (The Role of the State-owned Enterprise and
the Historical Development of the Market System)
Ziyin, as a project manager of Qingdao City Construction and Investment Group,
provided details about growth-coalition building in the Olympic Sailing Centre
project. Ziyin first introduced the historical development of the City Construction and
Investment Group (the state-owned development enterprise) and its pivotal role amid
the urban redevelopment projects.
The Dong’ao Group is the predecessor of the current Qingdao City Construction
and Investment Group, and the predecessor of the Dong’ao Group is Qingdao Eastern
Development Headquarter. The establishment of the Qingdao Eastern Development
Headquarter was an institutional innovation. The company was established to promote
the eastern development (eastward gentrification) strategy of Qingdao. When the
company was founded, the city public authority wanted to establish a special purpose
vehicle to separate the business function from the government’s administrative
function to finish the work in one department and provide a one-stop investment
attraction and promotion service.
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The driving force of the Qingdao Eastern Development Headquarter was fiscal
decentralization—the local government’s reliance on locally dependent tax revenues
when the central government retreated from local affairs in the 1980s. Lin et al. (2015)
take Guangzhou as an example. Since the 1980s, the Guangzhou municipal
government has been allowed and encouraged to innovate new methods of exploring
new ways of generating new tax bases. The downward urban construction
responsibilities from central government have enabled the Guangzhou municipal
government to keep their surplus profits after a lump-sum revenue remitted to the
central government. This central-state reshuffling mechanism has greatly encouraged
the Chinese municipal governments to be entrepreneurial and to tap into new financial
sources to generate revenues (Lin et al., 2015). As the controllers of land resources,
Chinese local governments participate in the trade of land resources as a method of
revenue-generating and consolidating power. Hence, to Chinese municipal
governments, the neoliberal downward power reshuffling also means “land-centred
politics” (Lin et al., 2015, p. 1966). Nevertheless, the central government’s retreat
also leaves Chinese municipal governments with heavy burdens of urban service,
medical care, education facilities, and retirement benefits (Lin et al., 2015). Fiscal
decentralization refers to the local growth coalition absorbing the devolved fiscal
power from central government to raise local revenues from their own resources and
become the main force for promoting local development (Peck & Tickell, 2002). He
and Wu (2009) explain that due to the stagflation and dilapidated urban infrastructure
caused by the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), Deng’s neoliberal reform introduced
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various forms of market-oriented restructuring and institutional innovation to
facilitate the local economic development of neoliberal cities. This process of change
is interpreted as the rescaling of state or “glocalization” (He & Wu, 2009, p. 285).
Glocalization (Hackworth, 2007) refers to the Chinese domestic market’s process of
gradually connecting to the global market. At the same time, decision-making powers
such as fiscal power are transferred down to the local government (Hackworth, 2007).
Amid this transition from a planned economy to a market-oriented economy, the
central government has faced two major tasks: (1) stimulating productivity at the
provincial/local level, and (2) transferring development pressure faced by the central
government to the local government (He & Wu, 2009). The central government
eventually adopted the tax-sharing system to replace the redistributive system—a
revenue-sharing system to tap into local fiscal resources, and this facilitates the
devolution of the central government’s fiscal power (He & Wu, 2009). Thus,
competitive local economies and local growth coalitions (formed by empowered local
government and private interests) were created to accelerate regional capital
accumulation as a result of this devolution of central power (Brenner, 1998; MacLeod
& Goodwin, 1999; Perreault & Martin, 2005). Under the tax-sharing system (fiscal
decentralization), local governments are able to control most of their revenue (He &
Wu, 2009). Furthermore, the municipalities gain substantial political power amid the
neoliberal state rescaling. According to He and Wu (2009), the City Planning Act in
1989 gives municipalities the power to assemble land resources and issue land-use
permits to achieve the control of land development. Consequently, the municipalities
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nowadays are capable of enacting regional land development policies to “exercise
power in the most effective way” (He & Wu, 2009, p. 302). Miraftab (2005) makes
clear that this fiscal decentralization reflects neoliberal entrepreneurial governance.
Under the ideological slogan of neoliberal reformation, the purpose of the
Qingdao municipal government’s entrepreneurial development of the eastern part of
the city was to expand the urban area and obtain huge revenues from the land
development as well as facilitate urban economic restructuring. Accordingly, the
Qingdao municipal governments started to formulate a growth coalition with the
semi-autonomous state-owned enterprises and private developers to extract value
from land development projects (Weber, 2002). The formation of the growth coalition
reflects the neoliberal localization of power (Hackworh, 2007). Neoliberal urban
governance therefore requires the cooperation of an organized relationship between
the local state and capital to undertake the central state’s devolved power (Hackworth,
2007). Hackworth (2007) also states that the capital and local state work together to
undertake the devolved power from central government, and the local government
uses the land-use zoning power to protect the interests of real estate elites. The local
development regime is made up of real estate elites, and city hall is the organizational
form of PPP. Together, they undertake the neoliberal centralized power devolution
(Hackworth, 2007). The municipal government began to enjoy greater autonomy in
the aspects of land use and fiscal responsibility. Local governments across China got
more freedom to allocate resources and stimulate local economic development (He &
Wu, 2009). And the local governments are behaving more businesslike (He &Wu,
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2009). In addition, David Harvey (1989) argues that the entrepreneurial cities in
China are facilitated by fiscal devolution, which is to say that fiscal decentralization
gives local governments more decision-making power conducive to facilitating the
entrepreneurial government (He &Wu, 2009). The municipalities across China
function as sellers to promote their cities (He &Wu, 2009), furthering the central
government’s divestment in local urban-development projects.
5.3.3. History of Market System and Development Regime in Qingdao
By 1998, Qingdao’s eastern development task had been completed. According to
the Qingdao City Situation (2000), in the year 2000, the total value of city
construction in Qingdao was 7.5 billion yuan (1.5 billion CDN). Among them, 2.4
billion yuan (0.48 billion CDN) was public investment. City hall’s appropriation
significantly leverages the private investment to conduct construction projects across
the city. The major public investment projects include widening the city’s major trunk
road, Hong Kong Road, and the construction of several major urban overpasses. For
example, the public squares (May 4th Square) near Olympic Sailing Centre were also
constructed at this time. Meanwhile, many municipal supporting projects also started
in 2000 as part of the city’s eastern development initiative (QDSQ, 2000).
To be specific, the real estate sector’s total value was 6.5 billion yuan (1.3 billion
CDN), and the annual growth rate in 2000 was 28.1 percent, compared with the
previous year (QDSQ, 2000). Additionally, the actual sales area of commercial
housing in the city was 2.588 million square metres, the annual growth rate was 30.2
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percent, and the area of commercial housing purchased by individuals reached 2.214
million square metres, an increase of 87 percent (QDSQ, 2000). Thus, the municipal
government’s fiscal situation was ample, because the above financial return of the
construction (real estate) sector dramatically supported the local land finance.
Accordingly, city hall has promoted the Chinese version of property-led economic
development, and the municipal government is more capable of making deals and
initiating land development projects.
The Olympic Sailing Centre has been used by the local growth coalition as a
flagship project to compete with other cities. Sassen (2009) elaborates that the
rebuilding of central cities (or any areas in the cities) is used as whitewash strategies
to attract globalized activities and flows to make cities invincible in interurban
competition. As Theodore and Brenner (2002) reveal, cities have become the place
where neoliberal institutional innovation and experiments occur as platforms for
economic development and market competition. The Chinese local growth coalition
makes huge profits from property-led economic redevelopment through local
boosterism and place promotion (He & Wu, 2009). The governing coalitions facilitate
capital accumulation through conducting urban redevelopment projects (He &Wu,
2009). He and Wu (2009) state further that interurban competition now appears in
China: the process of urban redevelopment is closely related to the cities’ place in the
urban hierarchy. Sassen (1991) explains that one result of this neoliberal city
governance is the growing global competition among centres for hypermobile
financial activities. And Keil (2009) illustrates that a competitive city amid the
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interurban competition is characterized by entrepreneurial urban governance.
According to Short (1999), the decentralized governmental system gives local
governments much more opportunity to facilitate place promotion and local
boosterism. In the same vein, fiscal decentralization saves Chinese municipalities
from financial constraints on place promotion.
Additionally, there have been a series of institutional changes since the 1980s
reform. The newly emerged Chinese real estate market and the housing reform have
brought the upsurge of people’s investment in inner-city properties. The land-leasing
system reform and privatization of housing led to the birth of the real estate market in
Chinese cities. Many state-owned enterprises and private developers have participated
in this investment boom. The land-leasing reform allows land-use rights to be traded
in the market, but the state still retains ownership of the land, thus, generating great
wealth through the trading of lands becomes possible. Subsequently, property-led
economic development has dramatically transformed the Chinese urban landscape.
In 2001, when Beijing won the bid for the 2008 Olympic Games, the Qingdao
Eastern Development Headquarter consequently became the Dong’ao (it means “East
Olympic” in Chinese) Group. And this reflects institutional innovation because the
business function has been completely separated from the municipal government’s
administrative function. The Dong’ao Group was under complete market operation,
which is conducive to the Qingdao municipal government’s pursuit of locally
dependent tax revenues. At the same time, with the nationwide separation of business
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and administrative functions and the lower manufacturing profits after the reform, a
large number of state-owned enterprises, which used to be governmental departments,
have entered the real estate market to seek higher profits in many Chinese cities.
During the Olympic Sailing Centre development process, the Qingdao municipal
government assigned all the free lands to the Dong’ao Group as subsidies and
favourable policy support. The Dong’ao Group thus monopolized the primary land
market of the original sites of the Olympic Sailing Centre. Consequently, the Dong’ao
Group could raise the land price of the Olympic Sailing Centre’s plots in the
secondary land market through an auction, which was also to ensure a transparent and
open transaction. Then the Dong’ao Group resold the plots of the Olympic Sailing
Centre to the Taishan Real Estate Group and the Hisense Group, the private
developers specializing in the development of the plots. In this way, the Dong’ao
Group contributed a lot of revenues of land development and social welfare to the
Qingdao municipal government. Therefore, the state-owned enterprise, not private
developers, is the primary propeller of the urban redevelopment project in the case of
the Olympic Sailing Centre project.
5.3.4. Final Evaluation: The Characteristics and Dynamics of the Growth Coalition
and to Answer the Research Question of How the Growth Coalition is Formed
This section’s main goal is to conduct the final analysis of the features of the
growth coalition in the case of the Olympic Sailing Centre and to answer the research
question of how the growth coalition is formed.
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To compare with the growth machine system in the U.S., it is the private sector
that has ample resources and offers selective incentives or small opportunities to
formulate a cohesive growth coalition. Thus, the private sector in the U.S. is the most
important stakeholder in urban renewal schemes (Stone, 1989). In contrast, in China,
it is the municipal government that provides the free lands as subsidies to the
state-owned development enterprises, leading to their monopolies of development
lands. In summary, to compare the two types of mechanisms of growth machines, the
growth coalition in the U.S. mainly pursues the commercial interests of private
enterprises (Logan & Molotch, 1987), while the Chinese growth coalition is
dominated by the municipal government who seeks the local economic development
to manifest the political performance of government officials in the public authority.
Moreover, the Chinese private developers, the Taishan Real Estate Group and the
Hisense Group, did not have a voice in the redevelopments’ decision-making process
because of their lack of land resources. In the Chinese context, the state has control of
urban redevelopment because it possesses land resources (He & Wu, 2009). The state
creates the condition for urban redevelopment projects but functions as a pacesetter to
regulate the projects’ disruptive effects (He & Wu, 2009). Nevertheless, the state’s
goal is to maximize the accumulation of the development regime’s wealth (He & Wu,
2009).
In the west, the ownership of productive assets is in the private sector. And
municipal governments are elected by the public constituents. The growth coalition,
made up of city hall and private sector, functions as an informal arrangement that
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complements the public authority and implements city development initiatives (Logan
& Molotch, 1987). However, the situation under the Chinese context is different.
There is no distinct division between public and private in the Chinese transitional
economy. And the state-owned development enterprises have deep ties with the
government because they used to be the public authorities’ business branches. Thus,
the Chinese state-owned enterprises are the interfaces between the governmental
authorities and the private sectors. Moreover, the Chinese state-owned enterprises,
private developers, and public authorities work together as a growth coalition to
promote urban redevelopments. As the municipal governments are in charge of the
land resources in the primary land market, they play a leading role in urban land
redevelopment. And the Chinese municipal governments function as the public arm
for private developers. In the case of the Olympic Sailing Centre redevelopment
project, the Taishan Real Estate Group and the Hisense Group maximized their profit
by developing Plots 28, 29, 30, and 31 into luxury residential and commercial land
use, while the Qingdao municipal government adopted a laissez-faire strategy by
assigning the free lands to the Dong’ao Group and letting the state-owned enterprise
resell the lands to the two private developers for further development.
Ziyin illustrated that the local land-based development is an essential criterion of
political performance for municipal government officials. As a result, the Chinese
municipal government officials have incentives to mobilize all available resources to
promote urban redevelopment projects such as the Qingdao Olympic Sailing Centre
redevelopment scheme. The Qingdao urban growth machine has also become more
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dynamic due to its close connections with the Qingdao municipal government. The
efficient implementation of the Olympic Sailing Centre project is closely related to
the municipal government’s support. With its support, the growth coalitions in
Chinese cities are capable of vigorously promoting urban development and
construction. Nevertheless, He and Wu’s (2009) research is contrary to the analysis
above. He and Wu (2009) illustrate that in Shanghai, where the market system is most
developed in China, private enterprises with ample capital resources and impelling
capacity to accumulate capability act as the primary participators (principal investors
and developers) in urban redevelopment initiatives. I think it is true that the situation
in Shanghai is more like in the U.S. The private real estate developers who possess
slack resources can mobilize resources and function as the primary players amid the
redevelopment initiatives (Stone, 1989). However, in second-tier Chinese cities such
as Qingdao, the local government, as the land provider, and the state-owned
development enterprise, as the land resource monopolist of the primary land market,
still play the most important roles.
In a nutshell, the Chinese growth machine system (such as the case of Qingdao)
has been stimulated by the fiscal decentralization/devolution that gives municipalities
new autonomy. What is more, the birth of the market economy, the establishment of
the real estate market after the 1980s reform, and the huge land-based profits
generated by property investment all lead to the birth of Chinese growth coalitions.
Together, the growth coalitions bring a new urban landscape and economic growth. In
turn, local economic development is the motivation for the local government,
271
state-owned enterprises, and the private sector to form a growth coalition. Chinese
urban renewal is relatively successful, compared with urban renewal in the U.S.,
because the central Chinese cities are still the economic growth engines of the
national economy that can attract the agricultural population. Furthermore, there are
always expanding economic activities in Chinese cities, which lead to high demand
for housing construction, infrastructure, and labour.
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6. Conclusion and Reflection
The relocation of Beihai Shipyard reflects the transformation from a Keynesian
industrial landscape to the neoliberal post-industrial waterfront.
Moreover, the newly developed off-budget financial instruments and entrepreneurial
urban governance pursued by the Qingdao municipal government have manifested
that the Chinese municipal governments are increasingly businesslike. This fiscal
transformation and ideological shift have been reflected by the change of industrial
structure, unfolding how the city transforms itself spatially.
Since the interviewees are unpaid, it is possible that the volunteering interviewees
provided inaccurate data because they were considering the purpose of their
organization and had preconceptions, and this could contribute different definition of
concepts to the interview results. If the interviewees are unpaid, this may increase the
possibility that they are not serious about the answers they provide; thus they would
choose a “safe” line of discourse that conforms to the official, rather than the
objective view I seek. For example, Zhipeng Li denied that the Chinese planned
economy before the 1980s represented one type of Keynesian welfare state ideology.
He also denied that the current entrepreneurial urban governance is the manifestation
of neoliberalism. In contrast, when I interviewed Linan Tian, she directly revealed
that the nature of the top-design of entrepreneurial urban governance is learning from
western experiences.
I think the real insight into why Zhipeng said that was due to his position. As the
deputy director of the City Planning Bureau, he had to consider the Chinese
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authorities’ ideological statements. From Zhipeng’s response, I can learn that the
Chinese government is pursuing western neoliberal city governance strategies in the
name of socialist urban governance with Chinese characteristics. In terms of external
propaganda, they still call it “serving the people, giving priority to the people,” which
is why Zhipeng disliked the term entrepreneurial. And this is also why, according to
He and Wu (2009), the trend of neoliberalism is a hidden process in China rather than
straightforward. However, in reality, the Olympic Sailing Centre project resulted from
the development and construction of significant government and capital participation,
and it only reflects the governing coalition’s dominance over people. The Olympic
Sailing Centre project represents the municipal government’s interests, the capital of
large state-owned enterprises, and the private developers. The funds and loans
underpinning the Olympic Sailing Centre project were all backed by government
support.
In contrast, when Director Linan Tian directly revealed the essence of the
top-design (designed by high-level central government and implemented by the
municipal government) of entrepreneurial urban governance, she did so because I had
established mutual trust with her through the interview. And I think this is why
Zhipeng and her have different opinions. In order to help me understand Chinese
entrepreneurial urban governance, Linan explicitly explained that it was learning from
western experiences. She elucidated the experience of the cadres from the Bureaus of
Urban Planning, who learned these top-designed social organization strategies mainly
through regular meetings. At the same time, the government department organized
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trips to other regions (Shenzhen, for example) to learn from these cities’ advanced
experiences on urban governance. Director Linan also introduced me to how the
municipal government, private sector, and state-owned enterprise function together as
a growth coalition to carry out governing decisions. She unveiled that the growth
coalition was cohesive and capable of initiating large-scale redevelopment projects.
I can learn from the interview with Director Linan Tian that the main thing
keeping the Olympic Sailing Centre growth coalition together is that they share the
same interests of redeveloping the Olympic Sailing Centre Business Circle. And the
things that drive and motivate the coalition to form resultant force are maintaining and
increasing the value of state-owned assets. This is what I have been told regarding the
goals of the growth coalition’s formation. However, I think this is because the high
profits of land development drive the three parties to cooperate. The three
stakeholders’ common interests are to extract value from the property-led economic
development and sustain the land finance—the most important common interest
between the stakeholders of the growth coalitions. Land finance refers to the concept
of local government acquiring financial revenue through land development. In
contrast to the U.S. urban regime mechanism, Chinese municipal governments offer
“small opportunities (free lands)” to enhance the growth coalition’s cohesion.
Therefore, the redevelopment coalition of the Qingdao Olympic Sailing Centre is
effective because of close ties between the state-owned enterprises and the municipal
government to carry out potent management decisions. Because of the development
coalition’s effectiveness, the Qingdao Olympic Sailing Centre’s development
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coalition could afford to launch an overall reconstruction to rebuild the original site of
Beihai Shipyard and construct the new Olympic Sailing Centre, including the
convention centre, hotels, a museum, marina, and restaurants.
It is very similar to the dynamics of U.S. land development in the 1950s. Title 1
of the Housing Act of 1949 authorized the municipal government to use eminent
domain to seize the lands. After the lands were aggregated and prepared, the
municipal government resold the land to private developers at a good price. The
Qingdao urban regime is not so much the same as the pre-1970s Keynesian urban
regime in the U.S. as an interface between neostatism and neocorporatism. Back to
the situation in China, the private developers are in charge of reconstructing the
demolished areas. So the Chinese municipal governments function as the public arm
of private capitalists (Levine, 1989) to help real estate developers enhance the value
of their property investments (secure and promote real estate developers’ interests)
amid the waterfront initiatives.
Implicit in the information that Zhipeng Li provided is that the growth coalition’s
strength is enormous. As the growth coalition develops cities, it is also transforming
the built environment. The municipal government and state-owned enterprises worked
together to relocate city hall to the Fushan Bay area (as an anchor institution). They
redeveloped the whole area to be the hub of the city’s skyscrapers, which greatly
facilitates the eastern part of the city’s spatial transformation. However, these
disruptive effects will negatively impact the surrounding neighbourhoods and trigger
opposition from residents. Nevertheless, the growth coalitions are allied with national
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and local capital, and it is effortless for them to thwart local opposition. The Qingdao
Olympic Sailing Centre, the Fushan Bay waterfront, has become the arena of
transformation to a post-industrial city. Neoliberal city governance policies have been
adopted to facilitate urban transformation. Accordingly, the city has been considered
the space of neoliberalism because large-scale long-lasting urban redevelopment
projects benefit the urban growth coalitions centred by municipal governments,
state-owned development enterprises, and private developers. Many waterfronts in
Chinese port cities have therefore become the arenas of neoliberal policies and
institutional restructuring.
In addition, the interview with Yanjie Li reveals that the relocation of Beihai
Shipyard reflects the transformation from a Keynesian industrial landscape to a
post-industrial waterfront. Amid this spatial transformation, white-collar
service-oriented jobs have replaced the blue-collar industrial jobs, and I believe this
means that post-industrial ideology has replaced Fordism ideology, and the original
Keynesian-Fordist development regime has been undermined by the new
development coalition. We know that New York, under the Bloomberg administration,
adopted a balanced waterfront redevelopment strategy that would not ignore the
maritime industry that preserves blue-collar jobs. But unlike their counterpart in New
York, the Qingdao redevelopment authorities did not adopt a balanced redevelopment
strategy: the service-oriented white-collar jobs completely replaced the industrial
manufacturing jobs on the waterfront. Moreover, polluted, hard, and industrial
harbour activities have changed to post-industrial activities. From my conversation
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with Yanjie, I can see that economic restructuring has happened on the waterfront,
and the change of industrial structure has reflected this transformation. The relocation
of Beihai Shipyard and the eastward relocation of city hall, combined with the real
estate development of the Fushan Bay area, reveal how the city transforms itself
spatially.
In retrospect, the waterfront redevelopment project in Qingdao has been used as
the flagship project for interurban competition amid this campaign of neoliberal city
redevelopment. The Chinese waterfront redevelopment projects are parts of the
territorial ideologies that emphasize unities of interests, ignoring the class factors. I
developed these arguments from the existing knowledge base on post-industrial urban
development theories, neoliberal theories, urban regime theory/growth machine
theory, and the literature on off-budget financial instruments that facilitate urban
redevelopment projects. I also extensively examined the case study’s geographical
region—the Shinan District in Qingdao city—to lay the social background for where
my story of waterfront redevelopment happened.
Building upon these theoretical underpinnings, I conducted empirical case studies
on Zhongshan Road Commercial Street and Olympic Sailing Centre projects and six
interviews to collect my materials and illustrate my own arguments. This is how I
developed my viewpoints based on literature reviews and theoretical discussions.
I personally agree that the current Chinese model of social regulation is
intrinsically neoliberal entrepreneurial urban governance, and that the urban
redevelopment coalitions centred by municipal governments and state-owned
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development enterprises are powerful in terms of initiating and propelling waterfront
redevelopment projects in Chinese port cities. However, I disagree with the viewpoint
that the current urban redevelopment model in Chinese cities is to “serve the people”
and ensure “the appreciation of state assets.” In summary, I disagree with Paul
Peterson’s idea that growth is for the well-being of all citizens. Putting it in the
Chinese context, I disagree with the communist bureaucrat’s embellishment of
socialism urban management with Chinese characteristics.
My study is unique because it expands the post-industrial waterfront
redevelopment stories, the urban regime theory/growth machine theory, the neoliberal
theories, and off-budget financial instruments empirical cases from the North
American context. And I apply these western social theories into the Chinese port
context, where the market system is emerging relatively and social/economic/political
backgrounds are very different. Moreover, the uniqueness of the redevelopment story
(Qingdao Olympic Sailing Centre) can serve as a good reference benchmark for future
similar studies associated with the redevelopment projects in Chinese port cities. I
believe my analysis of the social dynamics of Chinese societies regarding relocation
and the shifting of urban centres could be valuable to any future study associated with
urban redevelopment stories from Chinese cities.
What is more, how the Chinese urban growth coalitions conduct city
redevelopment projects in an entrepreneurial way through mobilizing land resources
to avoid the constrain of conventional budget public financing has been missing in
past literature. Therefore, the discussion about the financing of the waterfront
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redevelopment projects in the second-tier Chinese port cities contributes to filling the
literature gap of how the Chinese second-tier towns conduct great-mega projects
through off-budget financial instruments.
Generally speaking, one of the major limitations of the study is that the scale of
the empirical case is narrow. This study only considers Qingdao as the case-study city
and tries to generate the universal rule for the waterfront redevelopment projects.
Therefore, I believe that the next researchers could expand the number of study cities
to generate a universal rule for waterfront redevelopment projects across Chinese
ports. For example, future researchers could study more Chinese port cities and more
waterfront redevelopment sites if they are financially prepared and have enough time.
Future researchers could also conduct empirical studies by choosing study cities that
are completely different or contrary to the situation of Qingdao. Hence, what this
study lacks is contrast. Future studies could further extend the study focus beyond the
contexts of Chinese port cities. It would be interesting to see how inland capital cities
or other hub cities initiate great mega projects to facilitate urban redevelopment
projects and propel the campaign to promote their cities’ reputations. Consequently,
the North American urban regime theory/machine theory could have a more profound
application in Chinese cities under the Chinese contexts. And the impact and conflict
of applying North American-style coalition building into the Chinese context must be
fierce, just like the historical experiences of applying any western ideologies into the
foreign contexts of different cultures. In other words, one of the limitations of this
study is that the conflict caused by the collision between North American theoretical
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ideas and the social background of China is not very sharp, and it fails to stir up
waves of ideological collision.
All in all, capitalism all over the world is the same to some extent, but to another
extent, they are totally different because of the different cultural backgrounds of
different countries. I think future researchers should be more able to reflect the beauty
of this difference by deliberately intensifying contradictions.
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